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If you’re unable to stay ahead of a potential disaster as it unfolds, you’ll be stuck in a 
reactive mode. You’ll become a victim of circumstances rather than a master of your own 
destiny. (Watkins and Bazerman 2003) 
 
 
But, as we look to the horizon of a decade hence, we see no silver bullet. There is no 
single development, in either technology or in management technique, that by itself 
promises even one order-of-magnitude improvement in productivity, in reliability, in 
simplicity. (Brooks 1987) 
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Abstract 
 
Offshore outsourcing of IT services to low-cost countries such as India and China has 
experienced tremendous growth since the 1990s; this trend is expected to continue in the 
near future. Among IT services, software development – because of high information 
intensity and little need for customer and physical presence – is one of the ideal 
candidates for outsourcing to offshore countries. However, software projects are 
notoriously difficult to manage even in conditions of co-location. Despite the risks 
inherent in offshore-outsourced software development (OOSD) projects, organizations 
in high-cost countries have come to rely increasingly on offshore outsourcing to meet 
their software development needs. 
 
Software projects continue to fail despite the accumulation of knowledge over the past 
decades. In team-oriented activities such as software projects, a team-level study is the 
key to understanding failures. Using the grounded theory methodology, we explored 19 
project cases of OOSD failures from the team perspective, examining both the client and 
the vendor sides. Project managers engaged in OOSD projects from multi-national 
corporations in India and Switzerland served as the key informants of this research. This 
research allowed us to develop exploratory insights regarding OOSD project failures, 
particularly regarding how indications of failure manifest themselves in the early project 
stages.   
 
We analyzed failed OOSD projects with particular attention to the team level. Based on 
the unique team-level aspects that emerged from our study, we formulated theoretical 
propositions to emphasize the integration of the teams involved – client onshore, vendor 
onshore and vendor offshore teams – into a single project team. Our research 
emphasizes the importance of team members’ shared understanding of the organizational 
and professional cultures of onshore and offshore teams. In particular, we found that the 
integration of organizational work practices within the project team is of crucial 
importance in avoiding project failures. 
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In order to understand the dynamics of project teams during early project stages, and to 
offer project managers a predictive tool to avoid failures in OOSD projects, we studied 
the early warning signs (EWS) of failure, a project management tool that aids in the 
detection of project issues in advance. We identified six categories of EWSs of failure 
relevant to the onshore-offshore project environment. While the literature generally 
emphasizes the interaction between client and vendor teams, our work found the 
interactions between the vendor onshore and vendor offshore teams to be equally 
relevant to avoiding project failures. We further distinguished the EWSs of failure into 
early signals – concrete indications that are more easily noticed by project managers – and 
the early warning issues with which the early signals are associated. We then developed an 
exploratory model of OOSD project failures that incorporates the EWSs of failure in an 
effort to understand the failure process, particularly in the early project stages.  
 
Our analysis regarding the perception and management of EWSs of failure by project 
managers resulted in a model that consists of four management stages among clients and 
vendors – monitoring for EWSs, detection of EWSs, acknowledging issues, and 
addressing issues. Each stage of EWS management was found to be increasingly difficult 
to reach. We identified the reasons why managing issues failed in each particular stage, 
and found that the lack of adequate onshore-offshore project experience was of 
particular significance in the failure to detect and act upon EWSs.   
 
Our exploratory research contributes to the research literature on IS failure and IT 
outsourcing, taking a topic that has been the focus of few empirical studies – project 
failure – and shedding light on the issues and contexts that lead to failures in offshore 
outsourcing projects that involve various organizations on different continents. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Das Offshore-Outsourcing von IT-Dienstleistungen in günstige Länder wie Indien und 
China hat seit den 1990er Jahren ein enormes Wachstum erlebt. Diese Entwicklung wird 
sich voraussichtlich in naher Zukunft fortsetzen. Aufgrund der hohen 
Informationsintensität und der geringen Notwendigkeit von Tätigkeiten vor Ort sowie 
der Kundenpräsens, ist die Software-Entwicklung unter den IT-Dienstleistungen ein 
idealer Kandidat für das Offshore Outsourcing. Allerdings sind Software-Projekte, sogar 
wenn sie am gleichen Ort durchgeführt werden, für ihre schwierige Führung berüchtigt. 
Trotz der inhärenten Risiken von Software-Outsourcing-Projekten in Offshore-Länder 
(Offshore-outsourced software development auf Englisch; abgekürzt OOSD) verwenden 
Organisationen aus lohnintensiven Ländern zunehmend das Offshore-Outsourcing, um 
ihren Software-Entwicklungsbedarf abzudecken. 
 
Software-Projekte scheitern immer wieder, trotz des Wissenszuwachs in den letzten 
Jahrzehnten. Bei Team-basierten Tätigkeiten, wie es Software-Projekte sind,  liegt der 
Schlüssel zum Verständnis der Misserfolge in einer Untersuchung auf Team-Ebene. Wir 
haben 19 Projekte, die als OOSD-Misserfolge gelten, aus der Team-Perspektive heraus 
untersucht und haben dazu als Methode die Grounded Theory verwendet, um sowohl die 
Kunden- als auch die Anbieterseite zu analysieren. Als Primärquellen dieser 
Forschungsarbeit haben Projektleiter multinationaler Organisationen aus Indien und der 
Schweiz, die in OOSD-Projekte involviert waren, fungiert. Dieser explorative 
Forschungsansatz hat das Gewinnen von Erkenntnissen über OOSD-Projekt-Misserfolge 
ermöglicht, insbesondere von Indikatoren für Misserfolge, die sich bereits in frühen 
Projektphasen manifestieren.   
 
Wir haben fehlgeschlagene OOSD-Projekte analysiert und haben uns dabei besonders 
auf die Team-Ebene fokussiert. Wir haben einzigartige Aspekte auf der Team-Ebene 
diagnostiziert und auf dieser Basis theoretische Annahmen formuliert,  die die Integration 
der involvierten Teams (Kunden-Onshore-, Anbieter-Onshore- und Anbieter-Offshore-
Team) zu einem einzigen Projekt-Team begünstigen. Unsere Forschungsergebnisse 
zeigen, dass ein gemeinsames Verständnis aller Team-Mitglieder über die 
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organisatorischen und beruflichen Kulturen der Onshore- und Offshore-Teams wichtig 
ist. Eine Haupterkenntnis war, dass die Integration der organisatorischen 
Arbeitspraktiken innerhalb des Projektteams von entscheidender Bedeutung ist, um 
Projektmisserfolge zu vermeiden.   
 
Um die Dynamik von Projektteams in den frühen Projektphasen zu verstehen und um 
den Projektmanagern ein Prognose-Werkzeug zur Vermeidung von Misserfolgen in 
OOSD-Projekten bereitzustellen, wurden in dieser Arbeit frühe Warnindikatoren (early 
warning signs auf Englisch; abgekürzt EWS) für Misserfolge analysiert. Die EWS haben 
als Projektmanagement-Werkzeug die Identifikation von zukünftigen Problemen 
unterstützt. Wir haben sechs Kategorien von EWS für Misserfolge, die im Umfeld der 
OOSD-Projekte relevant sind, identifiziert. Während in der Literatur im Allgemeinen die 
Interaktion zwischen Kunden- und Anbieter-Teams betont wird, haben sich in unserer 
Arbeit die Interaktionen zwischen den Anbieter-Onshore-Teams und den Anbieter-
Offshore-Teams als ebenso relevant für die Vermeidung von Projekt-Misserfolgen 
herausgestellt. Wir haben dann die EWS für Misserfolge in zwei Arten unterteilt: Die 
erste Art sind die Early Signals, die konkrete Hinweise darstellen, die für die Projektleiter 
wahrnehmbar sind. Die zweite Art sind die Early Warning Issues, die mit den Early 
Signals verbunden sind. Anschliessend haben wir ein exploratives Modell für OOSD-
Projekt-Misserfolge entwickelt, welches die EWS für  Misserfolge einbezieht, um den 
Prozess des Scheiterns, besonders in den frühen Projektphasen, zu verstehen. 
 
Als Ergebnis unserer Analyse bezüglich der Wahrnehmung und dem Management von 
EWS für Misserfolge haben wir ein Modell mit vier Management-Phasen bezogen auf die 
Kunden und Anbieter erstellt. Die vier Phasen heissen: EWS überwachen, EWS 
erkennen, Probleme als solche (an-)erkennen und Probleme behandeln. Jede weitere 
Phase des EWS-Managements wurde als zunehmend schwieriger zu erreichen 
empfunden.  Wir haben die Gründe identifiziert, warum das Managen der Probleme in 
jeder Phase scheiterte. Um zu verstehen, warum die EWS nicht erkannt und behandelt 
worden waren, hat sich das Fehlen adäquater Erfahrungen im Umfeld von Onshore-
Offshore-Projekten als besonders bedeutend erwiesen.  
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Unsere explorative Forschung leistet einen Beitrag zur Literatur in den Bereichen von IS-
Misserfolgen und IT-Outsourcing. Wir haben die Thematik von Projekt-Misserfolgen in 
der vorliegenden Arbeit behandelt, worüber es bis jetzt nur wenige empirische Studien  
gab. Zudem haben wir die Probleme und die verschiedenen Kontexte des Offshore-
Outsourcing beleuchtet, die in vielen Organisationen auf verschiedenen Kontinenten zu 
Projekt-Misserfolgen führen. Dadurch haben wir Misserfolge im Offshore-Outsourcing 
besser verstanden.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Research context  
 
Information technology (IT) outsourcing1 has been prevalent since the 1960s, when 
organizations began to rely on external vendors for financial and operational computing 
(Lee et al. 2003). One of the landmark agreements in IT outsourcing history was signed 
in 1963, when EDS took over the data processing department of Blue Cross in 
Pennsylvania, USA (Dibbern et al. 2004). Although the quarter century that followed saw 
many organizations outsource their IT activities, it was not until Kodak signed its USD 1 
billion deal with IBM, DEC and Businessland in 1989 that organizations truly realized the 
potential of concentrating on organizational core competencies and took a widespread 
interest in outsourcing (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Hirschheim and Dibbern 2002). The 
global outsourcing business, which was worth USD 10 billion in 1989, had by 2010 
reached a global market of USD 450 billion, out of which global IT outsourcing was 
worth USD 270 billion (Willcocks, Cullen and Craig 2010). IT outsourcing is expected to 
grow further in the near future, to the tune of 5-8 percent annually (Willcocks, Cullen and 
Craig 2010). 
The globalization of the software industry has resulted in the growth of IT offshoring 
(Aspray, Mayadas and Vardi 2006).  This trend of transferring IT activities from high-
wage countries to low-wage countries like China and India has been promoted by cost 
arbitrage (Sahay, Nicholson and Krishna 2003; Dibbern, Winkler and Heinzl 2008), the 
availability of qualified workers (e.g., Heeks et al. 2001; Sarker and Sahay 2003), and the 
improved information and communication technology infrastructure (e.g., Walsham 
2002; Hinds, Liu and Lyon 2011). Beulen, Ribbers and Roos (2006, p. 207) define IT 
offshoring as “the transfer of IT service delivery responsibility to a provider operating 
from a continent different from the recipient.” There are two major forms of offshoring: 
captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing.  Captive offshoring refers to the delivery of 
IT services by an in-house organization located in an offshore country like India, while 
offshore outsourcing refers to outsourcing from a third-party organization in an offshore 
                                              
1 Hirschheim and Dibbern (2006, p. 3) define outsourcing as “making arrangements with an 
external entity for the provision of goods and services to supplement or replace internal efforts.” 
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country (Aspray, Mayadas and Vardi 2006). The latter form is associated with more risks 
since the client organizations are less able to exercise control over the project execution. 
Despite the inherent risks involved in IT offshoring (King and Torkzadeh 2008), 
offshore outsourcing has grown steadily: in 2010, the revenues surpassed USD 60 billion 
(Willcocks, Cullen and Craig 2010). IT offshore outsourcing is expected to grow faster 
than overall IT outsourcing, with some predictions expecting even double-digit growth in 
the near future (Willcocks, Cullen and Craig 2010). Notwithstanding the growth rates in 
IT offshoring, several studies have reported the failure of offshoring engagements to 
bring in the expected benefits for outsourcing organizations in terms of project 
objectives (e.g., Vashistha and Vashistha 2005; Rottman and Lacity 2008).  
 
Several models of IT outsourcing have emerged over the years, and one can classify 
outsourcing according to different criteria, including the degree of outsourcing, the 
ownership structure, or location of services. The degree of IT outsourcing in 
organizations can range from total to selective to none (Dibbern et al. 2004). Services 
commonly outsourced include business process outsourcing, software development, and 
IT infrastructure (Wiener 2006). Oshri, Kotlarsky and Willcocks (2011) provide an 
overview of outsourcing models organized by ownership and location (figure 1). 
Ownership structures in IT outsourcing engagements can include third-party 
organizations, joint ventures between vendor and client, and in-house development or 
services of the client. As for location, outsourcing services can be located in the same 
country as the client (onshore), in a neighboring country (nearshore), or in a far-off 
country on a different continent (offshore). 
 
Among commonly outsourced services, software or application development appears 
particularly ideal for global disaggregation because its key characteristics include e.g. high 
information intensity and low need for customer and physical presence (Apte and Mason 
1995). In the software industry, geographically distributed software projects have even 
emerged as the norm (Damian and Moitra 2006). However, software development 
projects have been difficult to manage “even in conditions of co-location and proximity” 
(Sahay, Nicholson and Krishna 2003, p. 245). This is due to the inherent complexities in 
project management (Brooks 1995) and to uncertainties around the project from the  
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Figure 1: Overview of outsourcing models (adapted from Oshri, Kotlarsky and 
Willcocks 2011, p. 26) 
 
outset (Hoch et al. 2000). Further, offshore outsourced software development (OOSD) 
projects are more prone to failure than domestically outsourced or in-house development 
projects (Iacovou and Nakatsu 2008). Widely cited offshore-specific risks that make 
OOSD projects more susceptible to failure include language differences (e.g., Dibbern, 
Winkler and Heinzl 2008), time-zone differences (e.g., Hinds, Liu and Lyon 2011), 
cultural differences (e.g., Krishna, Sahay and Walsham 2004), geographic distance (e.g., 
Carmel and Agarwal 2001), communication and coordination challenges (e.g., Heeks et al. 
2001; Narayanaswamy and Henry 2005) and knowledge transfer complexities (e.g., Sahay, 
Nicholson and Krishna 2003). As a result of these inherent risks, managing OOSD 
projects requires additional governance (Beulen, Ribbers and Roos 2006); nevertheless, 
the cost savings from offshore projects make them attractive for organizations. 
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Despite the body of knowledge accumulated over the last decades, software projects 
continue to fail (Sauer 1993). In terms of failure criteria measured by original timeline, 
budget, and functionalities, most software projects can be termed failures rather than 
successes (Standish 1995; Standish 2004; McManus and Wood-Harper 2007). In addition, 
it seems that most project managers have experienced one or more failures, as was 
revealed in a study by RONIN, a high-tech research group (cited in Hoch et al. 2000, p. 
161). That study interviewed 500 IT managers from the United States and United 
Kingdom, 76 percent of whom admitted to having experienced at least one complete 
project failure in their career and nearly 50 percent of whom remarked that it would be 
“alien” to most vendors to achieve success on the first try. There have been several 
academic studies on IT outsourcing failures resulting in project abandonments and 
contract cancellations (e.g., Oz 1994; Keil 1995; Keil, Mann and Rai 2000). Further 
examinations of failed offshore projects (failed in terms of failing to achieve objectives) 
include Aron and Singh (2005) and Rottman and Lacity (2008). There have also been 
several practitioner-oriented studies, in which offshoring was found to have failed to 
reduce IT costs (e.g., Hatch 2005; Vashistha and Vashistha 2005; Carter 2006).  However, 
there have been few academic studies dealing with OOSD project cancellations.  
 
The concept of failure itself has been defined in numerous ways (cf. section 2.1). In this 
thesis, we will concentrate on abandoned (Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 1991) or 
impaired projects (Standish 1995), which count among the most extreme types of project 
failures. Project failure is defined as the cancellation of the project, resulting in termination 
of contractual activities between clients and vendors prematurely, i.e., before the 
information system becomes operational. This includes projects that were abandoned or 
insourced because of the vendor’s inability to implement the information system. This 
thesis also defines as failures projects in which the vendor was replaced, the offshore 
activities were stopped, or the project was cancelled at any project phase. 
 
Hinds, Liu and Lyon (2011, p. 138) view globally distributed teams as “serving as an 
important vehicle of global work.” Our preliminary research into offshore project failures 
(Philip, Schwabe and Ewusi-Mensah 2009; Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010) has 
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indicated that team-level collaboration between onshore and offshore teams from the 
client and vendor sides plays the primary role in the project outcome. Team-level 
communication and coordination have emerged as critical issues in avoiding project 
failures. Several authors have studied the dependence of team effectiveness on task, 
teamwork, and communication technologies (e.g., Maznevski and Chudoba 2000; 
Sakthivel 2007). However, there has been a dearth of studies examining team-level issues 
leading to project failures in IT outsourcing research.  
 
In most project failures, “the seeds of failure sown earlier in the project … mature in the 
soil of ignorance” (Cule et al. 2000, p. 72). Post-mortem examination of failures has 
shown that there were significant early warning signs (EWS) of failure before the projects 
actually failed (Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 2006). Examining the collaboration 
between the vendor and client teams in the early project stages can provide the cues that 
indicate that the project is headed for failure. Although project troubles are rarely 
detected early enough in the IT industry (Havelka and Rajkumar 2006), project managers 
are mostly in a position to identify troubling issues during project execution (Keil et al. 
1998).  
 
Detecting potential issues during the first 20 percent of the project’s vendor-client 
collaboration phase would allow project managers to take appropriate corrective 
measures early enough to complete the project according to original estimates 
(Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 2006). These execution measures are analogous to 
the medical field. Doctors regard patient symptoms like chest pain and numbness in the 
left arm as classical symptoms prior to a heart attack (Ward 2003) – yet these symptoms 
might be late warning signs, as effective treatment requires the identification of early 
signs such as high blood pressure or high cholesterol levels (Ward 2003).  
 
Another good practical example of early warning signs is the deployment of the tsunami 
early warning system in the Indian Ocean that apprises of an impending tsunami resulting 
from underwater earthquakes (Sobolev et al. 2007; Rudloff et al. 2009). This system was 
developed after the horrific undersea earthquake in December 2004. The challenge in 
finding early warning signs includes eliminating false positives. In the case of the tsunami 
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early warning system, for instance, the difficulty of distinguishing whether an earthquake 
involves horizontal or vertical movement of the tectonic plates has posed problems for 
the system: the former is much more likely than the latter to cause a tsunami, but as 
detecting the direction of movement is less than precise, the system has issued several 
false alarms like the ones given in several Asian countries in April 2012 (Padma, Daniel 
and Yamin 2012). In this study, however, rather than providing causal explanations of the 
event – in the tsunami case, the direction of the earth plate movement – we intend to 
focus on predicting particular scenarios (cf. section 3.4). Information that helps project 
managers predict future project states allows them to initiate necessary measures to avoid 
disasters. We also work to guard against the false positives that could result from too-
hasty conclusions. 
 
Offshore projects, too, experience early warning signs – for example, a lack of readiness 
on the part of vendor offshore team members to question the onshore team regarding 
problems (Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010). This lack of questioning results from 
organizational and national cultures that shape work practices. Indian cultural 
conventions discourage open expression in front of superiors and questioning the 
requirements of clients. Indian team members’ silence could, however, be interpreted by 
the client team as an indication that project tasks are moving in a smooth manner. In the 
preliminary quantitative study in which we established the relevance of team-level analysis 
(Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010), we also uncovered several other communication-
related EWSs. However, only a deeper analysis of team-level issues can reveal how issues 
develop during project execution and how project managers can identify them. 
Understanding EWSs of failure better will allow more effective execution of OOSD 
projects.  
 
Since vendors might not work together with the client at the time when the project is 
initiated in the client organization, we have adopted the following pragmatic definition of 
EWSs in this thesis. We define early warning signs as a project state or indication that 
surfaces in the first 20 percent of the project’s cooperation or collaboration period 
between clients and vendors, and that warns one about possible or impending problems 
or issues (based on Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 2006). 
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1.2. Research relevance and questions 
This thesis aims to study the phenomenon of OOSD project failure and to provide 
project managers in offshore projects with tools to help them recognize situations that 
may be heading toward failure by detecting EWSs of failure. By studying the perception 
and management of EWSs of failure from the project managers’ perspective, we aim to 
obtain a better theoretical and managerial understanding of failures, with particular 
attention to indications and states of failure appearing in the early project stages. OOSD 
projects involve resources from onshore and offshore project teams and the project 
circumstances that lead to failure are not well understood. This could explain recurring 
project failures in many organizations. The insights gained from this research offer 
academics and practitioners a better understanding of offshore IT project performance 
by contributing both theoretical accounts of OOSD project failures and practical 
guidelines for addressing them. Further, the originally planned benefits (Ward and Daniel 
2006) of the offshore project such as cost savings, quicker time-to-market, etc., can be 
realized by recognizing and managing issues emerging from the project early enough. 
As the proliferation of studies testifies, academic interest in the phenomenon of IT 
outsourcing has grown substantially since the 1990s (Dibbern et al. 2004). A review of 
the IT outsourcing and IT offshoring literature shows that most studies have focused on 
the IT outsourcing engagement level, especially on decision processes and the 
management of IT outsourcing operations, rather than on the IT project level (Dibbern 
et al. 2004; Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis 2006; Lacity et al. 2010; Wiener, Vogel and 
Amberg 2010). This has resulted in a dearth of research on the team-level dynamics that 
cause project failures. Further, there has been scant research on failures in IT outsourcing 
projects (Sparrow 2003) and software development projects (Ewusi-Mensah 2003). 
Although the IT offshoring research domain has received more attention since the 2000s 
(Lacity et al. 2010), few in-depth studies address the management of offshored projects 
(King and Torkzadeh 2008). This gap in research regarding failures in OOSD projects 
prompted us to contribute to information systems (IS) failure research and help project 
managers achieve the planned business benefits from offshore outsourcing.    
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One major reason behind the lack of research into IT outsourcing failures is the 
sensitivity of failures for both the clients and vendors. As Sparrow (2003, p. 195) notes, 
this makes it difficult to research outsourcing relationships: “Few organizations are 
willing to talk openly about costly mistakes, unwise contracts or failed relationships. 
There is the added commercial sensitivity of the outsourcing relationship. The customer 
organization will not want to aggravate the position by open discussion of the supplier’s 
flaws and both customer and supplier will have a vested interest in keeping the matter 
private.” 
Similarly, IT offshoring research stream, which forms a sub-stream in the IT outsourcing 
research area, has few insights to offer regarding the peculiarities of OOSD project 
failures. The fear of backlash from the public in the outsourcing countries is an additional 
reason that makes clients reluctant to openly discuss offshoring in public. Failures in 
offshoring are even more sensitive than failures in domestic outsourcing and, therefore, 
publicizing the failure can lead to a loss of reputation for both clients and vendors. 
Because the risks involved in offshore software development are higher, the provider’s 
reputation and the client’s trust in the provider’s ability to deliver are vital to positive 
outcomes (Hoch et al. 2000). Since service providers engage in one-on-one relationships 
with clients to implement software solutions, and since word-of-mouth reference is the 
primary source of marketing for most service providers, the providers are exposed to 
higher risks when a failure is publicized. In fact, although failures are common in the IT 
industry, specialists in the industry seem to adhere to a code of silence regarding them 
(Ewusi-Mensah 2003). While there are many unsuccessful IS projects in organizations, 
only major disasters receive public attention (Flowers 1996). 
Glass (1997, p. 16) asserts that failures could provide a “much more indelible lesson to be 
learned” than successes. Ackoff (1994, p. 3) puts the matter more concretely: “When one 
does something right, one only confirms what is already known: how to do it. A mistake 
is an indicator of a gap in one’s knowledge. Learning takes place when a mistake is 
identified, its producers are identified, and it is corrected.” Unfortunately, the software 
industry has failed to learn lessons from failures (Glass 1998).  There are several barriers 
that keep organizations from conducting post-mortem examinations. Kasi et al.’s (2008) 
Delphi survey found that some of the main barriers include getting lost in current 
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business, lack of a culture of inter-project learning, and lack of mechanisms to encourage 
exploitation of the lessons of previous experiences.  
The lack of organizational willingness to admit failures and the difficulties that 
researchers face in trying to access the relevant data result in less research into the causes 
of failure (Ewusi-Mensah 2003). The tight-lipped approach of organizations to failures 
cripples the dissemination of knowledge about the issues surrounding failures and leads 
to a “cycle of failure” (Flowers 1996, p.2). Lyytinen and Hirschheim’s (1987, p. 301) 
failure studies found “little direct reward” for research in practice as projects continue to 
fail despite the body of knowledge accumulated.   
Although several studies in the past (e.g., Lucas 1975; Lyytinen and Hirschheim 1987; 
Sauer 1993; Fortune and Peters 2005) have shed light on IS failures from the usage and 
operation perspectives, failed software development projects have received little attention 
from researchers (Ewusi-Mensah 2003). Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski (1991, p. 83) note 
in their seminal work in the area of IS project abandonments that “IS project 
abandonment is indeed a complex, multidimensional issue that defies simple 
explanations.” In a survey of Fortune 500 companies in the United States, Ewusi-Mensah 
and Przasnyski (1994) found that 60% respondents abandoned more than one project 
due to more or less the same reason, while 70% answered that no records of abandoned 
projects were kept in the companies, which increases the likelihood of same failures 
repeating in organizations. As Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1990, p. 39) point out, the 
above survey demonstrates that the “failure to learn from mistakes has been a major 
obstacle to improving software project management.” Furthermore, Lyytinen and Robey 
(1999) note that organizations fail to learn from their own experiences because of barriers 
that include limits on organizational intelligence, disincentives for learning, organizational 
design, and educational barriers. 
The particular challenges involved in OOSD projects are discussed extensively in the IT 
offshoring literature (e.g., Lacity et al. 2010; Wiener, Vogel and Amberg 2010). The 
existing research indicates that OOSD projects, with their inherent risks, are more prone 
to failure than captive offshore or domestic development projects (Iacovou and Nakatsu 
2008). Offshore-specific factors like cultural and language differences, knowledge transfer 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 28 of 196 
 
issues, and geographical separation make team management challenging (Sahay, 
Nicholson and Krishna 2003; Oshri, Kotlarsky and Willcocks 2009; Philip, Schwabe and 
Ewusi-Mensah 2009). Researchers have found that several aspects, such as 
communication, coordination, and collaboration mechanisms, are necessary for the 
successful conduct of OOSD projects (e.g., Cramton 2001; Hinds, Liu and Lyon 2011; 
Sidhu and Volberda 2011).  
Despite such research, we still lack an in-depth study of an offshore project context that 
addresses failure-predicting circumstances. The insights from such an exploratory study 
would help us better understand the occurrence of EWSs of failure and situations in 
which failure is a likely outcome. Though IT offshoring research has illuminated several 
reasons behind the lack of success in offshore outsourced projects (cf. section 2.3), the 
unique aspects of OOSD projects that prompt failures have not been studied extensively. 
This raises unanswered questions regarding the extent to which team-level interaction or 
the lack of its intensity influences the failure rate of projects. Further, the lack of research 
in the IS failure research stream regarding offshore projects  indicates that detailed and 
concrete attention to circumstances that predict failures and to team-level interaction in 
OOSD projects is called for.  
By investigating the team-level issues, IS researchers as well as practitioners involved in 
OOSD projects would gain the following benefits. Firstly, information regarding the 
unique issues related to the project team in OOSD projects and regarding the team 
member (non)interactions that predict project failures can offer insights into overlooked 
team dynamics and thus help project managers avoid failure by taking action in the early 
stages of OOSD projects. Secondly, IS failure research would gain from the exploratory 
research in offshore projects by closing the gap between theory and practice in 
understanding failures (Yeo 2002).  Similarly, as McManus and Wood-Harper (2007, p. 
43) note, “[a]lthough our understanding of the importance of project failure has 
increased, the underlying reasons still remain an issue and a point of contention for both 
practitioners and academics alike.” We intend to reduce the research gap between theory 
and practice by delineating the specific aspects at the team level that predict project 
failures and by accounting for these failures theoretically. We therefore formulate the first 
research question (RQ) as follows: 
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RQ 1: Which unique team-level aspects of offshore-outsourced software development projects predict 
failures and how do they predict failures? 
Besides identifying OOSD-specific aspects related to failures, we also want to understand 
the role that early warnings play in reducing the failure rate (Kappelman, McKeeman and 
Zhang 2006) of OOSD projects. Our preliminary quantitative study regarding the EWSs 
of failure in OOSD projects confirmed the existence of EWSs in the offshore context 
(Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010). This research, which was done using a Delphi survey, 
was not specific to offshore outsourcing, but also included captive offshoring. The survey 
found that communication and coordination factors were the highest-ranked offshore-
specific EWSs. Our aim now is to deepen and extend the insights from that preliminary 
study and to provide a foundation for using EWSs of failure to design corrective 
management solutions that can put the troubled projects back on track.  
Reviewing the literature on the topic of EWSs (cf. section 2.4) reveals several unanswered 
questions that hamper our understanding of the concept of EWSs of failures from a 
global team perspective (Nikander and Eloranta 2001; Havelka, Rajkumar and Serve 
2004; Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 2006). Klakegg et al. (2010) calls for 
industry/project-specific studies to understand the nature of EWSs in each 
industry/project type. Analysis of the EWSs from various industries shows that there is 
far less work than is needed on EWSs of failures in offshore-outsourced software 
projects. A better understanding of OOSD project-related EWSs of failure would benefit 
project managers by helping them execute the project as originally envisioned. Further, 
the IT offshoring literature reveals a lack of deep research on the interactions between 
onshore and offshore teams in the early project stages, which could help illuminate EWSs 
from the global team perspective. In-depth research into the dynamics involved in the 
collaboration of team members in the early project stages (Fabriek et al. 2008) is missing, 
precluding a clear understanding of the deeper effects of the team issues and the EWSs 
of failure. Finally, empirical studies have not addressed the EWSs concerning the early 
OOSD project stages from the perspective of project managers, who are closer to the 
project than other stakeholders, and whose experiences are vital to gaining a deep 
understanding of how EWSs of failure are perceived. We lay the exploratory foundations 
of such work by analyzing the EWSs of failure related to the project team deeply and 
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studying the manner in which they are noticed by project managers. By analyzing these 
warning signs, our study will aid the project managers in OOSD projects to 
institutionalize an early warning mechanism to act upon (Keil and Montealegre 2000). We 
therefore formulate the second research question as follows:  
RQ 2: What are the early warning signs specific to offshore-outsourced software development project 
failures that are related to the project team and how can the project managers perceive them?  
A better understanding of EWSs of failure – whose existence has been confirmed by 
several empirical works (Nikander and Eloranta 2001; Havelka, Rajkumar and Serve 
2004; Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 2006) – and their relation to the project team 
is in itself valuable, but it is not sufficient. Several questions regarding the failure to 
manage EWSs in offshore projects remain open. The scantiness of the research on how 
EWSs are managed (Nikander and Eloranta 2001; Williams et al. 2012) prompted us to 
address how project managers notice the presence of the EWSs of failure, particularly in 
OOSD projects.  Our research provides an in-depth analysis of the perception and 
management of the EWSs of failure by focusing on inefficiencies in managing EWSs at 
the team level in the OOSD project context. 
 
Further, even when the issues that lead to failure are detected in the early stages, they may 
not always be acted upon (Williams et al. 2012). This prompted us to study why the 
EWSs of failure that are noticed are not managed before the problems causing the failure 
become so exacerbated that they lead uncontrollably to project failure. Little research 
exists concerning the reasons why project managers fail to notice EWSs, and the extent 
to which project managers could control issues that lead to project failures demands 
more analysis. The reasons why project managers do not act upon EWSs of failure need 
to be understood. These insights will enable project managers to be more proactive 
regarding issue resolution and complete the project according to the original estimates. 
The present exploratory research lays the foundation for illuminating the reasons behind 
the inability of project managers to manage the EWSs in failed OOSD projects. A better 
understanding of these reasons would allow managers to adapt better to the onshore-
offshore project context. The third RQ is therefore formulated as follows:  
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RQ 3: How are the team-level early warning signs of failure managed by project managers in offshore-
outsourced software development projects? Why are they not managed effectively?  
1.3. Contributions 
Our study is one of the few to analyze failed project cases in the offshore-outsourced 
context. This thesis makes three main academic contributions to the literature on IS 
failure and IS outsourcing. Firstly, we identify and characterize the EWSs of failure in 
OOSD projects at the team level, distinguishing them into easily noticeable early signals 
and their early warning issues. Secondly, we develop an exploratory model of OOSD 
project failure that incorporates the concept of EWSs. This model can aid project 
managers in understanding the early failure process and to monitor and assess risk right 
from the start of the project. Thirdly, we develop a four-stage model for the management 
of EWSs and identify the complexities involved in managing EWSs during the project. 
This model can be applied to examining the inability of vendors and clients to detect and 
manage issues in OOSD projects.  
1.4. Thesis structure 
This chapter has introduced the key concepts of this thesis and our overall research 
endeavor; an overview of the thesis structure is depicted in figure 2. Next, we turn to a 
review of the literature that served as the background to our exploratory research and 
that represents the extant knowledge on the topic at hand (chapter 2).  After that, we 
describe the qualitative research design adopted to answer our research questions as well 
as the research path followed in this research (chapter 3).  
 
The subsequent three chapters set out the results of our empirical research and answer 
the research questions formulated in this chapter. First, we discuss the unique aspects 
that predict failures in OOSD projects during the project execution in the light of team 
cooperation at onshore and offshore locations (chapter 4). We outline the theoretical 
propositions we have developed that indicate the circumstances for reducing the 
likelihood of failures in the onshore-offshore project context. Next, we identify and 
discuss the EWSs of failure and put them into the context of OOSD project failures 
(chapter 5). We then turn to the perception of EWSs during the failed projects, together 
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with the inability of project managers to manage them appropriately in a timely manner 
(chapter 6). A summary and synthesis of the key findings from the empirical chapters 
concludes this thesis (chapter 7).  The final chapter also outlines the limitations of this 
study and its implications for research and practice, and considers potential future 
research directions. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Thesis structure 
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2. Literature review 
 
In this chapter, we survey the literature relevant to understanding the early project stages 
of the offshore outsourced project context. The context in which projects are executed 
influences the ability of project managers to understand EWSs of failure (Klakegg et al. 
2010). Therefore, reviewing the research on the project context, formed by project 
failures, software project team characteristics, and the offshore-outsourced software 
environment allows us to understand the EWSs of failure better, even if this is an area 
with limited research literature. The IS literature by academics and practitioners in the 
areas of IT outsourcing, IS implementation, IS failures, IT project management and risk 
management provides the basis for answering the research questions we formulated in 
chapter 1. Since little work has been undertaken in the area of OOSD project failures 
specifically, the literature primarily provides the background to the research context. The 
general topics discussed below include IS project failures, software projects and teams, IT 
offshoring, and early warning signs. Finally, we summarize the topics discussed in order 
to understand the extent to which the existing literature has answered the research 
questions and to identify further research gaps. 
2.1. IS project failures 
There is a lack of consensus among researchers regarding how to define project failure 
(Pinto and Mantel 1990).  Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1987) regard the notion of IS failure 
as “nebulous and ill-defined” (p. 258) and define IS failure as the “inability of an IS to 
meet a specific stakeholder group’s expectations” (p. 263), which is among the narrowest 
failure definitions, since it encompasses the expectations of each stakeholder. Following 
the above definition, a project could be declared a failure if the expectations of a 
stakeholder group are not fulfilled. Sauer (1993) notes the problematic nature of Lyytinen 
and Hirschheim’s (1987) definition, pointing to the different capabilities of stakeholders, 
their ignorance of each others’ intentions, and their unequally reasonable expectations. 
Further, Flowers (1996, p. 4)  defines an IS as a failure “if, on implementation, [IS] does 
not perform as originally intended or if it is so user-hostile that is rejected by users and is 
under-utilized.” Among the more generous views, McManus and Wood-Harper (2007, p. 
39) maintain that failure is “an absolute error that could not be recovered from.”  
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Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski (1991, p. 69) analyze abandonment of IS projects and 
define the following three failure categories: 
 Total abandonment – the complete termination of all activity on the project 
prior to full implementation 
 Substantial abandonment – a major truncation or simplification of the project 
to make it radically different from the original specification prior to full 
implementation 
 Partial abandonment – the reduction of the original scope of the project, 
without entailing major or significant changes to the project’s original 
specifications, prior to full implementation.  
 
One reasonably clear definition of failure comes from the Standish Group’s (1995) 
CHAOS report, which has long been published at regular intervals and which is among 
the failure reports most cited by practitioners and academics. Although the practitioner-
oriented CHAOS report remains controversial among academics, it provides useful 
definitions of project performance by clearly differentiating between success and failures 
(challenged and impaired, p. 2): 
 Project success: The project is completed on-time and on-budget, with all features 
and functions as initially specified 
 Project challenged: The project is completed and operational but exceeds the 
budget, exceeds the time estimate, and offers fewer features and functions than 
originally specified 
 Project impaired: The project is cancelled at some point during the development 
cycle 
 
Another categorization of at least partial failure comes from the consulting firm KPMG: 
software development failures that appeared as software runaways. A software runaway is 
defined as a project “which has failed significantly to achieve its objectives and/or which 
has exceeded its original budget by at least 30%” (Cole 1995, p. 3). Glass (1998, p. 3) adds 
causation to the above definition, describing a runaway project as “a project that goes out 
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of control primarily because of the difficulty of building the software needed by the 
system.” Glass’ (1998) runaway projects, by definition, are 100% over budget compared 
to KPMG’s 30% threshold and failure to meet the original targets.  
 
Boddie (1986) discusses challenging projects that are always under crunch mode: the 
schedules are squeezed by half in order to achieve business objectives. Similarly, Yourdon 
(2003, p. 3) defines a death march project as “one which for which an unbiased, objective 
risk assessment (which includes an assessment of technical risks, personnel risks, legal 
risks, political risks, etc.) determines that the likelihood of failure is >= 50 percent.” Such 
projects will have schedules compressed to less than the half the required timeline, staff 
reduced to less than half, budget reduced to half, and requirements that are double 
compared to a normal project environment.  
 
Smith (2001) summarizes the characteristics of troubled project types described by 
Boddie (1986), Yourdon (2003), and Glass (1998) as a ratio of the projected cost to 
complete to the original budget cost (figure 3). The troubled projects included ‘crunch 
mode,’ ‘death march,’ and ‘runaway’ projects. For Smith (2001, p. 8), a troubled project 
has one or more of the following characteristics: 
1. It exceeds the planned timescale by more than 50 per cent, excluding the 
timescale impact of agreed changes in scope 
2. It exceeds the build cost by more than 35 per cent, excluding the cost of 
agreed changes in scope 
3. It is the cause of major buyer dissatisfaction to the extent that the future of the 
project is called into question 
4. The buyer lacks the commitment to make the project succeed 
5. It substantially fails to support the intended business processes 
6. It substantially fails to deliver the anticipated benefits 
7. The outcome for buyer-vendor is not win-win 
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Troubled projects
’Crunch mode’ projects
’Death march’ and ’runaway’ projects
Projected cost to complete
Original budgeted cost
1 2 5431.35
 
Figure 3: A taxonomy of challenged projects (Smith 2001, p. 4)  
 
McManus and Wood-Harper (2007, p. 39) assert that “a predominant paradigm in IS 
project management is to view the development and delivery process as a three way 
trade-off between time (business urgency), cost (budget) and quality (product 
functionality or capability).” However, Atkinson (1999) argues that among the three 
success criteria used for measuring the success of IT project management, cost and time 
are at best only guesses that were calculated when uncertainty was high. The third 
criterion, quality, is a phenomenon that changes over the life cycle of the project. 
Nevertheless, Ewusi-Mensah (2003, p. 8) regards the inaccuracy or indefensibility of the 
cost and time estimates as irrelevant since “the inability of the project team to achieve the 
targeted goals makes the project development effort a failure.” 
 
According to Wateridge (1995), projects that were perceived to have failed have time and 
cost as the defined success criteria, while successful projects do not appear to regard time 
and cost as critical. Different stakeholders also have different views about the success of 
a project, and thus IS success and its criteria to some extent always remain a matter of 
definition (DeLone and McLean 1992). Agarwal and Rathod (2006) note that failure 
criteria are even more ambiguous than success criteria, and while the external 
stakeholders of a project use time and cost as success criteria, the stakeholders internal to 
the project from the provider’s side consider the attainment of scope as the main success 
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criterion. Linberg (1999) noted that even though a system cost 417% above the budget 
and came 193% behind the planned schedule, the IS professionals considered the project 
a success because it was innovative and led to the acquisition of knowledge. 
 
Apart from the three process-related failure criteria based on time, cost, and product 
applied by many authors, Nelson (2005) offers three further dimensions for judging the 
project outcome based on past, present, and future perceptions: use, learning, and value 
from the project. Based on these three criteria, projects can be termed failures if 
outcome-related criteria are not fulfilled, even though the process-related criteria are 
fulfilled (successful failures). On the other hand, it is also possible that the process-related 
criteria were not fulfilled for a project, but that project may nevertheless be termed a 
success within the organization (failed successes).  
 
Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski (1994) viewed the abandonment of projects in a positive 
light, since abandonment prevents further expenditure of resources on projects that may 
never become successful, and since it offers organizations an opportunity (although an 
expensive one) to learn from past mistakes. Boehm (2000, p. 96) maintains that project 
termination cannot be interpreted as project failure as infeasible projects should be 
identified and terminated early enough. Boehm also puts the project risks and 
terminations into perspective: “It can take some adjustment to realize that terminating 
projects can be natural and even healthy. If you don’t try some risky projects, you’ll lose 
your competitive edge. But you shouldn’t expect all your risky projects to succeed.” Early 
recognition of project risks developing into project issues and eventually leading to 
project termination was found to be the key to prudent use of project resources within 
organizations. 
 
Most researchers examining IS failures judge failures from either the project development 
or the integration and operations perspective. Studies taking the project development 
perspective address projects that failed to complete the software development process 
because of the project team’s failure to deliver a functioning information system. On the 
other hand, studies from the integration and operations perspective concern projects that 
are completed in terms of software development processes, but failed in terms of project 
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outcome (Nelson 2005). They consider issues related to integration into existing 
application landscape, usage, and operations of the information system – issues that 
appear after the development phase. Below, we discuss the major works in the above two 
categories. 
2.1.1. The software development project perspective 
Integration and operations analysis of information systems formed the focus of the 
seminal work by Lucas (1975, p. 4), but Lucas also acknowledged the particular 
difficulties involved in managing software projects, stating: “[Project] management must 
coordinate users, the computer staff, and … consultants and must manage the 
development of a system. Specifications must be developed and met on time and within 
the original cost estimates. This management task has proved to be very difficult and the 
attainment of original goals elusive.” This failure to complete the software development 
phase of outsourcing projects and the resulting project abandonments have since been 
studied by several authors. 
 
The seminal work by Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski (1991; 1994) in the area of IS project 
abandonments argues that abandonments require complex and multidimensional 
explanations. Their surveys among top IS executives at Fortune 500 companies tested 
organizational, economic and technological issues based on the IS literature and found 
that organizational issues were the dominant factors leading to abandonment of projects. 
Similarly, Glaser’s (2005, p. 82) practitioner-oriented work emphasizes the role of 
management in project failures and attributes failures to “the result of the actions and 
inactions of senior leadership.”  
 
Ewusi-Mensah’s (2003, p. 9) analysis of software development failures, based on a review 
of the literature and the major empirical works, concludes that failures are “multifaceted 
and multidimensional,” and any single contributing factor can cause the project to fail. 
Further, he notes that software project abandonment can result from a “multiplicity of 
cofactors” (p. 47) – among others, technical, organizational, political, managerial, 
sociological, and economic factors.  He identifies 9 factors critical to the abandonment of 
software projects; these factors fall into 3 categories, namely, socio-organizational, socio-
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technical, and economic. Inappropriate project-team composition was noted as one of 
the important factors that lead to project abandonments. On the other hand, McManus 
and Wood-Harper (2007), in their study on IT project failures, report that management, 
technical and business reasons were responsible for 53%, 27%, and 20%, respectively, of 
the 51 (out of 214) project cancellations across Europe that were analyzed during the 
period 1998-2005. The failure factors identified by them highlighted the difficulties in 
project and process management involving the client and vendor teams. 
 
KPMG’s (Cole 1995) surveys in the United Kingdom regarding runaway projects found 
that technology was a major factor (45% respondents) that led to runaway projects in 
1994. Only 7% of respondents in 1989 considered technology a cause of runaway 
projects. Other causes of runaway projects found in the 1994 survey included project 
objectives not fully specified, bad planning and estimating, inadequate/no project 
management methodology, insufficient senior staff on the team and poor performance by 
suppliers. Other authors (e.g., Standish 1995; Ewusi-Mensah 2003) mention technical2 
aspects as opposed to the technological aspects referred to by Cole (1995). Technology as 
a cause leading to failures is less pronounced in most works than it is in Cole (1995).  
 
Process and people alignment issues formed the major reasons behind the project 
cancellations reported by the Standish Group’s (1995) CHAOS report. Boehm (2000), in 
his attempt to explain the issues leading to project failures reported by the Standish 
Group (1995), maintains that not all reasons can be traced back to poor management and 
that cancellations can be “natural and even healthy” as the business evolves (Boehm 
2000). The Standish Group’s (2009) report also points to process and people related 
issues, and the authors note project management expertise and execution as major factors 
affecting failures; these factors are relevant to offshore projects as well. 
 
                                              
2 Ewusi-Mensah (2003) defines the terms technical and technological as follows: technical is “the 
general level of expertise and depth of experience in computer hardware and software, and in the 
ability of the design team to appropriately use those resources to achieve the design objectives of 
the project” and technological is “the available computer hardware, telecommunications and 
networking facilities/infrastructure, software tools, and software development methodologies in 
the organization on which the project development is critically dependent” (pp. 107-108). 
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2.1.2. The integration and operations perspective 
The seminal empirical work by Lucas’ (1975) found that organizations tend to “overlook 
organizational behavior problems and users” (p. 2) and concentrate on technical aspects. 
Lucas’ work remains relevant as organizational and technical issues are still among the 
major factors that lead to project failures (Ewusi-Mensah 2003; McManus and Wood-
Harper 2007). Further, Cannon’s (1994) analysis of two failed cases reports that failure 
was caused by the interaction of technical and organizational factors. 
 
Flowers’ (1996) study of some of the prominent failed IS project cases such as the online 
membership system of the Performing Right Society, the Confirm computerized 
reservation system, the London Ambulance Service computerized dispatch system, and 
the London Stock Exchange TAURUS found critical failure factors3 under three 
categories that led to failures: organizational context, management of project, and 
conduct of the project. Technological, social and process related issues formed the 
majority of the characteristics that predicted failure. However, the factors he identifies are 
limited by the cases analyzed. 
 
Further, Yeo (2002) conducted a Singapore-based survey in 2000, in which 92 
respondents (Yeo does not specify whether they were clients, vendors, or both) rated the 
failure factors based on their experience on one IS project that was ‘challenged’ or 
‘impaired’ as defined by the Standish Group (1995).  The study categorizes 10 issues of 
influence under 3 spheres of influence. The 3 spheres of influence are process-, context- 
and content driven issues. The 10 issues of influence include business planning, project 
planning, project management and control (process driven issues), corporate culture, 
corporate management, users, politics (context driven issues), information technology, 
business process and system design, and IT/IS professional and knowledge sources 
(content driven issues). This survey noted that the managers dealt with team problems in 
projects reactively rather than in a proactive manner.  
  
                                              
3 Flowers (1996, p. 157) defines critical failure factors (CFF) as “the crucial elements of a project 
that, when they are in a less than optimal state, will increase the chance that an IS project will 
either fail or at worst, become a disaster.”  
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From a practitioner-oriented perspective on failures, Vashistha and Vashistha (2005) 
claim that 50 percent of offshore engagements can be considered failures since they do 
not reduce costs or improve quality. In other words, they do not achieve the intended 
benefits (Ward and Daniel 2006). They discuss the management competencies and the 
challenges that need to be addressed to manage projects successfully, including factors 
related to performance, relationships, contracts, finances and resources. This work 
attributes offshore project failures to improper management, which is consistent with 
other empirical studies concerning completed software development project. 
 
Since our research focus is on analyzing the failures during the software development 
phase of offshore outsourced projects, we adopted the software development project 
perspective for this thesis. Contracts have become the primary form of control in IT 
outsourcing engagements (Kern and Willcocks 2000; Gopal et al. 2003). According to 
Kern and Willcocks (2000), contracts build the foundation and regulate the engagement 
in outsourcing ventures. Therefore, we consider the fulfillment of contractual obligations 
as the basis of OOSD project failure. As already defined in chapter 1, we define OOSD 
project failure as the cancellation of the project resulting in premature termination of 
contractual activities between clients and vendors before the information system 
becomes operational. This definition of offshore project failure corresponds to the 
concept of “total abandonment” in failure research (Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 1991) 
as well as to the concept of “impaired” projects (Standish 1995). Compared to process 
and outcome-based criteria used to judge project failures, this definition could be viewed 
as an extreme form of failure in software projects. Though offshore development project 
failures can result from external or internal issues that affect the project team in OOSD 
projects, this study concentrates on issues that are internal to OOSD projects and that 
project managers thus could notice and rectify during the project. The next section takes 
up the software project and team characteristics that affect OOSD projects. 
 
 
 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 42 of 196 
 
2.2. Software projects and teams 
McGrath (1984, p. 7) define groups as “social aggregates that involve mutual awareness 
and potential mutual interaction.” Teams can be viewed as a form of groups (McGrath 
1984), which Faraj and Sproull (2000, p. 1554) defined as “a primary mechanism for 
accomplishing organizational work.” Cohen and Bailey (1997, p. 241) define team as “a 
collection of individuals who are interdependent in their tasks, who share responsibility 
for outcomes, who see themselves and who are seen by others as an intact social entity 
embedded in one or more large social systems (for example, business unit or the 
corporation) and who manage their relationships across organizational boundaries.” They 
identify four types of teams, namely, work teams, parallel teams, project teams and 
management teams. In this thesis, we concentrate on project teams put together for the 
purpose of software development; such teams are defined by Cohen and Bailey (1997, p. 
242) as time-limited teams that deliver one-time outputs and for the most part have tasks 
that “are non-repetitive in nature and involve considerable application of knowledge, 
judgment, and expertise.” 
Other taxonomies of project teams offer additional characteristics that apply to offshore 
project teams: they are, for example, global, dispersed, and virtual. Jarvenappa and 
Leidner (1998, p. 792) define a global virtual team as “a temporary, culturally diverse, 
geographically dispersed, electronically communicating work group.” According to 
Martins, Gilson, and Maynard (2004, p. 808), virtual teams are “teams whose members 
use technology to varying degrees in working across locational, temporal, and relational 
boundaries to accomplish an interdependent task.” Kahai, Carroll and Jestice (2007, p. 
62) find that virtual teams could be further categorized “in terms of their tasks, the 
diversity among members, the level of shared understanding among members, how well 
the team members know each other, and how the team members and interactions are 
being led.” MacDuffie (2007), studying distributed work practices, notes that virtual team 
members could also come from outside the organization, while Baba et al. (2004, p. 548) 
define a globally distributed team as “an interdependent work group comprised of 
culturally diverse members based in two or more nations who share a collective 
responsibility for making or implementing decisions related to a firm’s global strategy.” 
In a similar vein, Cramton (2001, p. 346) defines geographically dispersed teams as 
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“groups of people with a common purpose who carry out interdependent tasks across 
locations and time, using technology to communicate more than they use face-to-face 
meeting.”    
According to Bettenhausen (1991, p. 348), membership in a team impacts “how people 
see themselves, feel about themselves, and act in the group.” Team members identify 
strongly with the team rather than with the organization (Knippenberg and Schie 2000). 
This happens because the organization, being so large, poses a threat to the team 
members’ individual characteristics, while the smaller environment of the team offers 
more commonality, and the small-group setting creates fellow-feeling and mutual 
identification. One implication of team identification being stronger than organizational 
identification is that measures to enhance strong identification with the organization 
could be implemented at the team level rather than at the organizational level. Still, 
matters beyond the team and even beyond the organization also influence the project: for 
example, Hofstede et al. (1990) found that while organizational culture had more context-
specific influence pertaining to work practices, national culture guided the priorities of 
team members based on underlying values.  
 
A project team works across inter-organizational environments – within and outside the 
multi-national client or vendor organization – meaning that the team is surrounded by 
several organizational cultures. As many scholars have noted, this could pose difficulties 
for the effort to create “strong, shared working cultures” (Brannen and Salk 2000, p. 
452). Earley and Mosakowski (2000, p. 47) argue that diversity within the team, especially 
national heterogeneity, cannot be “an inherent characteristic of effective teams,” while 
Newman and Nollen (1996) argue that management practices need to be adapted to the 
national culture (Hofstede dimensions) to become effective. In a similar vein, Gibson and 
Zellmer-Bruhn’s  (2001) study about the concept of teamwork in France, the Philippines, 
Puerto Rico, and the United States found that different countries associate teamwork 
with varying concepts. These concepts include metaphors as varied as the military, family, 
sport, associates, and community, and concepts are not always shared between teams 
from different countries because of distinct underlying values. There are also some 
characteristics specific to software projects, which we discuss below. 
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Glaser (1984) distinguishes a software project from on-going general management, noting 
that a software project has a specific objective, a specific time period, a budget for capital 
expenditures and operating expenses, and an ad-hoc team that includes part-time 
members. The formation of ad-hoc teams poses challenges as no two information 
systems are alike and each project forms a unique undertaking. Lakhanpal (1993) found 
in his empirical survey covering 31 completed software projects within a large US 
electronic company that the performance of software project teams is highly dependent 
on the team’s cohesiveness and capability. The total amount of team member experience 
in software projects was found to have the weakest influence in the performance of 
project teams. Further, Hoegl and Gemuenden’s (2001) empirical study of 145 software 
development teams in co-located conditions found that teamwork quality – defined by 
constructs such as communication, coordination, balance of member contributions, 
mutual support, effort and cohesion – affects team performance. Again, cultural 
differences may pose problems: Carmel (1999) maintains that cross-cultural teams find 
the development of cohesion more difficult. 
 
Apte and Mason (1995) assert that information-intensive services like software projects, 
with their high information intensity and little need for customer and physical presence 
have substantial potential for global dispersion. In their framework, a software 
development project appears ideal for global outsourcing. However, the nature of 
software project makes them vulnerable to failure (Brooks 1995; Hoch et al. 2000). Sahay, 
Nicholson and Krishna (2003) found software projects challenging to manage even in co-
located conditions. Having the team members spread around various organizations and 
countries, especially in the global development scenario, further complicates the 
management of a project, making it “far more challenging than co-located projects” 
(Kotlarsky and Oshri 2005, p. 37). 
 
The complexity of software increases in nonlinear proportion with its size, so that the 
larger a software project is, the more vulnerable it is to failure (Hoch et al. 2000; 
Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 2006). The difficulties in managing software projects 
stem from the inherent interdependencies and complexities of the knowledge-intensive 
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development of software entities (Brooks 1995; Hoch et al. 2000). Brooks (1995, p. 183) 
notes the following about the complexity of software systems: “Many of the classical 
problems of developing software products derive from this essential complexity and its 
nonlinear increase with size. From the complexity comes the difficulty of communication 
among team members, which leads to product flaws, cost overruns, schedule delays. 
From the complexity comes the difficulty of enumerating, much less understanding, all 
the possible states of the program, and from that comes the unreliability.” 
 
In his widely-cited paper “No silver bullet,” Brooks (1987) maintained that there is no 
magic solution to the poor performance of software projects. His observations still hold 
true. Software development remains an endeavour that is “communication-intensive, 
complex and difficult even in conditions of co-location and proximity” (Sahay, Nicholson 
and Krishna 2003, p. 245). As software development forms an “intellectually demanding 
creative activity,” intensive coordination and control throughout the development stages 
is necessary to achieve the project objectives (Ewusi-Mensah 2003, p.8). Kraut and 
Streeter (1995) argue that with increased project size and complexity, coordination 
becomes more difficult; they stress the importance of applying formal impersonal, formal 
interpersonal, as well as informal interpersonal procedures to managing projects. 
 
Uncertainty since the start of the project is another characteristic of software 
development projects that makes them prone to failure (Hoch et al. 2000).  Therefore, 
the early stages of the project form the most critical path to the success (Ewusi-Mensah 
2003; Bhat, Gupta and Murthy 2006). The effort and intensity that go into the 
requirement analysis and design stages will reduce the number of changes that are 
required after the test phase. It is much more expensive to make changes to the software 
during the later stages than in the critical early stages (Flowers 1996; Ewusi-Mensah 
2003).  Rework and retesting of the system will increase the project’s costs and lengthen 
its duration. Hoch et al.’s (2000, p. 97) metaphor of upstream and downstream phases 
notes that the uncertainty for software development projects will be higher “in terms of 
the final outcome as well as in terms of schedule, cost, and other project parameters” 
during the upstream phase (figure 4) because of unclear customer requirements, not 
entirely predictable design, changing requirements and changing technology. The 
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 Figure 4: Upstream-downstream framework (Hoch et al. 2000, p.98) 
 
uncertainty gradually reduces as the project progresses towards the downstream phase. 
However, Hoch et al. (2000) note that there will be a residual uncertainty or risk even 
after the project reaches the maintenance phase. Paying attention to such uncertainty is 
obviously important in understanding project failures. Below, we discuss software project 
risks that are manifested during the project as EWSs as well as their management in 
projects. 
 
Schmidt et al. (2001) assert that identification and analysis of software project risks has 
gained a prominent role in improving the management of software projects and thus in 
reducing the chances of project failures. Software project risks that cause project failures 
may appear as risk events with unexpected outcomes during the initial project stages (El-
Masri and Rivard 2010). Among various definitions of risk, Barki et al. (1993, p. 206) 
define software development risk as “the uncertainty surrounding a project and the 
magnitude of potential loss associated with project failure.” Ropponen and Lyytinen 
(2000, p. 99) define risk as “a state or property of a development task or environment, 
which, if ignored, will increase the likelihood of project failure.” Echoing this, Wallace 
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and Keil’s (2004, p. 70) definition describes risks as “factors than can, when present, 
adversely affect a project, unless project managers take appropriate countermeasures.” 
On the other hand, Applegate, Austin and Soule (2009, p. 312)  view risks in a more 
positive light, as “an essential characteristic of projects that promise benefits.” Assessing 
risks and taking action to mitigate risks are the two major process stages identified in the 
software project risk management literature (Schmidt 2001). Some of the major works in 
risk management regarding assessment and mitigation of risks are discussed below. 
 
McFarlan (1981), in his early risk management work, has proposed three project risk 
dimensions that are inherent in a project: project size, experience with technology, and 
project structure. Applegate, Austin and Soule (2009) reiterate the relevance of these risks 
as sources of project implementation; they suggest that requirements volatility poses 
more concrete risk than project structure. Gogan, Fedorowicz and Rao’s (1999) analysis 
of two case studies with their inherent characteristics of time constraints and system 
interdependence further extended McFarlan’s (1981) risk assessment framework by 
adding the above two dimensions. 
 
Boehm’s (1991) early work regarding software project risks in the defense industry 
identifies risks and offers a  risk management framework composed of risk assessment 
and risk control. He suggests the need for “explicit early concern with identifying and 
resolving … high-risk elements.”  Further, a Delphi survey conducted by Schmidt et al. 
(2001) in the United States, Hong Kong, and Finland captured the differences of general 
risk perceptions in terms of national cultures. Wallace and Keil (2004) develop a risk 
categorization framework based on the importance of risk and control perceptions by 
project managers. They found project execution risks associated with project teams, 
project complexity, and project planning and control to be of high importance in 
determining the project outcome.  
 
Keil et al. (1998, p. 76) maintain that the reason behind high project failure rates is that 
“managers are not taking prudent measures to assess and manage the risks involved in 
[software] projects”; they develop a software risk categorization framework based on the 
risks identified in Schmidt et al.’s  (2001) Delphi study. Based on the perceived relative 
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importance of risk and perceived level of control by project managers, they suggest four 
risk categories: customer mandate, scope and requirements, execution, and environment. 
 
The higher-level framework and mitigation strategies presented in Keil et al. (1998) 
provide an instrument for dealing with risks collectively as a category, rather than 
individually. Their study also notes that project managers perceived as the most 
important risks those that were attached to phenomena they could not directly influence, 
such as customer mandate as well as scope and requirements not under their direct 
control. Risks related to execution were found to have moderate importance as they were 
under project managers’ direct control. However, we found in our preliminary research 
(Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010) that risks related to environment and execution are 
equally important in the offshore context.  
 
Wallace and Keil’s (2004) survey of 507 software project managers uses the risk 
categorization framework by Keil et al. (1998) to study the interaction of project risk 
categories. Their statistical multiple regression analysis examines product and process 
outcomes, and concludes that managing risks related to scope and requirements, on the 
one hand, and execution, on the other, is critical for project success. Further, project 
execution risks associated with project teams, project complexity, and project planning 
and control were found to be twice as important as scope and requirements risks in 
determining the project outcome. Further, Cule et al. (2000) note the necessity of 
recognizing the unique nature of each IS project and the consequent need for specific 
tactics depending on internal and external risks. 
 
Although the risk studies of most researchers implicitly assume that collaboration 
between clients and vendors is taking place, only a few authors have studied outsourcing 
and offshoring risks specifically. Taylor’s (2006) study on outsourcing risks found issues 
that are of an intractable and unforeseen nature. Intractable issues arose despite project 
managers’ best efforts to address risks before the project started. Client expectations, 
Taylor found, form the key risk that needs to be managed to ensure project success. 
Smith and McKeen (2004) consider offshore-outsourced engagement risks from the 
organizational perspective, including language, culture, time differentials, and project 
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management skills. Further, Iacovou and Nakatsu’s  (2008) Delphi survey identified 
offshore-outsourced risks that organizations needed to consider in order to avoid 
engagement failures. Out of 25 risks they identified, nine were specific to the offshore 
project environment; they also note that project managers required more than the 
fundamental project management skills to successfully execute offshore projects as a 
result of higher risk exposure. Sakthivel (2007), by contrast, highlights the importance of 
teamwork: assessing the risks involved in offshore development, he concludes that team 
effectiveness formed the highest risk in offshore outsourcing as well as in captive 
outsourcing. He notes that teamwork “with a high degree of interdependent tasks for a 
diverse team warrants face-to-face interaction” (p. 70), which is the case for offshore-
outsourced projects involving knowledge complexities.  
 
An important risk factor in project failures is the escalation of commitment behavior 
leading to unintended results (Keil and Montealegre 2000; Mähring et al. 2008). Keil and 
Montealegre (2000) studied the de-escalation measures for projects exhibiting escalation 
of commitment towards a failing course. They found four phases involved in the de-
escalation procedure, namely, recognizing the problem, reexamining the present course 
of action, searching for alternative courses of action, and implementing an exit strategy. 
These strategies could prove effective in recognizing and managing the EWSs of failing 
projects and rectifying them. We discuss some relevant theories applied in the IS 
literature to explain software development performance and team interactions below. 
 
Software project team development in organizations can be elegantly explained using the 
theoretical framework developed by McGrath (1991). His time, interaction, and 
performance (TIP) theory of groups offers a nonsequential model of team development 
(Mennecke, Hoffer and Wynne 1992) that is applicable to understanding the problems of 
OOSD project teams. This theory has been widely employed in the social sciences as well 
as in information systems research to study group changes over time (e.g., Warkentin, 
Sayeed and Hightower 1997; Burke and Chidambaram 1999). Time, interaction, and 
performance are the three dimensions that are unique for group projects. The TIP theory 
posits that group members engage in multiple, concurrent projects, and any group action 
involves modes and functions that contribute to the organizational and group 
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development (see appendix A for propositions). The group modes – inception, problem-
solving, conflict resolution, and execution – do not follow a fixed sequence of phases and 
group members can follow different mode paths in concurrent projects. This contrasts 
with Tuckman’s (1965) popular model, often applied by practitioners, of progressive 
team development (Mennecke, Hoffer and Wynne 1992). Tuckman’s model follows a 
sequence of activities in four phases – forming, storming, norming, and performing. The 
early project phases build the groundwork for project success and the identification of 
group activities that go through different modes and functions provide explanations of 
the project performance. However, the TIP theory has some limitations for explaining 
the development of project teams involving multiple vendor and client organizations, as 
it was conceived for groups within a single organization. 
   
Dennis, Fuller and Valacich (2008) apply the TIP theory to explaining the 
communication processes in dispersed teams, something that is applicable in the OOSD 
project context. Their theory of media synchronicity explains communication processes 
in terms of conveyance and convergence of information within teams. The more familiar 
the context, the less emphasis on convergence of meaning between members is required, 
and vice versa. The next section takes up this question of the project context of IT 
offshoring. 
2.3. IT offshoring  
 
Literature reviews by Dibbern et al. (2004), Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis (2006) and 
Lacity et al. (2010) reveal that most of the research in the area of IT outsourcing (and also 
IT offshoring) takes the organizational perspective. Wiener, Vogel and Amberg (2010) 
review the IT offshoring literature from the project management as well as from the 
organizational perspective. There has been an increase of research in the area of IT 
offshoring since the 2000s; however, empirical research from the team perspective 
remains limited.  We will review some major works from the organizational and team 
perspectives in this section.  
 
The agency theory explains the relationship aspects between client (principal) and vendor 
(agent) in IT outsourcing using the contract as a metaphor (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
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Dibbern et al. 2004). The agent is assumed to have access to more private information 
than the principal and the consequent information asymmetries allow the agent to hide 
information during the engagement (Baiman 1990). Differing risk attitudes and goals, as 
well as uncertainties, define the hidden behaviors and actions of actors during the 
cooperative contracting period (Ross 1973; Eisenhardt 1989a). An outsourced software 
project is a case of an agency problem due to the intangible nature of software and the 
difficulties in monitoring incomplete contracts (Keil, Mann and Rai 2000). Imperfect 
monitoring and verification problems (Eisenhardt 1989a) posed by offshore-specific 
conditions may mean that the agent is not compelled to behave according to the 
principal’s interest. In particular, using short-term contracts (Eisenhardt 1989a) in OOSD 
projects could result in greater information asymmetries between the actors than using 
long-term ones. These difficulties explain why additional governance is required for 
OOSD projects compared to domestic outsourcing projects. Below, we discuss various 
dimensions of IT offshoring that exacerbate the problem of imperfect monitoring in 
projects involving onshore and offshore teams. 
 
IT offshoring adds more risk dimensions than IT activities carried out on the same 
continent, as cross-border business activities increase risks (Carmel and Tjia 2005).  Risks 
are inherent in IT offshoring because of the semi-globalized state of the world 
(Ghemawat 2007).  Aspray, Mayadas and Vardi (2006) discuss threats and vulnerabilities 
that are absent in domestic outsourcing compared to IT offshoring. The major risk 
categories in the literature associated with offshore IT projects from the organizational 
perspective are the following: 
- Culture (e.g., Apte et al. 1997; Karolak 1998; Aspray, Mayadas and Vardi 2006; 
Beulen, Ribbers and Roos 2006) 
- Language barriers (e.g., Apte et al. 1997; Aspray, Mayadas and Vardi 2006; 
Beulen, Ribbers and Roos 2006) 
- Time-zone differences (e.g., Apte et al. 1997; Beulen, Ribbers and Roos 2006; 
Lee-Kelley and Sankey 2008)  
- Human resources (e.g., Gold 2005; Aspray, Mayadas and Vardi 2006; Beulen, 
Ribbers and Roos 2006)  
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- Rotating onshore and offshore resources (e.g., Gold 2005; Beulen, Ribbers and 
Roos 2006)   
- Loss of proprietary knowledge (e.g., Carmel and Tjia 2005; Hussey and Hall 
2007)  
- Infrastructure (e.g., Carmel and Tjia 2005; Beulen, Ribbers and Roos 2006)  
- Security and privacy (e.g., Carmel and Tjia 2005; Gold 2005; Aspray, Mayadas 
and Vardi 2006; Beulen, Ribbers and Roos 2006; Hussey and Hall 2007)  
- Knowledge transfer (e.g., Beulen, Ribbers and Roos 2006; Oshri, van Fenema 
and Kotlarsky 2008)  
- Understanding the customer’s business processes (e.g., Beulen, Ribbers and 
Roos 2006; Iacovou and Nakatsu 2008)  
- Geopolitical risks (e.g., Carmel and Tjia 2005; Beulen, Ribbers and Roos 2006)  
- Contractual risks (e.g., Carmel and Tjia 2005; Iacovou and Nakatsu 2008)  
- Societal and regulatory changes (e.g., Apte et al. 1997; Carmel and Tjia 2005; 
Gold 2005)  
 
Kelly et al. (2010) assert that project management in global projects could be viewed as 
socio-material “sense-shaping.” This includes interactional social protocols among the 
onshore and offshore teams involved, discursive practices, and configurational collective 
moods of interactions. Similarly, Vlaar, van Fenema and Tiwari’s (2008)  case study with 
an Indian offshore vendor found that socio-cognitive acts and processes of sense-making 
and sense-giving by onshore and offshore team members led to better outcomes in 
distributed projects. Below, we review an important dimension that affects sense-making 
in OOSD projects, namely, cultural differences. 
 
Cultural distance has been widely cited as one of the factors affecting the outcome of 
global collaborations (Hinds, Liu and Lyon 2011). We include some of the varying 
definitions of culture here. Hofstede (1984, p. 260), in his seminal work regarding cultural 
orientations at the national level, which surveyed around 116,000 IBM employees in 40 
countries in 1968 and 1972, defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one human group from another.” The four cultural 
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dimensions that Hofstede (1984) defined include power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance; these were defined as static traits that remain 
unchanged over decades. Other definitions of culture include, for instance, Spencer-
Oatey (2004, p. 4), who proposes that culture is “a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, 
behavioral norms, and basic assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, 
and that influence each member’s behavior and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ 
of other people’s behavior”; Kitayama (2002, p. 92), who views culture as a dynamic 
system of behavior with “meanings, practices, and associated mental processes and 
responses” that are loosely organized and entrenched in the local context; and Chao and 
Moon (2005, p. 1128), who regard the complexity involved in culture as a mosaic with 
“multiple indicators of cultures,” with the person’s demographic, geographic and 
associative attributes forming various tiles in the mosaic.  
 
Applying the concept of culture to groups, Karahanna et al. (2005, p. 4) maintain that 
group culture becomes an “important factor in the interactions and effectiveness of 
groups.” They propose that cultural values and practices at varying levels of supranational 
(regional, ethnic, religious, linguistic), national, professional, organizational, group, and 
individuals are interrelated to each other.  Further, they contend that practices (which 
evolve over time) are more relevant than values at the group and organizational levels, 
whereas values (which hardly change over time) are dominant on the supranational and 
national levels of culture. Also considering the different levels at which culture influences 
behavior, Leung et al. (2005) propose that culture is a dynamic multi-level and multi-layer 
construct that affects all levels (global, national, organizational, group and individual) in a 
top-down as well as a bottom-up manner, while Leidner and Kayworth’s (2006) review of 
culture proposes a tripartite view of IT-culture conflict, in which IT values, group 
member values and values embedded in an information system provides the key to 
conflicts. 
 
Peterson et al.’s (2002) empirical work on the perceptions of IS designers from the 
United States, Japan, and Korea regarding success and failure factors shows consistency 
with Hofstede’s (1984) cultural dimensions. An interpretive case study by Levina and 
Vaast (2008) of a major Western global bank with captive units and outsourcing vendor 
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collaborations in Russia and India compared the differences in competencies, 
interpersonal connections, and social dimensions. Their empirical work from the 
organizational perspective also clearly illustrates the cultural differences between 
countries like India and Russia. However, Dibbern (2004) points out that the empirical 
works in this tradition, including Hofstede (1984), Trompenaars (1993) and others, are 
based on statistical averages and therefore hide inevitable variation in the cultural 
dimensions across organizations. This is relevant as team members hailing from different 
cultures and origins in multi-national organizations involved in offshoring form a 
“cultural mosaic” (Chao and Moon 2005).  
 
Gefen and Carmel (2008) suggest that to outsource from a foreign country, clients must 
overcome the cost of cultural distance, in addition to transaction costs.  They found that 
previous relationships played the strongest role in choosing vendors in general, and that 
most clients showed a preference for outsourcing to a vendor in their own country – 
except for Americans, who preferred offshore vendors. Dibbern, Winkler and Heinzl 
(2008) argue that transaction costs increase with the differences in cultural values and 
practices between vendors and clients. Taking a similar tack, Beck, Gregory and Prifling’s 
(2008) case study of an Indo-German project argues for the relevance of combining 
formal and informal project management measures with the ‘cultural intelligence’ of 
project members to produce the expected outcome. A mutual understanding of 
organizational culture among vendor and client team members, Beck, Gregory and 
Prifling conclude, is the key to effective results. Further, Winkler, Dibbern and Heinzl’s 
(2007) analysis of Indo-German case studies concludes that the power distance between 
team members affects the management of software projects and the adoption of either 
vendor or client culture by the team is more likely to lead to a successful outcome.  
 
Carmel and Tjia (2005) discuss five centrifugal forces that affect offshore software 
development and thus influence the performance of team members. These include 
communication breakdown, coordination breakdown, control breakdown, cohesion 
barriers and cultural clash. Based on three cases of offshore software development 
projects, Heeks, Krishna and Nicholson (2001) argue that there exist geographical, 
cultural, and linguistic distances between the client and vendors that affect the 
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relationship; the main factors determining relationship outcomes, they find, are culture, 
tacit knowledge, and informal information. Culture affects the concept of temporal 
separation, according to Huang and Trauth (2008), who analyze the cultural4 influences 
on the temporal separation and coordination of global software projects. The cultural 
differences they found to be relevant include the perception of time, hierarchical 
structure, relationship orientation, and social obligation. Based on cultural differences, 
Narayanaswamy and Henry (2005) propose a design for a control strategy that fits the 
cultural setting and thus improves project performance in offshore software 
development. 
 
Further, Sahay, Nicholson, and Krishna’s (2003) empirical work analyzes six case studies 
involving organizations from North America, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Korea 
that engaged in software development projects with Indian software companies. Tensions 
of space and place, issues of power and control, transformations of identity, tensions of 
standardization, complexity of knowledge transfer, and language and culture were 
identified as the major challenges involved in global software development works. 
Krishna, Sahay and Walsham’s (2004, p. 64) investigation of cross-cultural issues that 
outsourcers from North America, Western Europe, and Japan experienced with Indian 
software providers concludes that cross-cultural software production “is not a trouble 
free process.” They suggest that because of the importance of a cultural match between 
countries, the choice of ‘culturally neutral’ projects such as embedded software and 
middleware could reduce cross-cultural issues. Further, the development of application 
software is recommended only when the right cross-cultural match between nations – 
such as Japan-China or United States-Canada – is present; otherwise, major efforts 
through staffing or training are essential. Interestingly, the success of India in offshore 
software development has been in application software as against the culturally neutral 
software recommended by Krishna, Sahay and Walsham (2004). 
 
                                              
4 Huang and Trauth (2008, p. 3) define culture as “shared values and beliefs that are historically 
situated and emergent, and are constantly interpreted and negotiated in social relations and 
interactions by a group of people within a particular socio-cultural context.” 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 56 of 196 
 
Using data from the International Benchmarking Standard Group (ISBSG) during the 
period 1991-2003 (57 paired projects), Bagchi, Kirs and Udo (2007) argue that offshored 
projects require more time to complete than onshore projects, and emphasize the critical 
role of communication in the early stages. Herbsleb and Moitra’s (2001) find that 
multisite software development takes longer to complete than co-located development 
because of communication and coordination delays. Further, Ebert and De Neve’s (2001) 
case study of global software development projects in a multinational company also 
provides empirical support for the significance of communication and coordination in 
achieving project success in globally dispersed teams. To illustrate the differing 
interpretation of symbols in different cultures, they argue that even “a common 
syntactical language does not necessarily mean the same semantics and pragmatics” (p. 
68). 
 
Fabriek et al.’s (2008) analysis of successful and failed offshore outsourced and captive 
software development projects has shown that informal communication between team 
members has played the key role in successful outcomes. Improper planning, they find, is 
the main reason for failed projects. Prikladnicki and Audy’s (2009) case studies of captive 
and outsourced offshore projects also point to communication problems between team 
members as key. Communication between team members affects knowledge transfer 
since the distances affect the complete and unambiguous knowledge transfer (Fabriek et 
al. 2008; Wende, Schwabe and Philip 2010).  
 
Further, Damian and Zowghi’s (2003a) case analysis of captive software development in 
the United States and Australia concludes that face-to-face communication improves 
informal communication and thus heightens trust between the team members. Oshri, 
Kotlarsky and Willcocks (2009) argue that face-to-face meetings improve social ties and 
offer better possibilities for coordinating tasks between team members. They argue that 
communication and coordination aspects are the most critical in the early project stages. 
Similarly, based on the statistical analysis of 34 software projects from two Indian 
vendors, Gopal et al. (2002, p. 199) conclude that the “communication and coordination 
between customers and vendors has complex effects on project performance.” 
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Carmel and Agrawal (2001) note that physical distance between team members engenders 
coordination, control and communication problems. The main challenge identified by 
Carmel and Agrawal (2001) in global software development is the negative impact of 
distance on communication and its negative impact on coordination. Carmel and Abbott 
(2006) study the configurations of global software development in offshore and 
nearshore destinations and find that “distance still matters.” According to Carmel and 
Abbott (2006), the difficulties introduced by distance include communication, control 
and supervision, coordination, creating social bonds and building trust. They found India 
to be the only and unique major farshore or offshore destination that is far from all major 
client nations. Some clients try to minimize the disadvantages of distance by choosing 
software services offered by firms that are geographically close to the clients (nearshore) 
but less expensive than in the client country (Carmel and Abbott 2006). This could 
explain why Indian and other offshore service providers have established subsidiaries in 
client countries in recent times and offer nearshore services to major clients in the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Switzerland by operating from nearshore countries like 
Canada, Mexico, or Hungary. Interestingly, Gumm’s (2006) case study analysis concludes 
that it is not the physical but the organizational distance within the project team and 
between the team members that forms the biggest challenge in distributed projects. 
 
Ramasubbu et al.’s (2008) empirical work on 42 offshore software development projects 
of a CMM (Capability Maturity Model) Level 5 verified vendor reports that investments 
in structured processes can mitigate the negative effects of work dispersion. The better 
productivity and project performance that Ramasubbu found in the analyzed projects 
confirm the vendor claim that higher process levels can lead to successful projects, 
although process improvements made only at the vendor side will not suffice to avoid 
failures. On a similar note, Rottman and Lacity (2006) recommend that client 
organizations elevate their process gaps in terms of CMM certification to get them close 
to the vendor level and thus extract better value, as most top Indian vendors have CMM 
Level 5 certifications. Further, Hertzum and Pries-Heje’s (2009) case study of an Indian-
Danish collaboration shows the success of defining roles and responsibilities: this 
reduced interactions between team members, thus minimizing the impact of inequalities 
in terms of culture and process maturity. 
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Casey’s (2010) case study of a US company with teams in Malaysia and Ireland points out 
that virtual software project management is a “difficult and complex endeavor” (p. 84) 
because of language, cultural and time differences, and also because the dynamic 
environment with its specific requirements has to be addressed. She argues that distance 
affects coordination and visibility as well as communication and cooperation, and these 
two categories in turn affect each other. Further, Ramesh and Dennis (2002) argue that 
the major challenge for global team members lies in communication between team 
members and coordinating the team activities. They propose the concept of an object-
oriented team for virtual teams that decouples team member communication by the use 
of well-defined processes, semantically rich media (repositories), and the reduction of  
information flow in large and complex projects. However, they do not recommend this 
type of team member decoupling for traditional integrated teams in small and less 
complex projects. In particular, more coordination is required in the early stages of 
requirement analysis than in the later stages for team activities.  
 
Prifling, Gregory and Beck (2009) report that the introduction of more formal project 
management led to project success after the deliverables in an Indo-German project 
failed to meet the initial expectations from the client. Once a level of trust has been 
established, the amount of formal project control could be reduced. Further, Sharma et 
al. (2008) argue that the differences in language, culture and personalities could affect 
trust building, and thus influence the technical communication5 in projects. Based on an 
examination of captive software projects, Kotlarsky and Oshri (2005), emphasize the 
importance of social ties, especially rapport and trust between globally distributed team 
members, for successful collaboration. They highlight the relevance of social interactions, 
which aid informal communication in projects.   
 
                                              
5 Sharma et al. (2008, p. 64) define technical communication as “communication activities that 
take place between a client and vendor based on the outsourcing contract managed by client as 
well as vendor project managers using different communication modes – from the exchange of 
information (explicit) to the sharing of nuanced intelligence (tacit).” 
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Sabherwal’s (2003, p. 154) case studies on coordination mechanisms between vendors 
and clients find that two sides can “pull project coordination in different directions.” 
However, Sabherwal also concludes that the end result in these cases was somewhere in 
the middle, i.e., more formal coordination was used than the client wanted and more 
informal coordination using interpersonal interactions was employed than the vendor 
desired. Further, Kotlarsky, van Fenema and Willcocks (2006) describe four coordination 
mechanisms related to knowledge management in global software projects that lead to 
better collaboration: coordination by organization design, work-based coordination, 
technology-based coordination and social coordination. Improved social interactions 
through communication activities were found to result in better efficiencies related to 
coordination and communication.  
2.4. Early warning signs 
 
The business economist Ansoff’s (1975) seminal work in the area of the corporate 
strategic management notes that sudden and unfamiliar changes in an organization’s 
environment result in strategic discontinuity, which are noticed first as weak signals that 
become more specific and stronger with time. He offers a framework for minimizing 
strategic surprises by anticipating strategic risks based on states of knowledge. The five 
states based on threats or opportunities (T/O) with increasing knowledge are: (1) sense 
of T/O,  (2) source of T/O,  (3) T/O concrete, (4) response concrete, and (5) outcome 
concrete. Ansoff’s seminal work set off a spate of academic and practitioner studies in 
the areas of communications, military intelligence, and business economics (Nikander 
2002) that used weak signals under synonyms such as symptoms, early indicators, 
presignals, and early warning signs.  
 
Nikander and Eloranta’s (2001) study of EWSs in the industrial construction projects 
concludes that most of the information regarding EWSs comes from within the project. 
They identify sixty-eight basic types and 11 main type groups of early warnings based on 
four project cases and interviews with 17 project professionals. An observed event or 
indication can be interpreted as a warning, a problem, or a cause of the problem 
depending on the project stages (Nikander and Eloranta 2001). Figure 5 illustrates the 
overlap they describe between the groups of warnings, problems and causes of problems. 
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Figure 5: Warnings, problems and causes (Nikander and Eloranta 2001, p. 395) 
 
However, these overlapping possibilities in Nikander and Eloranta’s exploratory work 
result in a lack of a clear differentiation of warnings, problems, and causes that does not 
allow project managers to detect EWSs unambiguously. These overlaps could lead to 
incorrect interpretations regarding the problem causes and thus to erroneous responses 
to the problems.  
 
The interviewees of Nikander and Eloranta’s (2001) study indicated the possibility of 
utilizing EWS as a project management tool. Further, Nikander and Eloranta (2001) 
suggest an EWS framework that involves monitoring and analysis of early warnings, 
problems, and causes of problems (figure 6). As risks refer to a likely problem, they 
found that the information related to early warnings could help manage emerging risks 
and offer responses by finding the causes of the problem. While the dependencies 
between early warnings, causes of problems, probable problems and responses are 
displayed, the exact relations or semantics between these concepts remain unclear. 
Nikander (2002, p. 49), without explicitly referring to project phases, defined  EWS as 
“an observation, signal, message, or some other form of communication that is or can be 
seen as an expression, indication, proof, or sign of the existence of some future or 
incipient positive or negative issue. It is a sign, omen, or indication or future 
developments.” 
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Figure 6: Concepts of EWSs and risk management (Nikander and Eloranta 2001, 
p. 395) 
 
Havelka and Rajkumar (2006) analyze the symptoms and causes of troubled IS projects. 
Their study, based on the nominal group technique with four focus groups of 20 IS 
consultants, identifies 108 symptoms of troubled software development projects. Eleven 
categories of identified symptoms include: (1) client or stakeholder-related symptoms, (2) 
project’s goal-related symptoms, (3) meeting symptoms, (4) team symptoms, (5) task 
symptoms, (6) project symptoms, (7) project management symptoms, (8) communication 
symptoms, (9) management symptoms, (10) project portfolio symptoms, and (11) process 
symptoms. Havelka and Rajkumar’s (2006)  work provides the most comprehensive list 
of symptoms in the area of software development to date. Further, Sanchez and Perez 
(2004) compile from the literature a list of early warning signals for research and 
development (R&D) projects; they then test this list in Spanish industrial organizations 
with 114 R&D managers. The signal list includes project internal and project external 
factors within an organization, related to critical success factors.  
 
As opposed to works on EWSs that consider the whole project lifecycle, Kappelman, 
McKeeman and Zhang (2006) focus on the first 20 percent of the project lifecycle. This 
study in the area of IT projects identifies 53 EWSs in three risk categories defined by 
Wallace, Keil and Rai (2004), namely, social subsystem, project management, and 
technical subsystem. The identified EWSs were rated by 157 experienced IT project 
management experts in a survey that aimed to rank the most important EWSs of IT 
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project failure. All 12 dominant EWSs are located in the social subsystem and project 
management risk categories. Technical EWSs, Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 
conclude, are not the most relevant ones in the first 20 percent of the project lifecycle. 
The EWSs in the list were elicited from project experiences without details on how to 
recognize them concretely.  
 
Klakegg et al.’s (2010) report for Project Management Institute (PMI), based on 
interviews and eight case studies in Norway, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 
discusses EWSs in complex projects from the project owners’, or governance, 
perspective, as opposed to the project management or execution perspective adopted in 
the present study. They cover outsourcing projects in IT, oil and gas, construction, 
manufacturing, and public sector industries and differentiate EWSs into two types: hard 
issues of a technical nature that can be measured through project assessments and soft 
issues related to people that can be identified through gut feelings. They recommend the 
use of both types in projects and assert that the way EWSs are handled also affect their 
detection. Although they do not differentiate the EWS identification period during the 
project, they use three stages to differentiate EWSs – project set-up, early stages and 
project execution. Further, Klakegg et al. (2010, p. 149), while assessing the general 
inability to pick up EWSs, assert  that “we do not understand uncertainty well, and we are 
not good at seeing through complexity or mastering interpersonal effects.” 
 
As several of the studies described above demonstrate, IS projects can learn from other 
areas regarding the detection of EWSs. Loosemore’s (2000) model of crisis management 
in the construction industry deals with EWSs with regard to their visibility, which aids 
project managers in detecting them. He notes that visibility of EWSs is “determined by 
their intensity, duration, and subtlety” (2000, p. 31). EWSs are difficult to detect in 
project design, which is subtle and of low-intensity and short duration, as opposed to 
physical buildings that emit signals that are blatant and of high intensity and long 
duration. The intangible nature of software development further lowers the visibility of 
EWSs. 
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The KPMG survey of 120 organizations in the United Kingdom regarding failed projects 
known as runaway projects (Cole 1995) found that 89% had time overruns and 62% had 
cost overruns as symptoms of runaway projects. More than 50% of the projects in the 
survey showed symptoms during the development phase while 25% of the projects 
showed them in the early planning stage. Although, according to the above survey, cost 
and time overruns are symptoms of failing projects, the detection of these late warning 
signs provides no anticipatory information that a project is about to fail. In a similar vein, 
Sparrow’s (2003) practitioner-oriented work discusses warning signals that could help 
alert outsourcing failures from the customer perspective. Her work investigates 
outsourcing relationship failures from the organizational perspective, and she examines 
warning signals that could appear at any project stage, meaning that some of them were 
late warning signs.  
 
Our own preliminary research on offshore software development projects found 21 
EWSs in four categories: communication, people, formal process, and formal output-
related EWSs (Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010). The offshore-specific EWSs identified 
by that work are all related to team communication and coordination, showing the 
relevance of interaction among team members in OOSD projects to avoid project 
failures. In that work, we explored the EWSs relevant to offshore projects, but whereas 
that work analyzed offshore projects in general (captive as well as outsourced offshoring), 
the present study concentrates specifically on the offshore-outsourced context.  
 
In his 1984 work, Ansoff (1984) develops further the initial ideas of weak signals 
presented in Ansoff (1975), adding a temporal dimension. He defines weak signals as 
“imprecise, early indications about impending impactful events” and strong signals as 
issues that “will be sufficiently visible and concrete to permit the firm to compute their 
impact and to devise specific plans for response” (Ansoff 1984, p. 22). Based on the state 
of knowledge, defined in Ansoff (1975), and the available response time, one can choose 
a model for the management of issues from among periodic planning, weak signal 
management, strong signal management, or crisis management. Ansoff’s model for 
strategic issue management for weak signals looks at impact, signal strength, and urgency 
to prioritize the warning signs. The priority levels available for issues based on 
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environmental, internal and performance trends are “urgent,” “postponable,” and 
“delayable” (figure 7). He recommends actions based on the impact and urgency of issues  
 
Figure 7: Priority assignment in strategic issue management (Ansoff 1984, p. 366) 
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on a periodic basis.  
 
Havelka and Rajkumar (2006) develop a recovery framework for IS projects involving 
four stages and twelve steps. The four stages include recognition, immediate recovery, 
sustained recovery, and maturity. The strengths of their model include short-term 
recovery based on immediate steps as well as sustained project recoveries. Nikander 
(2002), too, offers a multi-step model for managing issues. His decision support model of 
EWSs consists of six stages, which are (1) detection of EWS, (2) interpretation of early 
warnings, (3) determination of the state of knowledge, (4) identification of problems or 
risks, (5) exploration of available time, and (6) selection of procedures.  
 
The models presented in Ansoff (1984), Havelka and Rajkumar (2006), and Nikander 
(2002) provide comprehensive procedures for project managers to manage the warning 
signs; however, their applicability in a project context involving onshore and offshore 
teams from various organizations needs to be validated. They could turn out to be 
“cumbersome, slow and expensive for use” in fast-paced project work (Nikander 2002, p. 
63), particularly in OOSD projects that involve collaboration between clients and 
vendors. 
2.5. Summary and research gaps 
 
In this section we summarize how the literature review has contributed to answering the 
research questions posed by the present study. Further, we outline the research gaps that 
demand further analysis. 
 
The literature describes software teams as units involving ad-hoc members that fulfill a 
specific objective within a time frame and budget (Glaser 1984). Offshore outsourced 
software development (OOSD) project teams involve team members from multiple client 
and vendor organizations. The cohesiveness and capability of members have been found 
to affect the software project outcome within a single organization (Lakhanpal 1993; 
Carmel and Tjia 2005). However, the lack of cohesion in OOSD teams is not well 
understood. Distance and organizational culture affect communication among team 
members (Herbsleb and Moitra 2001). Informal communication, especially, is known to 
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lead to better project outcomes (Fabriek et al. 2008). Team interactions and the 
effectiveness of teams are affected by the cultural orientations of members (Karahanna, 
Evaristo and Srite 2005). Chao and Moon’s (2005) metaphor of culture as mosaic tiles 
subsumes the variety of OOSD team members in terms of demography, geography, 
values and behavior.  
 
Software projects are characterized from the outset by their uncertainty and complexity. 
Early project stages were found to be the most critical in terms of avoiding failures, as 
rectification of mistakes in later stages is expensive (Flowers 1996; Ewusi-Mensah 2003). 
Coordination measures involving interpersonal measures in formal and informal ways 
could help project managers cope with complexity (Kraut and Streeter 1995). However, 
both clients and vendors could pull coordination within projects in various directions 
(Sabherwal 2003). Interdependent knowledge chains among team members can be 
managed using coordination measures in terms of organization, work, technology and 
social interactions (Kotlarsky, van Fenema and Willcocks 2006). To be managed 
successfully, OOSD projects, because of their inherent offshore-specific risks, require 
more than fundamental project management skills from project managers (Iacovou and 
Nakatsu 2008). Research on IS failure has found that major failures can be attributed to 
organizational context, management processes, and project team capabilities within a 
project (e.g., Lucas 1975; Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 1991; Flowers 1996; Yeo 2002). 
Ewusi-Mensah (2003) found inappropriate project-team composition to be an important 
socio-technical factor that leads to failure. However, research regarding software 
development failures (Ewusi-Mensah 2003) and OOSD project failures has been scanty 
and no existing research directly addresses the context of offshore failures.  
 
The literature provides many hints toward answering research question #1 (“Which 
unique team-level aspects of offshore-outsourced software development projects lead to 
failures and how do they lead to failures?”). Several factors, including coordination, 
communication, organizational culture, explain the lack of success in offshore outsourced 
projects. However, it is not obvious whether those factors lead to failures directly, nor is 
the extent to which non-interactions in the early stages lead to failures well understood. 
Whether other aspects also lead to failures in the offshore outsourced context needs to 
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be explored further. The TIP theory offers a theoretical framework for explaining issues 
in a project within a single organization. However, failures in OOSD projects that involve 
multiple organizations cannot be explained using extant theories. The research gap 
between theory and empirical work in the offshore context requires an investigation into 
failed projects. 
Several failure studies have discussed the reasons behind failure in software projects (e.g., 
Standish 1995; Ewusi-Mensah 2003); however, those studies do not differentiate between 
early and late project phases. Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang’s (2006) work addresses 
the EWSs of failure during the first 20 percent of the project’s calendar, and concludes 
that social and project management risks are the dominant ones. Our own preliminary 
study of offshore project failures (without specifically studying offshore outsourcing) 
found coordination and communication factors to be relevant in the offshore context 
(Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010). EWSs are identified through project assessments 
during the project and gut-feelings of project managers (Klakegg et al. 2010). Offshore-
specific aspects that lead to project failure could plausibly affect the early project phases 
in OOSD projects. 
 
The lack of studies regarding the EWSs of failure in the OOSD project context means 
that deeper analysis is required to answer research question #2 regarding the EWSs of 
failures in OOSD projects. It was formulated as the following: What are the early 
warning signs specific to offshore-outsourced software development project failures that 
are related to the project team and how can the project managers perceive them?  In 
particular, several authors suggest that the influence of varying organizational and 
national contexts demands more analysis (e.g., Karahanna, Evaristo and Srite 2005; 
Huang and Trauth 2008). Little research exists on project failures and team interactions 
in the early phases; that is another area in need of further analysis. Also, even though 
project managers are closer to the project than other stakeholders and thus notice issues 
more quickly, few EWS studies concentrate on the project managers’ perspective (with 
some exceptions, like Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang (2006)). 
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The agency theory explains the difficulties involved in monitoring the actions and 
behaviors of actors and thus the inherent difficulty of detecting EWSs (Baiman 1990). 
Several factors related to software projects have been found to affect project managers’ 
ability to perceive the EWSs of failure. The uncertainty of projects from the outset (Hoch 
et al. 2000; Klakegg et al. 2010) as well as the difficulties of understanding complexities 
and mastering interpersonal effects (Klakegg et al. 2010) affect their ability to see through 
issues. Further, risks that are under the control of project managers are perceived as the 
least important ones, which could lead to overlooking them (Keil et al. 1998). Wallace 
and Keil (2004) conclude that risks related to the project team are important 
determinants of project outcomes. However, there is a dearth of studies that analyze 
EWSs from the team perspective. Assessment and management of risks form the two 
stages in risk management. While there are some exceptions – for instance, Keil and 
Montealegre (2000) study de-escalation procedures regarding projects having escalation 
of commitment towards a failing course – it remains true that few studies offer insights 
regarding the management of issues in the early project stages (Ansoff 1984; Nikander 
2002; Havelka and Rajkumar 2006).  
 
The limits of the literature on EWSs constitute a gap in the research, revealing that there 
is insufficient research to answer research question #3 (“How are the team-level EWSs 
of failure managed by project managers in OOSD projects? Why are they not managed 
effectively?”).  There are few guidelines for managing EWSs in a timely manner capable 
of putting projects back on track. The perception of early warning signs in the offshore-
outsourced environment by project managers merits a deeper analysis. The issues known 
in the early stages may not always be acted upon (Williams et al. 2012). The reasons 
behind and the consequences of the failure to manage them in OOSD projects remain 
unexplored.  
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3. Research design and methodology  
 
The survey of literature in the previous chapter reveals that there exist several research 
gaps  in explaining project failures in the onshore-offshore environment. EWSs or issues 
in the early project phase, in particular, have attracted little attention. In order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the circumstances and situations that project managers face in 
OOSD projects, we have adopted a qualitative approach (Stebbins 2001; Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005) for this thesis. Given the scarcity of the literature both on EWSs and on 
project failures in OOSD projects, a qualitative approach is more appropriate than the 
validation studies or theory testing that are predominant within quantitative research. 
 
A qualitative approach also matches well our study’s explorative nature and its emphasis 
on deeper analysis of factors that predict failure and of the perception of EWSs of failure. 
As exploration qualifies “as primarily inductive” (Stebbins 2001, p. 7), analyzing the 
partially-known phenomenon of OOSD project failures requires inductive reasoning to 
understand the failure process. Based on its use of inductive reasoning as well as an 
explorative point of view, qualitative research could “uncover new ideas and 
observations” (Stebbins 2001, p. 8), which is why we apply qualitative rather than 
quantitative methods in this thesis. Theoretical models developed from qualitative 
exploration could then help improve the prediction of the phenomenon under study. In 
this chapter, we present the qualitative research design that we employed. Our discussion 
covers the philosophical foundation (positivism), the research approach (qualitative 
exploration), the research method (grounded theory), the data collection technique 
(interviews) and the data analysis approach (qualitative data analysis) (Myers 2008; see 
figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Qualitative research design (based on Myers (2008)) 
 
3.1. Positivism 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative research are guided by basic underlying philosophical 
assumptions. Research in the social sciences has a positivist, interpretive, or critical 
underlying epistemology or set of philosophical assumptions (Myers 2008). Among these 
assumptions guiding research, positivist and interpretive approaches are the most 
common ones in IS research (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Dibbern et al. 2004).   
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Figure 9: Underlying philosophical assumptions (Myers 2008, p.37)  
 
Positivism is defined as the position that differentiates between facts and values, in which 
scientific knowledge comprises only facts (Walsham 1995). The reality, it is assumed, is 
“objectively given and can be described by measurable properties which are independent 
of the observer (researcher) and his or her instruments” (Myers 2008, p. 37). Positivists 
develop formal propositions, formulate hypotheses or draw inferences “about a 
phenomenon from the sample to a stated population.” (Myers 2008, p. 37). These 
inferences will be based “on the existence of a priori fixed relationships within 
phenomena” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p.5).  
 
On the other hand, interpretivists adopt “a non-deterministic perspective” (Dibbern et al. 
2004, p.21) to understand a phenomenon, and they assume the position that the 
“knowledge of reality is a social construction by human actors” (Walsham 1995, p.376). 
Interpretive researchers “attempt to understand phenomena through the meanings that 
people assign to them” (Myers 2008, p.38). There is no assumption regarding “a priori 
understanding of the situation” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p.5) for the interpretive 
researcher.  
 
The main differences between the positivist and interpretivist assumptions noted by the 
interpretive researcher Jörgen Sandberg are discussed by Weber (2004). Table 1 provides 
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a summary of Sandberg’s views in terms of ontology, epistemology, research object, 
method, theory of truth, validity, and reliability. 
 
Metatheoretical 
assumptions about 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontology Person (researcher) and 
reality are separate 
Person (researcher) and 
reality are inseparable (life-
world) 
Epistemology Objective reality exists 
beyond the human mind 
Knowledge of the world is 
intentionally constituted 
through a person’s lived 
experience 
Research object Research object has 
inherent qualities that exist 
independently of the 
researcher 
Research object is 
interpreted in light of 
meaning structure of 
person’s (researcher’s) lived 
experience 
Method Statistics, content analysis Hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, etc. 
Theory of truth Correspondence theory of 
truth: one-to-one mapping 
between research 
statements and reality 
Truth as intentional 
fulfillment: interpretations 
of research object match 
lived experience of object 
Validity Certainty: data truly 
measures reality 
Defensible knowledge 
claims 
Reliability Replicability: research 
results can be reproduced 
Interpretive awareness: 
researchers recognize and 
address implications of their 
subjectivity 
Table 1: Differences between positivism and interpretivism (Weber 2004, p. iv)  
 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 73 of 196 
 
This research has been undertaken from a positivist philosophical perspective. We 
assume that the researcher and the reality of project failures are separate and that 
knowledge of project failures and of the EWSs of failure can be extracted by investigating 
the reality objectively from both the vendor and client perspectives. We draw inferences 
from a sample of failed projects to make generalizations (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991) 
about the EWSs of failure that appear during the client and vendor collaboration. 
According to Stebbins (2001, p.11), “Social science exploration is positivistic, in part, 
because it is nomothetic, its principle [sic] goal being production of valid generalizations 
about a type of group, process, activity, or situation.” The phenomenon of OOSD 
project failure exists independent of the researcher and thus the objective reality can be 
mapped using empirical methods. 
 
 The study of EWSs prior to failures and of the unique aspects of OOSD projects in the 
offshore-onshore environment, in which the interactions of several stakeholders from the 
client and vendor groups form a unique ecosystem, were undertaken using the grounded 
theory methodology. In contrast to the objective application of research quality criteria 
like reliability and validity in quantitative studies, the use of these criteria in qualitative 
research remains problematic (Kirk and Miller 1986; Stebbins 2001). The quantitative 
measures required to check the above criteria cannot be applied satisfactorily in 
qualitative research.   Therefore, we adopted the qualitative criteria proposed by Corbin 
and Strauss (2008) to offer a robust qualitative research methodology. Their ten quality 
judgment criteria are: 1. fit, 2. applicability, 3. concepts, 4. contextualization of concepts, 
5. logic, 6. depth, 7. variation, 8. creativity, 9. sensitivity and 10. evidence of memos. We 
believe that these criteria can roughly establish the validity and reliability in qualitative 
research. Criteria like coding concepts and memos ensure the replicability of the results, 
whereas the remaining criteria ensure that the data truly measures the real world.  
 
The positivistic epistemology provides a logic and methodology for developing 
theoretical models capable of predicting project failures and identifying EWSs of failure, 
and thus helping reduce the instances of project failures. By reducing failures, 
organizations increase the benefits for stakeholders, which further maximizes their own 
likelihood of survival. The interpretivist philosophical foundation, on the other hand, 
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provides tools for answering questions about the meanings ascribed by people or 
researchers to their experiences, and to the words and deeds of other people. Since our 
research demands a logical approach that deals with reality beyond the lived experience of 
persons, the interpretivist epistemology would not be suitable for answering our research 
questions. 
3.2.  Qualitative-exploratory research 
 
Our preliminary study of EWSs of failure employed a Delphi survey (Philip, Schwabe and 
Wende 2010) that established the relevance of team-level research for understanding 
failures in OOSD projects. That study could be termed a “quantitative-exploratory” 
(Stebbins 2001, figure 10) approach to the little-researched phenomenon of OOSD 
project failures; its aim was to obtain an overview of offshore failures. This preliminary 
quantitative exploration mainly identified communication and coordination issues as the 
EWSs that manifested before offshore project failures; in addition, it found that a 
research focus on the team level was relevant to efforts to avoid failures. We will not 
discuss the preliminary study (Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010) in detail in this thesis. 
 
  
Figure 10:  Phenomena and research methods (Stebbins 2001, p.7) 
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The present research, carried out after the preliminary quantitative study, can be termed 
“qualitative-exploratory” (Stebbins 2001); the in-depth investigation of team interactions 
that lead to failures in OOSD projects demands this approach. We study the onshore-
offshore project environment in a qualitative way to offer theoretical conceptions 
regarding failures in OOSD projects. Based on Stebbin’s (2001) framework of explorative 
research methods, we have moved from the little-known phenomenon of offshore 
project failures in the preliminary study (Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010) towards the 
partially-known phenomenon of offshore-outsourced project failures in this thesis. We 
provide generic concepts for understanding OOSD project failures better; to some 
extent, we also offer a generic conceptualization of such failures. 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p.3) define qualitative research as “a situated activity that 
locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices 
that make the world visible.”  Using the practices and techniques of grounded theory, our 
aim has been to make the world of IS failures more visible. Further, Stebbins (2001, p. 3) 
defines exploration in social science as “a broad-ranging, purposive, systematic, 
prearranged undertaking designed to maximize the discovery of generalizations leading to 
description and understanding of an area of social or psychological life ... The emergent 
generalizations are many and varied; they include the descriptive facts, folk concepts, 
cultural artefacts, structural arrangements, social processes, and beliefs and belief systems 
normally found there.” Variations in social structures, cultural dimensions, work 
processes, and belief systems among the client and vendor team members involved merit 
deeper analysis to answer the research questions. The IS discipline primarily employs 
social science methods to conduct research, and our qualitative exploration will put forth 
generalizations that describe the phenomenon of study in OOSD projects in a 
comprehensive enough manner to allow for predictions regarding factors leading to 
project failure.  
3.3.  Grounded theory 
In IS research, the grounded theory method is widely used for qualitative studies, 
especially when the research is of an exploratory nature (Espinosa et al. 2007). This 
theory development approach was used as the general research method to answer our 
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research questions. It was the most appropriate method, considering the exploratory 
nature of the study as well as the sensitivity of failure research. This method of building 
theories through systematic collection and analysis of qualitative data was developed by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967). The extension of the original theory by Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) subsequently led to two different schools of grounded theory development – 
Glaserian and Straussian approaches. The former insists on grounding theories solely on 
collected data, whereas the latter allows a survey of the literature during the research 
process. We followed a Straussian approach (Corbin and Strauss 2008) to develop a 
theoretical account of OOSD project failures grounded in empirical data. We made 
extensive use of literature surveys before and after the data collection; this was necessary 
to situate the research in IS offshoring and failure research streams. Charmaz’s (2005, 
p.509) analysis of the history of grounded theory in social sciences concludes that both 
approaches “draw upon objectivist assumptions founded in positivism,” which further 
justifies our epistemological position. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989b) identifies three distinct uses of theory for research: as an initial guide 
to designing the collection of data, as a part of an iterative process to collect and analyze 
data, and as the final product of research. Theories strive to explain and predict 
phenomena and provide causal relationships between them (Sutton and Staw 1995). 
Further, according to the taxonomy of theory types in IS provided by Gregor (2006), the 
four primary goals of theory include (1) analysis and description, (2) explanation, (3) 
prediction, and (4) prescription. Among these goals, our primary goal has been the 
prediction of project failures, especially in early project phases. Theories aimed at 
predicting the phenomenon of interest “states what will happen in the future if certain 
preconditions hold. The degree of certainty in the prediction is excepted to be only 
approximate or probabilistic in IS” (Gregor 2006, p. 618). It should be noted that project 
failures cannot be predicted with precision, as any external or internal factor could bring a 
project, which is a unique undertaking, to its downfall. Further, we concentrated on 
developing a practical theory that facilitates the application of knowledge to the 
profession of project managers. As noted by Van de Ven (1989, p. 486), “Good theory is 
practical precisely because it advances knowledge in a scientific discipline, guides research 
toward crucial questions, and enlightens the profession of management.”   
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We develop testable propositions regarding the unique aspects that lead to project 
failures in OOSD projects, although we do not offer “well-developed justificatory causal 
explanations” (Gregor 2006, p. 619). Providing well-developed causality relationships 
between each construct (the domain of the theory of explanation) was not the prime 
objective of this research, since we aimed to provide prediction tools for project 
managers to help guide their actions as well as develop theoretical constructs regarding 
project failures and the EWSs of failure. In an exploratory field, developing a theory that 
could apply detecting EWSs of failure in order to predict project failure provides 
practicality and utility (Bacharach 1989) for project managers in terms of “what will be” 
(Gregor 2006) the situation in the future. However, we do provide explanations of 
project failures to some extent, and offer “a set of explanatory factors, without explaining 
the underlying causal connections between the dependent and independent variables” 
(Gregor 2006, p. 625). Our endeavor to identify the EWSs of failure and to seek the 
reasons behind the EWSs resulted in managerial tools for predicting project development 
in the onshore-offshore project environment. The EWSs of failure explain the general 
nature of relationship between the project issues and failures, without providing well-
developed causal explanations among the constructs. Lack of data triangulation 
possibilities of failed projects through the counterparts in other organizations was the 
main reason for the failure to advance our study from “partially-known phenomenon” to 
“better-known phenomenon” (Stebbins 2001). If opportunities for case study research 
(Yin 2003) on project failures comprising both the client and vendor sides arise in the 
future, the improved qualitative data such research could provide might result in 
explanatory theories of project failures. 
 
Several authors discuss the theoretical foundations of IT outsourcing (Dibbern et al. 
2004; Busi and McIvor 2008; Lacity, Khan and Willcocks 2009). More than 20 prominent 
theories from various disciplines in social sciences have been used to explain IT 
outsourcing decisions and outcomes. Our research presents a managerial and theoretical 
perspective to help illuminate the relatively unexplored area of offshore-outsourced 
failures. We develop a substantive theory – in the sense of Gregor (2006), which 
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describes a substantive theory as a theory developed for specific areas of inquiry, like 
failures, divorce etc. – to predict the phenomenon of OOSD project failures. 
3.4.  Interviews 
Qualitative research makes use of interviews as a data collection technique to “obtain a 
rich, in-depth experiential account of an event or episode in the life of the respondent” 
(Fontana and Frey 2000, p. 646).  Structured, unstructured, or semi-structured interviews 
individually or in groups (Myers and Newman 2007) are the three general forms of 
interviews in social science research. Among these forms, the unstructured or semi-
structured interview is the most common type used in IS qualitative research (Myers and 
Newman 2007). This interview type has an incomplete script and leaves room for 
improvising questions to obtain the rich details of OOSD projects. Clarification of 
specific issues by following up with questions was possible using the semi-structured 
interview type (Oshri, van Fenema and Kotlarsky 2008). 
 
We followed the dramaturgical model suggested by Myers and Newmann (2007) as the 
basis for conducting interviews. In order to avoid the problems and pitfalls of qualitative 
interviews, Myers and Newmann (2007) use the drama metaphor for interviews and 
elaborate on the concepts of drama, stage, actor, audience, script, entry, and exit that 
improve the quality of interview performance.   
 
In conducting the interviews, we used the interview guide approach described in (Myers 
2008) – that is, we came to the interview with a set of open-ended questions that guided 
the interview, but allowed substantial flexibility for interaction with the interviewee and 
for follow-up questions.  Although the interview guide is recommended only as an 
“emergency parachute” in the exploratory research context (Froschauer and Lueger 
2003), where more unstructured approaches are generally preferred, we found that 
structuring the interviews using the understanding of the phenomenon gained through 
the literature survey provided a better focus for the research. 
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Esterberg (2002) notes that a qualitative interview could legitimately ask the interviewee 
to elaborate on the following aspects: their experiences or behaviours, their opinions or 
values, their feelings, their factual knowledge, their sensory experiences, and their 
personal background. In general, we have included three types of questions in the 
interview script (Myers 2008): team and project contexts, related project issues, and 
demographic questions. While the demographic questions elicited the personal 
background of the interviewees, team and project contexts as well as questions related to 
project issues elicited other legitimate themes such as interviewees’ experiences, 
behaviours, opinions, or values, as well as factual knowledge, as suggested by Esterberg 
(2002). 
 
The semi-structured interview questions that covered team and project contexts as well as 
project issues are listed in table 2. The interviewees were asked to narrate a major OOSD 
project failure and success in their career based on these interview questions. Because of 
the sensitivity of the topic, they were assured of anonymity during this research and we 
did not insist on project managers revealing the names of companies involved in the 
cases, though some interviewees revealed these details voluntarily. Questions #1 through 
#7 elicited the team and project context information about the narrated projects based 
on the interviewee’s project experiences. Although we primarily analyzed project failures, 
question #1 was included to obtain a contrast between a project success and a project 
failure in the interviewees’ careers. This question regarding the critical success factors of 
the most successful OOSD project in the interviewees’ careers also acted as an entry 
question and set the field for the rather difficult questions regarding failures. Questions 
#2 through #7 dealt with the team and project contexts of a major OOSD project failure 
in the interviewee’s career. These questions also provided background information about 
the questions regarding project issues that followed. We provided our definitions of 
project failure (cf. section 1.1) and project team (cf. section 4.1) to answer these 
questions. 
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# Interview questions 
1. 
Could you please narrate the most successful OOSD project in your career? 
What were the critical success factors of that project?  
2. 
Could you please narrate a major OOSD project failure in your career? Please 
provide details such as original project objectives, human resources involved, 
duration and budget. 
3. 
Please provide details of the project set-up, such as countries involved, onshore-
offshore work distribution, project management, and control of the failed project 
mentioned in question #2. 
4. 
Could you please talk more about the failure process of the project mentioned in 
question #2 in terms of important project episodes or as a chain of events that 
affected the project? Please provide a timeline of the important episodes or 
events in the project. 
5. 
Could you please generally discuss the team member interactions between the 
vendor and client of the project mentioned in question #2? Could you 
differentiate between formal and informal activities?  
6. 
How was the project team maintained throughout the failed project? How do 
you rate the performances of different teams onshore and offshore? 
7. 
Were there any changes regarding the project team interactions between the 
vendor and client from the project team perspective after the events mentioned 
in question #4? 
8. 
What do you think were the specific aspects of the OOSD project team that led 
to failure in the project mentioned in question #2? How was the team different 
from domestic outsourcing? 
9. 
Was there a single underlying aspect of the project team identified in question #8 
that led to project failure? How were the other aspects related, if at all?  
10. 
Could you please identify the issues or indications of future issues (during the 
first 20% of the project’s collaboration period between the client and vendor) 
that led to the project failure mentioned in question #2? Please elaborate the 
issues using examples from the project team perspective that were related to the 
following team modes: 
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a. Inception mode, b. Problem-solving mode, c. Conflict resolution mode and d. 
Execution mode 
11. 
Can you think of other issues or indications of future issues (during the first 20% 
of the project’s collaboration period between the client and vendor) that led to 
the project failure mentioned in question #2? 
12. 
Did you notice the problems mentioned in questions #10-#11 during the failed 
project? Could you please reflect how the management of those problems could 
have saved the project? 
13. 
Did the management of the identified problems that led to failure appear critical 
for the most successful OOSD project that you mentioned in question #1? If 
not, please reflect on this. 
Table 2: Semi-structured interview questions 
 
Questions #8 and #9 aided in answering research question #1 (cf. section 1.2), which 
concerns the unique team-level aspects that predict OOSD project failures. The literature 
survey regarding this question revealed research gaps between theory and empirical work 
on the offshore project context that predict failures. These open-ended questions aimed 
to provide material for filling that gap and specifically elicited the team-level aspects that 
predicted failures as well as the extent to which non-interactions among project team 
members result in failures.    
 
The literature review to answer research question #2 revealed a clear lack of studies 
investigating the EWSs of failure in offshore-outsourced projects from the perspective of 
project managers, who are closer to the project than other stakeholders. Question #10 is 
based on the TIP theory (cf. section 2.2), which was used to understand the issues during 
the first 20% of the project’s collaboration between the client and vendor. Different 
modes of the TIP theory (inception, problem-solving, conflict resolution, and execution 
modes) allowed the interviewees to differentiate and provide examples of varying issues 
during the failed project. Although it is not common to use existing theoretical 
frameworks to develop grounded theory, we used the TIP theory “as an overarching 
framework for the study” (Myers 2008, p.112) of EWSs. We further asked the open-
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ended question #11 to identify other issues that cannot be categorized using the TIP 
theory modes. We identified and clustered (Miles and Huberman 1984) the EWSs of 
failure to understand the perception of EWSs by project managers.    
 
The insufficiency of existing research to answer research question #3 regarding the 
management of EWSs of failure was addressed using the open-ended question #12, 
which prompted analysis of how the EWSs identified in the answer to research question 
#2 were managed during the project collaboration. Further, question #13 examined 
whether the identified EWSs were addressed in the most successful OOSD project in 
interviewee’s career. The issues identified in failed projects were found to have been 
addressed in the successful projects, confirming that the analyzed project issues were 
worth studying and allowing us to draw a contrast between project success and failure.  
 
The demographic questions listed in table 3 provide personal background about the 
interviewee and offer valuable hints about his or her competence and experience in 
dealing with OOSD projects. As the interviews are based on career experiences, details  
# Demographic questions 
1. 
What is your nationality? 
2. 
What is your age group bracket (age groups in 5 year brackets, e.g. 31-35, 36-40)? 
3. 
How many countries have you worked in?  
4. 
How many years of IT-related experience do you have? 
5. 
How many years of OOSD project experience do you have? 
6. 
How many years of project-management experience do you have? 
7. 
How many years of OOSD project-management experience do you have? 
8. 
How many OOSD project failures and successes have you experienced in your 
career? 
Table 3: Demographic questions 
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like nationality, age-groups, work experiences, and number of failed and successful 
projects show the value of the data obtained through the interviews. In this thesis, we do 
not analyze the aspects related to nationalities, age-groups and countries where project 
managers worked, as they are beyond the scope of this work. The interviews we 
conducted were semi-structured expert interviews (Mayring 2002; Froschauer and Lueger 
2003) that focused on experienced project managers based in Switzerland and India. 
3.4.1. Interview partners 
Since we studied failures from the project team perspective, we included experienced 
project managers (PM) from the client and vendor sides in our research. The inclusion of 
both sides was important, as they played equal roles for the outcome of offshore projects. 
Only PMs with at least two years of OOSD project management experience were 
requested to take part in the interviews.  Client and vendor PMs were able to leverage 
their years of experience in OOSD projects and contribute to a better understanding of 
project failures.  
 
We contacted PMs involved in offshore projects at major multinational organizations 
located in Switzerland and India as the key informants for interviews. They were chosen 
as  interviewees since they were the “most knowledgeable and qualified” stakeholders 
involved in failed projects (Glick et al. 1990). We interviewed the initial contact persons 
and further asked them to recommend other PMs with possible experience of failed 
OOSD projects, a technique known as “snowballing” in qualitative research (Myers and 
Newman 2007). Altogether, we interviewed 42 PMs during the period from October 
2011 to February 2012. However, we could only use 19 of these interviews (9 from the 
client and 10 from the vendor sides) for data analysis. The other 23 interviews could not 
be used for analysis, as those managers defined failure in a manner different from our 
definition; therefore, their project cases did not qualify for inclusion within our narrow 
failure definition. These latter interview cases came under the categories of challenged 
projects (Standish 1995), or nearshore projects within the same continent (Carmel and 
Abbott 2007).  
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The ratio of project managers who had experienced OOSD project failures (19 PMs) to 
project managers who had not (23 PMs) indicates that most real-world projects are 
completed. Most PMs had experience with projects that overshot their budget and 
timeline.  
 
Table 4 offers background information about interviewees and shows the overall career 
experience of the project managers (from both the client and the vendor sides) whose 
interviews were included in our data analysis. On average, the client PMs interviewed had 
more IT-related, project management, and OOSD project management experience than 
the vendor PMs. The median value of OOSD project failures was 1 for both clients and 
vendors; however, the higher standard deviation of client PMs (11.22) compared to 
vendor PMs (1.37) could reflect the differences in the project context for clients and 
vendors. 
 Clients Vendors 
No. of interviewed project managers 9 10 
IT-related (average years) 16.56 15.22 
OOSD project (average years) 8.33 9.56 
Project management (average years) 11.11 8.56 
OOSD project management 
(average years) 
7.22 6.11 
Median (standard deviation) of 
OOSD failures 
1 (11.22) 1 (1.37) 
Median (standard deviation) of 
OOSD successes 
12 (21.02) 5.5 (16.08) 
 
Table 4: Overall career experience of project managers 
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3.4.2. Interview cases 
Table 5 provides an overview of the failed OOSD project cases6 that were analyzed. It 
shows a summary of the countries involved in failed OOSD projects, the industry where 
the project was executed, and the cancellation phase during the project. All projects 
involved India as the offshore destination, and thus this study can be considered India-
centric. The industries represented in the sample include banking, air transport, power 
generation, public sector, automotive, and insurance. The research could be equally 
applied to all industries involved in OOSD projects, although some financial industries 
such as banking could be considered more information-intensive than others.  
 
Interview cases Countries involved Industry Cancellation phase 
A Germany, India, 
Switzerland 
Power generation Integration and 
testing 
B India, Switzerland Banking  Integration and 
testing 
C India, Switzerland Insurance Integration and 
testing 
D India, Switzerland Banking  Integration and 
testing 
E India, Switzerland Banking  Integration and 
testing 
F India, Switzerland Insurance Requirement analysis 
G India, Switzerland Banking  Integration and 
testing 
H India, Singapore, 
Switzerland 
Banking  Integration and 
testing 
I India, Switzerland Air transport Integration and 
testing 
                                              
6 The terms “project cases,” “interview cases,” and “cases” are used interchangeably in this 
thesis. Please note that they should not be confused with case studies. 
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J Germany, India, 
Switzerland 
Insurance Integration and 
testing 
K India, Switzerland Banking  Integration and 
testing 
L India, USA Automotive Integration and 
testing 
M India, Switzerland, 
USA 
Insurance Requirement analysis 
N Germany, India, 
Switzerland 
Public sector Integration and 
testing 
O Germany, India  Automotive Integration and 
testing 
P India, Switzerland Public sector Integration and 
testing 
Q India, Switzerland Insurance Integration and 
testing 
R India, Switzerland Air transport Integration and 
testing 
S India, Canada, 
Switzerland 
Insurance Requirement analysis 
 
Table 5: Failed project cases 
 
All project cancellations described in the interviews happened during the last 10 years. In 
terms of methodologies applied, only project case Q used agile methodology; the rest 
were executed using the waterfall model. The typical phases of an OOSD project 
encompass requirement analysis, design, coding, and integration and testing. Most of the 
projects limped along all the way to the integration and testing phase, where the final 
decision of project cancellation was taken. The cancellation took place earlier only in 
project cases F, M, and S; these were cancelled during the requirement and analysis phase, 
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where the lack of business benefits and project management capabilities were noted early 
during the execution. 
3.5.  Qualitative data analysis 
The techniques we applied for analyzing qualitative data included the analysis of memos, 
series of events, critical incidents, content analysis, and inductive analysis (Myers 2008). 
Once the theoretical saturation of categories and concepts was reached as required by the 
grounded theory approach (Corbin and Strauss 2008), we limited our inquiry to 19 
project cases. The average interview duration was around 1 hour.  The interviews were 
recorded on tape and subsequently transcribed, resulting in a total of 255 pages of text. 
The interview text was sent to the interviewees for validation.  
 
We wrote memos for each emerged concept, which were analyzed further for developing 
categories. Content analysis allowed us to make sense of the events, issues, and situations 
that were instrumental to project failures. According to Patton (2002, p. 381), content 
analysis involves “the process of identifying, coding, and categorizing the primary 
patterns in the data.” Open and axial coding schemes (Boyatzis 1998; Corbin and Strauss 
2008) were employed to build thematic categories of data and to understand the 
relationships between the emerging concepts and categories.  Open coding was employed 
in the initial analysis to delineate concepts from the data. Then, we used axial coding to 
relate the emerged concepts to each other; in total, we had 91 concepts. We then applied 
inductive analysis in order to understand the patterns and relationships between 
concepts. Patton (2002, p. 390) notes that in inductive analysis  “the patterns, themes, 
and categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data rather than 
being imposed on them prior to data collection and analysis.” 
 
We employed the MAXQDA 10 software for data coding and analysis. The emerged 
concepts were combined to develop theoretical predications about failures in the early 
stages of OOSD projects. The process of developing theoretical constructs (Lee and 
Baskerville 2003) regarding EWSs of failure and OOSD projects was far from easy, 
which could also explain the fact that so far little extensive research has been undertaken 
into OOSD projects and failures.  
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The categories that we constructed on the basis of the concepts were subsumed into 
general ones from the particulars (Miles and Huberman 1984), so as to enable the 
development of theoretical constructs. We clustered categories (Miles and Huberman 
1984) and employed Lee and Baskerville’s (2003) generalizability framework to make 
qualitative generalizations about emerging concepts. As the complex nature of project 
failures makes statistical generalization difficult (Lyytinen and Hirschheim 1987), our 
qualitative data analysis mainly looked for generalizations from empirical observations to 
theoretical statements. Among the four types of generalizations classified by Lee and 
Baskerville (2003, see table 6), we generalized from empirical statements culled from 
interviews to theoretical statements – that is, we used the data gathered through the 
interviews in the development of theoretical constructs. We also synthesized empirical 
statements from the literature to other (more general) empirical statements, and 
generalized from theoretical statements (e.g., TIP theory) to empirical statements. 
 
 Generalizing to Empirical 
statements  
Generalizing to 
Theoretical statements  
Generalizing from 
Empirical statements 
EE – Generalizing from 
data to description  
 
This involves generalizing 
data to a measurement, 
observation, or other 
description. 
ET – Generalizing from 
description to theory  
 
This involves generalizing 
measurement, observation 
or other description to a 
theory. 
Generalizing from 
Theoretical statements  
TE – Generalizing from 
theory to description  
 
This involves generalizing a 
theory, confirmed in one 
setting, to descriptions of 
other settings. 
TT – Generalizing from 
concepts to theory  
 
This involves generalizing a 
variable, construct, or other 
concept to a theory. 
Table 6: Generalizability framework (adapted from Lee and Baskerville 2003, p. 
233)  
 
The known as well as emerging concepts were further confirmed and validated against 
the extant literature to relate our study to the empirical and theoretical findings in the 
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research area (Corbin and Strauss 2008). This adds to the plausibility of our research 
findings by providing theoretical coherence (Miles and Huberman 1984).   
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4. Unique aspects of  OOSD project failures  
 
4.1.  Introduction  
 
The higher risks involved in OOSD projects make them more difficult to manage than 
domestic outsourcing projects. The literature on IT outsourcing provides some insight 
into the factors that make these projects more challenging. However, empirical research 
on project failures has been too scant in IT outsourcing to offer a concrete diagnosis of 
the specific aspects that predict project failures. Several project teams7 are involved in the 
development of software at the onshore and offshore locations. Especially in multi-
national corporations, the organizational set-ups can be very complicated to coordinate 
between the teams involved, as the teams are located in several countries. In OOSD 
projects, two or more teams work together from different onshore and offshore locations 
to achieve the project objectives (Oshri, Kotlarsky and Willcocks 2009).   
 
OOSD projects are globally distributed projects that involve team members from 
vendors and clients working at onshore and offshore sites (figure 11). Typically, three 
different subteams will be involved in such projects, namely, client onshore, vendor 
onshore, and vendor offshore subteams.8 Except within the same location, the teams 
work as virtual units. Instead of working as a single team unit like in in-house projects – 
or often in captive offshoring (same organization) as well – offshore-outsourced projects 
involve three loosely connected subteams that work for a common objective. Each 
subteam has its own leads, who usually act as primary interfaces between teams. The 
vendor offshore and onshore teams mostly come from sub-units in the global 
organization, with project leads having multiple responsibilities and fulfilling “linking 
pin” functions in organizational charts (Likert 1967).  
                                              
7 The terms “groups” and “teams” are used interchangeably in this thesis. Academic literature 
from sociology, organizational science, and psychology tends to use the word “group” as 
opposed to popular management and IS literature that uses the word “team” (Cohen and Bailey 
1997). 
8 Since client and vendor onshore team members mostly work at the onshore site, they will be 
collectively referred to as “onshore teams” in this chapter. The vendor offshore team will be 
referred to as the “offshore team.” OOSD projects can also have client members distributed 
across the globe within the same organization. 
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Figure 11: OOSD project team  
 
In this work, we define OOSD project team as a group of team members comprising 
members from subteams9 in two or more organizations from different countries, working 
together to accomplish a common project objective. In the IT outsourcing context, the 
project objective is the development of the information system contracted by the client 
and guided by the client’s organizational objective. Onshore and offshore teams are 
responsible for mostly interdependent tasks, and the challenge in the offshore context is 
to integrate different teams into a single project team. The organizational team setup at 
the vendor side, with its onshore and offshore teams, exacerbates the complexity of 
coordination activities in OOSD projects. The IS outsourcing context involves boundary-
spanning activities across organizations and nations. The project team is embedded in the 
inter-organizational and multi-national environments (figure 12) and these environments 
set the “conditions under which group interaction takes place” (McGrath 1984, p. 14). 
 
                                              
9 We use the terms “teams” and “subteams” interchangeably in this thesis. The term “project 
team” is used to refer to the integrated unit of subteams in all locations, whereas “teams” and 
“subteams” are referred to subteams at onshore or offshore locations. 
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Figure 12: OOSD team embedment  
 
According to Carmel (1999), the loss of “teamness” in dispersed teams affects the 
performance of global projects. Most social science and IS research has concerned co-
located or captive teams and there exists little solid research on the dynamics in OOSD 
project teams that predicts project failures (Lacity et al. 2010; Hinds, Liu and Lyon 2011). 
The failure to work together as a single project team is an area that calls for extensive 
research in IT outsourcing. In this chapter, we analyze the project context (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008) that could predict failures in OOSD projects. We investigate, in an 
exploratory manner, the unique characteristics of project teams in OOSD projects as well 
as the team member (non)interactions that predict project failures10. 
 
To reiterate the research question formulated in chapter 1: 
 
Which unique team-level aspects of offshore-outsourced software development projects predict failures and 
how do they predict failures? 
                                              
10 Parts of this chapter have been published earlier in (Philip, Wende and Schwabe 2012) and 
(Philip, Wende and Schwabe 2013b). 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 94 of 196 
 
4.2. Unique failure-predicting aspects of OOSD projects 
The qualitative analysis of empirical data (cf. section 3.5) resulted in the identification of 
distinct patterns of team-level aspects that predict project failures. Six general categories 
of project aspects that help predict project failures at the team level emerged by 
subsuming particular characteristics into more general categories (Miles and Huberman 
1984). They include both offshore-specific and non-offshore specific aspects (Philip, 
Wende and Schwabe 2012). Offshore-specific aspects are unique to OOSD projects and 
require special attention. They are: project team-building efforts, team collaboration, 
awareness of shared work context, and onshore-offshore team coordination. Non-offshore 
specific aspects are not unique to OOSD projects, but in order to overcome the 
disadvantages caused by the offshore environment, they require more attention in that 
environment than in domestic software outsourcing projects. They include shared project 
execution structures and team member competencies.  
 
We further differentiated the emerged categories into three higher-level categories that 
affect team performance: team initiation, team interactions, and team moderators. Team 
initiation efforts build up the OOSD project team and include the aspects of setting up 
of shared project structures and team-building efforts. The initiation influences 
subsequent team interactions, which are manifested in the collaboration between teams 
and the awareness of shared work context among onshore and offshore teams. 
Furthermore, the category of team moderators influences team development and 
performance by influencing, throughout the life of the OOSD project, the other team 
development categories, namely, team initiation and team interactions. 
 
After the identification of those aspects of the functioning of project teams that predict 
failures, we reconciled them with the extant literature, which we discuss in the sections 
below. Some of the characteristics or factors contributing to failures that emerged in our 
exploratory research were prominently noted in the literature, although those researchers 
did not focus on failures. We further developed theoretical propositions to predict 
project failures based on our exploration as well as on literature on partially-known 
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phenomena (Stebbins 2001) related to failures. Please note that section 3.4.2 provides an 
overview of the project cases that are referenced in this work. 
4.2.1. Team initiation 
4.2.1.1. Project team-building efforts 
Failure to build a functioning project team by integrating team members from the client 
and vendor organizations may be an indication that the project is heading toward a failing 
direction. The onshore vendor project manager of case P remarked the following about 
the team-building exercise among dispersed team members and the barriers that led to 
failures: “You cannot ignore the status of team building. And if you start to ignore it, 
even if we have methods, even if we have processes, we are running a project. We are not 
doing business as usual. It’s not something that has a clear input and a clear output. … 
And there I need to have a very high focus on team building. And as more of my team is 
distributed, the more I need to take care of our team building.” The integration of  
individual talents (Curtis, Krasner and Iscoe 1988) in different locations into a single 
project team is required in OOSD projects.  
 
OOSD projects mostly experience “semi-virtual” interactions, in which selected team 
members get the chance to visit their colleagues onsite or offshore. However, Oshri, 
Kotlarsky and Willcocks (2009) note that such meetings are short, formal and sporadic in 
nature, which hinders the development of social ties. The lack of social ties and 
opportunities to openly discuss project matters was found to affect the bonding and 
rapport among the team members, in accordance with the findings of Kotlarsky and 
Oshri (2005). As the project manager of case D remarked: “There was a lot of interaction 
but as you can see through the corrective measures, one member once said, ‘I need to be 
able to look the people I am working with in the eye.’ When you have a video conference 
or a telephone conference, they heard what the other party said but they never had a 
team-building off the context of the professional element, or always just a personal 
relationship to the others.” 
 
Team cohesion has been known to be a factor that predicts improved project 
performance (Bettenhausen 1991). Hofstede (1984) identified individualism/collectivism 
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as one of the cultural dimensions that varies at the national level. Collectivism refers to a 
sense of being part of the collective group that is embedded in a social and cultural 
setting. Most Asian nations rank high in this dimension, whereas Western countries were 
found to have an individualistic outlook. Bochner and Hesketh (1994) found empirical 
support that teams that are high on collectivism put more emphasis on group 
performance and recognition.  Further, Gibson (1999) found that the level of collectivism 
moderates the positive relationship between team efficacy and team effectiveness. 
However, in another quantitative team study, Eby and Dobbins (1997) found no direct 
links between team collectivism and team performance; rather than by collectivism, 
performance was determined by the willingness of teams to cooperate. 
 
We found that the lack of a shared sense of identity within the project team affected the 
outcome in failed projects. The establishment of a shared identity among the dispersed 
teams has proved crucial to establishing a functioning project team. MacDuffie (2007, p. 
569) defines shared identity as “the degree of commonality in perceiving oneself as a 
member of an established and esteemed in-group with a particular identity, set of values, 
norms, and routines.” Mostly, the vendor offshore team could be viewed as the out-
group in the project team since they are far from the action and depend on the transfer 
of knowledge from onshore to work effectively. For instance, in project case N, the 
vendor offshore team was given the specifications for the software to be developed 
without any context information, and was simply expected to deliver to the onshore 
team. The vendor onshore project manager of case N agreed that the vendor onshore 
team could not identify with the offshore team and even questions from offshore were 
blocked by the onshore team members. The table 7 provides an overview of the 
development phases in an OOSD project with the sites and typical teams involved from 
project cases. Although team composition can vary depending on task complexity and 
familiarity, vendor offshore team members cannot always follow the relevant social and 
non-verbal cues that could smooth collaboration between team members. Most teams 
will be involved in the various development stages, except for the coding and the 
maintenance phases, where the vendor team members mostly work independently.   
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Development phases Sites Teams 
Requirement analysis Onshore, offshore Client onshore, 
vendor onshore, 
vendor offshore 
Design Onshore, offshore Client onshore, 
vendor onshore, 
vendor offshore 
Coding Offshore Vendor offshore 
Integration and testing Onshore, offshore Client onshore,  
Vendor onshore, 
vendor offshore 
Maintenance Offshore Vendor offshore 
Table 7: Typical OOSD phases and team involvements 
 
Furthermore, new team members could be introduced into the project team at any phase 
of the project, which points to the necessity for mechanisms to help new team members 
feel part of the project team. Also in projects P and O, the offshore team members did 
not feel part of the project team because of the lack of team-building measures between 
the onshore and offshore teams. This hindered the development of the trust and rapport 
that are required to offset the differences in national and organizational work practices 
that exist between the teams.   
 
The TIP theory holds that all team members work together as an integrated team in the 
execution mode (McGrath 1991), a scenario that was missing in failed OOSD projects. 
The client, vendor onshore, and vendor offshore teams need to develop a shared identity 
to improve team cohesiveness and thus team performance. In order to emphasize the 
integrated nature of the offshore and onshore teams, we formulate the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Shared identity within the project team comprising offshore and 
onshore teams will reduce the likelihood of project failure in OOSD projects. 
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4.2.1.2. Shared project execution structures 
The lack of a shared understanding regarding project execution among onshore and 
offshore team members results in projects not being completed according to the original 
project objectives. The geographical and cultural distance entails the need for mutually 
agreed-upon project structures to avoid failures. The vendor onshore manager of case K 
noted the necessity of structures in OOSD projects as follows: “You might have a 
maverick pulling the project through, but if you don’t have a structure for offshore 
projects, you will not succeed. And offshore [project] requires that to be done.” A lack of 
shared project structures and the consequent divergent expectations among team 
members on different sites result from varying organizational and professional practices. 
Key project structures include scope formulation, requirement specifications, approvals, 
communication, documentation, tracking, and roles and responsibility assignment; all 
these require more formality in the absence of direct meeting possibilities. Formal 
structures will compensate for the social cues that are left out in a semi-virtual working 
environment. For example, the project in case F had to be cancelled in the requirement 
analysis phase as the project scope kept changing and the insecurity surrounding the 
execution of such a project offshore was high. Similarly, the client project manager of 
case M noted that the scope change of internal projects was still possible, whereas with 
outsourcing arrangements, the changes proved very difficult. 
 
According to the TIP theory, projects with ill-defined processes will spend more time in 
problem-solving and conflict resolution modes (McGrath 1991). The lack of co-located 
work possibilities demands that project structures be defined in an unambiguous manner. 
The formulation of project structures at the outset of the OOSD project allows the 
project to spend most of the time in the execution mode. The standardization of work 
processes, tools and systems (Hinds and Mortensen 2005) might also reduce the 
difficulties caused by perceived physical distance between the onshore and offshore 
teams. As the opportunities for face-to-face informal communication become rare for the 
project team, the additional formal structures that are shared by clients and vendors will 
offer fewer confrontation possibilities.  
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Ramasubbu et al.’s (2008) work regarding offshore software development performance 
indicates that structured processes could mitigate the negative effects of work dispersion 
between teams. Unlike structured processes like CMM processes, we found that having 
mutually accepted structures (Sakthivel 2007) and expectations about the project 
management processes (Rottman and Lacity 2008) are crucial for the outcome. 
Karahanna et al. (2005) assert that organizational and professional cultures will dominate 
over national cultural traits in team behaviors that involve strong task components or 
work practices (cf. (Hofstede 1984)). Similarly, Earley and Mosakowski (2000, p. 26) 
found that virtual teams in multinational organizations develop a hybrid team culture 
over time, which they define as “an emergent and simplified set of rules, norms, 
expectations, and roles that team members share and “enact.””  
 
Furthermore, Brannen and Salk (2000) report the development of a “negotiated culture” 
that could be a mutation of different team cultures, rather than one organizational culture 
clearly dominating the other by establishing its work practices in the project. Team work 
practices that are emergent or negotiated need to be mutually accepted and understood. 
Such a shared understanding of project structures and expectations forms the 
fundamental basis for executing offshore projects. MacDuffie (2007, p. 569) define 
shared understanding as “the degree of cognitive overlap and commonality in beliefs, 
expectations, and perceptions about goals, tasks, processes, and members’ knowledge, 
skills, and abilities.” The lack of a shared understanding of project structures between the 
onshore and offshore teams could lead to project failures. We formulate the following 
proposition regarding shared project structures in OOSD projects, where the 
organizational and work practice differences cause various perceptions of project 
activities. 
 
Proposition 2: A shared understanding of project structures between onshore and 
offshore teams will reduce the likelihood of project failure in OOSD projects. 
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4.2.2. Team interactions 
4.2.2.1. Collaboration between teams 
Onshore and offshore team members interact with each other intensively to develop 
information systems. This requires adaptation to the onshore-offshore project 
environment.  The requirement specification, in particular, is a collaborative activity that 
requires intensive communication (Edwards and Sridhar 2005). The heterogeneity of 
teams in different locations requires a shared understanding of the team’s collaborating 
mechanism (Gibson and Zellmer-Bruhn 2001). Kotlarsky and Oshri (2005, p. 40) define 
collaboration as a multi-dimensional process that involves  “constructs such as 
coordination, communication, meaning, relationships, trust and structure.”  
The onshore vendor project manager of case Q remarked that any information 
transmitted through communication is relative: “Any kind of language, either written or 
spoken, is subjective, not objective.” If communication is to provide a basis for effective 
collaboration, information needs to be conveyed and converged (Dennis, Fuller and 
Valacich 2008) to ensure that the distant offshore team members understand the 
semantics in a manner compatible with that of the onshore actors. The onshore vendor 
project manager of case P noted the following regarding the challenges in collaboration 
and sharing project context: “There is a barrier in communication. I cannot look into the 
eyes of the other one, I cannot hear the kind of volume and melody his voice is making 
or her voice is making. I cannot really ask questions.” Nevertheless, he maintained that 
increased interactions, especially face-to-face ones, made people feel a part of the project 
team: “When people travel here and then back, after a couple of months they were 
behaving as one team. But, as I said, the people, it was not a bottleneck, the process was 
a bottleneck.” However, as Oshri, Kotlarsky and Willcocks (2009) note, face-to-face 
meetings are events that are too rare to sustain effective communication in OOSD 
projects.           
 
The deployment of appropriate communication media plays an important role in 
improving collaboration among onshore and offshore actors (Wende, Schwabe and 
Philip 2010). How the team members on the opposite sides of the onshore/offshore 
divide perceive each other depends on a combination of formal and informal 
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communication measures over time. Depending on the interdependency and complexity 
of tasks, asynchronous media like e-mail and documents, or synchronous media like chat, 
telephone, videoconferencing, and face-to-face communications can be deployed to 
execute necessary tasks (including generation of ideas and plans, intellectual tasks, 
judgment tasks and negotiation of conflicts of interests (Hollingshead, McGrath and 
O'Connor 1993)). The social cues, information richness, and distractions of media will 
determine the effectiveness of the media to execute the tasks (Daft and Lengel 1986; 
Hollingshead, McGrath and O'Connor 1993). Short, Williams and Christie (1976) note 
that face-to-face meetings will improve the social perception of the other side. However, 
such meetings between team members from both the vendor and client happen only 
occasionally in OOSD projects. The use of asynchronous communication in the virtual 
team context puts an end to the formal social control in co-located teams such as direct 
supervision and social trust (Montoya-Weiss, Massey and Song 2001). Lee-Kelley, 
Crossman and Cannings’ (2004, p. 656) study of virtual teams found that an 
“asynchronous communication process converts a two-way dialogue into a two-way 
monologue, which can create issues of attributing meanings.” Instances of informal 
spontaneous communication11 (like water-cooler or corridor talk) that can improve 
collaboration by reducing conflicts and friction in the information flow are as rare as 
face-to-face meetings in OOSD projects.  
 
An aberration that we found resulted from the optimization of project resources was the 
missing collaboration between client onshore and vendor offshore teams. This reduced 
the information intensity that reached the vendor offshore team. Figure 13 depicts the 
situation experienced by the vendor project manager of case N that led to project failure. 
The communication direction in the project was set up without involving the offshore 
team members. The vendor onshore team acted as a facilitator between the client and 
vendor offshore teams, and so the vendor offshore members only knew about the  
                                              
11 Hinds and Mortensen (2005, p. 293) describe spontaneous communication as “informal, 
unplanned interactions that occur among team members.” 
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Figure 13: Collaboration setup 
 
explicitly formulated information about the project, which was not rich in content, and 
missed the tacit and idiosyncratic details.  As knowledge of European social security 
systems was necessary for the completion of the project and as the vendor offshore 
members did not possess such knowledge, they were unable to provide the expected 
deliverables.  The same scenario was repeated in case I: no offshore team member was 
involved in direct communication with the client.  That was the main reason for the 
failure of the project – the offshore members did not understand the project 
requirements completely since the documented requirements were not explicit enough 
for the Indian developers to comprehend.  
 
The offshore vendor project manager of project case O noted the disregard of the 
offshore team that led to the breakdown of collaboration: “That complete lack of 
collaboration and communication and collaboration at the team member level and 
communication at the management level [were the aspects leading to failure]. There was 
no communication… The communication should have been much more frequent, much 
more strong, more ad hoc also at times, but it was not. There was no respect for the 
offshore team, I would say. It’s difficult for me to tell that, but at times I feel that they 
don’t care about the offshore project team, especially the offshore project manager, 
would like to talk to them. That was another reason. The reason why what happened is 
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that because of lack of communication the offshore project manager was not able to 
direct his team in the right direction. He himself was directionless.” The absence of a 
direct communication channel can affect the quality of teamwork by consuming more 
time and acting as a source of faulty information exchange (Hoegl and Gemuenden 
2001). Buchan, Croson and Dawes (2002) found that cooperation decreases with 
increased social distance – a characterization that applies to the OOSD project context – 
and thus the trust level will also be lower in indirect-exchange conditions than in direct-
exchange conditions. Furthermore, Metiu’s (2006) study of distributed captive groups has 
shown that the main problem in collaborating across borders lies in the teams’ lack of 
desire to work in a cooperative manner, not in the sophistication of communication 
tools. This becomes relevant as the vendor organizations are in a sense multi-national 
software development organizations with captive centers in onshore or offshore 
locations. 
 
Information intensity will be reduced with the intervention of facilitators located 
onshore, and so the vendor offshore members need to have a presence onshore to 
capture the missing bits and bytes relevant to the development. The collaboration level is 
also affected by the organizational culture and geographic distance between onshore and 
offshore teams that lead to information asymmetries between them. The lack of 
involvement from the vendor offshore team in the collaboration setup will result in the 
loss of tacit, embedded, and encultured knowledge required for the software 
development, which could prolong the project timeline and overshoot the budget. The 
following proposition captures the nuances lost in OOSD project collaboration leading 
to failures.  
 
Proposition 3: Direct collaboration between vendor offshore and client onshore 
teams will reduce the likelihood of project failure in OOSD projects. 
 
4.2.2.2. Awareness of shared work context 
 
Team initiation efforts can lead to interactions between onshore and offshore teams that 
may further develop into an awareness of onshore-offshore work context. This emerging 
state, shared among team members, requires the combined efforts of offshore and 
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onshore project managers. The client project manager of case B noted the lack of 
awareness of shared work context: “Because it [work context] is different and it is not a 
question of bad and good, it is different. And if you are not aware enough of this issue 
then you could not solve it.”  The client manager expected the vendor onshore and 
offshore organizations to manage the local contextual work differences between them; 
however, the vendor teams did not collaborate intensively enough to allow each side to 
become aware of the shared project work context.  
 
Differences in national and organizational cultures hinder the development of shared 
awareness among onshore and offshore teams. The onshore vendor project manager of 
case K remarked the following about the impact of culture on collaborative work: 
“Collaboration is … something which is different for different cultures. So you have to 
adapt to the needs of different cultures. For example, the Swiss are very, very people 
oriented. They would like to see the team. So organizing video conferences … being able 
to see the person face to face, by organizing visits where the customer team goes to 
offshore to meet the project team, interacts with them, or even virtual parties.”  
 
Several researchers address team presence and the activities that provide context to team 
members. Short, Williams and Christie (1976, p. 65) define the construct of social 
presence as “the degree of salience of the other person in the interaction and the 
consequent salience of the interpersonal relationships,” which explains how individuals 
or teams are perceived to be present in the medium by other individuals or teams. How a 
team’s social presence is perceived depends on the capacity of the medium to “transmit 
information about facial expression, direction of looking, posture, dress and non-verbal 
vocal cues” (Short, Williams and Christie 1976, p. 65). Face-to-face interactions are 
perceived to have the highest social presence compared to lean media such as e-mail, 
which has fewer social cues and also a low social presence. A higher social presence also 
contributes to greater awareness of the shared work context. However, in OOSD 
projects face-to-face interactions are limited to a few selected team members. 
 
Apart from having an optimal social presence, the lack of awareness regarding each 
other’s cultural context can hamper team interactions between vendor and client teams. 
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A lack of cultural sensitivity or respect for the offshore team can lead to an exodus of 
offshore team members, as the onshore client project manager of case L experienced. 
This US project manager’s rigid and hard-hitting communication style offended and 
demotivated the Indian team members, and most of the team members eventually left the 
company, leading to the cancellation of the project. 
 
We found, however, that the effects of cultural distance between onshore and offshore 
teams diminished or even disappeared over time in teams that invested sufficient effort in 
team-building. The client project manager of project case F found that: “With the time, 
with the experience you get that [culture] factor under control and it doesn’t play a role 
anymore today. Because people know how the culture works and how to interact best.” 
The client project manager of case M had this to say about the development of cultural 
sensitivities: “It doesn’t really matter where they come from as long as you understand 
where they come from and accept any differences of culture. So I would say it doesn’t 
really matter who you are working together with as long as you do it on a respectful way.” 
National cultural dimensions were found to be less relevant when team members invest 
effort in cooperating. As Karahanna, Evaristo and Srite (2005) note, the work practices 
established within the team trump underlying national values. 
 
Nevertheless, the absence of social cues and the breakdown of social constraints in the 
mostly virtual collaboration during offshore software development can lead to a loss of 
shared context. Team members can find themselves in a state of deindividuation (Lea and 
Spears 1991), in which dispersion can result in low accountability, self-awareness and 
reduced feelings such as empathy, embarrassment, and guilt (Diener 1979; Siegel et al. 
1986). Montoya-Weiss, Massey and Song (2001) found that the use of asynchronous 
communication in the virtual team context prevented shared experience among team 
members, although shared experience is usually present in co-located software 
development. On the other hand, Hollingshead, McGrath and O'Connor’s (1993) 
research found that intellectual tasks (such as software development) are not necessarily 
performed better in face-to-face situations than in virtual ones.  
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Dourish and Bellotti (1992) studied the need for team members to be aware of how their 
activities and presence provide context to other members. In the distributed project 
collaboration, the onshore team’s awareness of the presence and activities of the offshore 
team members, and vice versa, played a role in transferring knowledge effectively. The 
diversity of local contexts further exacerbates the transfer of embedded and local 
knowledge between sites (Oshri, van Fenema and Kotlarsky 2008). Damian and Zowghi 
(2003a) found that reduced awareness of the local context can affect the requirement 
analysis negotiations in the early project stages. Similarly, Hinds and Mortensen (2005) 
found that if virtual teams shared a work context, that could help moderate the 
relationship between interpersonal conflicts and distribution as teams could make better 
sense of team member behaviors. They define shared context as a state “when team 
members have access to the same information and share the same tools, work processes, 
and work cultures” (p.293).  
 
Baba et al. (2004, p. 551) argue that knowledge sharing between teams leads to a process 
called  cognitive convergence (“team members gradually enhance the degree of overlap 
or similarity among their cognitive structures”) that can improve virtual team 
performance. Further, they contend that higher interdependencies between teams, as well 
as greater task complexity, call for intensive interaction between teams to improve shared 
understanding. Dispersed collaboration leads to a failure to communicate contextual 
information, which in turn results in a lack of mutual contextual awareness. Cramton 
(2001) notes that the failure to convey contextual information hinders the development 
of mutual knowledge. 
 
We found that the level of awareness of the shared work context that team members 
possessed is relevant to establishing a common understanding.  We formulate the 
following proposition to capture the significance of the shared work context during 
collaboration in OOSD projects. 
 
Proposition 4: A strong emphasis on fostering a shared work context between 
onshore and offshore team members will reduce the likelihood of project failure in 
OOSD projects. 
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4.2.3. Team moderators 
4.2.3.1. Team member competencies  
Project team member competencies in the requisite competence areas of OOSD projects 
– ranging from technical, communication, and domain knowledge – improve project 
performance. Lacking these competencies can result in staffing issues in domestic 
outsourcing projects as well, but this problem becomes more pronounced in the Indian 
context, where market forces play a big role in high turnover of employees (Sidhu and 
Volberda 2011) and the available human resources in projects. Several vendors 
complained about the unavailability of the promised resources in the project, which later 
led to disappointments. The vendor project manager of case Q found that the domain 
knowledge competencies of the Indian developers were not adequate for the insurance 
domain and described the difficult situation as follows: “So the fact that they were 
distant, very distant from the onshore action that was stuck in this cyclical, political game, 
and that they didn’t have a great deal of expertise in doing what they’re being asked to do 
certainly created an environment where this team of people were very, very eager to do 
what they were being asked to do but could not see the inherent challenges that made it 
almost impossible to do what they were being asked to do. So they were these offshore 
guys who kept rolling the rock up the hill and then watching it tumble down again every 
night. Without stopping and being able to say, ‘There’s a bloody good reason for this.’ ”  
 
The client project manager of project case A, which was about developing a business 
intelligence system, remarked the following about the competency of available resources: 
“The provider didn’t tell us at that point of time that they did not have many people on 
this, like really trained on this tool. So the provider assumed that, like it happens in many 
offshore projects that I’ve seen, that thought that people could learn on the job and then 
deliver, but basically since the requirements were complex and there were so many kinds 
of communication issues this did not happen and they got exposed basically.” The 
offshore team members also lacked the communication competency to interact with the 
client project manager in an unambiguous manner, which led to project slippages and 
eventually the decision to abandon the project. 
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As team members in the semi-virtual work environment add more overhead in the 
project, the teams involved need to be aware of the missing verbal and non-verbal cues in 
communication. Acquiring offshore capability in terms of synchronous and 
asynchronous communication facilitates project execution. For tasks that demand 
negotiation, information-rich communication media (Daft and Lengel 1986; 
Hollingshead, McGrath and O'Connor 1993) could be used to compensate for the social 
cues that may be lost as a result of the cultural and physical distances between teams. 
 
Technical and domain-specific knowledge have been identified as critical for offshore 
software project outcome (Rottman and Lacity 2006; Iacovou and Nakatsu 2008). Balaji 
and Ahuja (2005) have suggested the integration of external and internal knowledge 
within the team as critical for project success. Project team competencies are mainly 
addressed during the initiation phase of the project (McGrath 1991). This team 
moderating aspect needs to be addressed by both onshore and offshore team project 
managers by choosing skilled and cooperative project members who enhance the team. 
The agency theory notes the risk of adverse selection of team members, which explains 
the missing team member competencies. Adverse selection refers to “the 
misrepresentation of ability by the agent” (Eisenhardt 1989a, p. 61). The inability of the 
actors to observe each others’ behavior could be solved by outcome-based contracts that 
specify concrete deliverables, in which both sides assume responsibility for respective 
competencies. As the agency theory offers elegant explanations regarding the missing 
team member competencies in OOSD projects, we do not formulate any propositions 
here. 
4.2.3.2. Onshore-offshore team coordination 
Organizational capacity (Amit and Schoemaker 1993) and contextual knowledge (Klakegg 
et al. 2010) to deploy team resources in the onshore-offshore environment have emerged 
as the required capabilities to moderate team performance. Based on the 
interdependencies of the team resources involved (Malone and Crowston 1994) – team 
members and their knowledge – both onshore and offshore project managers need to 
coordinate these resources. Failure to manage the dependencies among onshore and 
offshore teams could predict the failing direction in which the project is bound. Project 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 109 of 196 
 
case M was cancelled in the requirement analysis phase, as the client project manager did 
not have the confidence to manage the offshore resources. The main reason for the 
failure in case B was the inability of the vendor offshore coordinator at the onshore 
premises to manage the resources in the offshore location and to integrate them into the 
project team. Apparently, the offshore coordinator was only acting as an extended official 
of the Indian company in Switzerland, and each arm of the same company operated 
without much organizational coordination.  
 
The vendor offshore and onshore teams are prone to coordination failures. For instance, 
the onshore vendor project manager of project case Q admitted that the onshore team 
could not offer the required assistance to the offshore team: “In this particular instance 
the offshore components of the team were really the tail of the dog. They were not the 
part that bit or barked. … We had a hybrid model and there was supposed to be an 
onshore team of people who did have experience in the insurance industry and did have 
experience as business analysts, integration with the customer, integration with the 
business analysts, integration with the business, really, to define clear requirements and 
use cases and to come up with a very clear, technical design document and architectural 
design documents. Neither of those things happened.” The client and vendor onshore 
teams failed to notice the knowledge dependencies and the need to coordinate among 
teams to transfer the knowledge about insurance domain that the offshore team lacked. 
This led to poor deliverables and eventually also to project cancellation. 
 
Coordination involves putting the right team resources in the right place during the 
course of the project to avoid management overhead and information asymmetries. As 
Kraut and Streeter (1995) note, the coordination of teamwork has been found to affect 
the effectiveness of the team. Faraj and Sproull (2000, p. 1555) describe coordination as 
“team-situated interactions aimed at managing resources and expertise dependencies.” 
Addressing offshore-specific attributes such as distance, language, and culture (DeLone 
et al. 2005) results in minimum friction during knowledge transfer. Further, Kotlarsky, 
van Fenema and Willcocks (2006) found that coordination in terms of organization, 
work, technology and social interactions allows for better management of knowledge 
interdependencies. 
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According to McGrath (1991), the project team needs to consider the possibilities for 
interaction and the synchronization of activities within a team. However, the project 
resources and efforts need to be coordinated between teams from different organizations 
in OOSD projects.  The project managers’ understanding of national and organizational 
differences as well as of the sensitivities of the other teams plays a significant role in 
avoiding project failures. Both client and vendor teams need to acquire the capabilities 
(knowledge and capacity) to coordinate team members and their expertise for the project 
execution. That includes managing dependencies by assigning tasks to team members, 
allocating resources to train the counterparts, and synchronizing activities (Malone and 
Crowston 1990). We formulate the following proposition to emphasize the necessity of 
team coordination in OOSD projects.  
 
Proposition 5: Coordination of project team resources among the onshore and 
offshore teams will reduce the likelihood of project failure in OOSD projects. 
  
4.3. Summary  
 
In this chapter, we investigated the unique or specific aspects of offshore-outsourced 
software development (OOSD) projects related to the team level that predict failures. 
Since there has been scant empirical work on project failures in IS research, this 
exploratory research analyzed development failures by analyzing both client and vendor 
perspectives. We identified several concrete aspects that predict failures; these include 
both offshore-specific aspects that are unique to OOSD projects (project team-building 
efforts, team collaboration, awareness of shared work context, and onshore-offshore 
team coordination) and aspects that can also appear in domestic outsourcing projects 
(shared project execution structures and team member competencies). Although some 
knowledge of these aspects already existed in the literature through research in contexts 
other than OOSD projects, they offer a basis to understand the early project issues 
leading to failures, thus helping illuminate EWSs of failure. 
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We further developed theoretical propositions grounded in empirical data that predict 
team development and failures of OOSD project team (consisting of client onshore, 
vendor onshore and vendor offshore teams). Team-level analysis of project failures that 
integrates different teams forms the major contribution of this analysis.  Aspects of team 
characteristics that predict failure in three higher-level team categories emerged from this 
qualitative study to explain the team performance and dynamics that led to project 
cancellations. We juxtaposed these emerged aspects of team characteristics that lead to 
failure with the extant literature to situate the relevance of various properties that point 
toward project failures. The higher-level categories derived from the empirical data 
include team initiation, team interactions, and team moderators.  
 
The team initiation category includes the various aspects of team-building efforts and the 
set-up of shared project execution structures by onshore and offshore teams. The 
integration of team members during the team-building process by fostering the 
development of shared identity between teams was found to aid team development. The 
emerging state of shared understanding of project structures between onshore and 
offshore teams provides a common basis for the execution of the OOSD project.  
 
The category of team interactions includes the collaboration between teams and the 
team’s awareness of the shared work context; these are relevant to interaction between 
the various parts of the project team. We found that direct collaboration between all 
teams is crucial if failures are to be avoided; in particular, we noted that allowing 
collaboration between vendor offshore and client onshore teams to remain indirect is 
prone to causing undesirable results. Awareness of the shared project context was 
identified as an emerging state that provided a stage for team members to identify with 
the onshore-offshore project context.  
 
The team moderating category influenced the development of the team throughout the 
project through team member competencies and onshore-offshore team coordination. 
Team competencies, we found, are a restricting factor that depends on the availability of 
competent project members in the dynamic Indian offshore market. Coordination of 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 112 of 196 
 
team resources at onshore and offshore locations was found to moderate the project 
performance.  
 
We found McGrath’s (1991) time, interaction, and performance (TIP) theory to contain 
some useful guidance regarding performance within single teams in an organization. 
However, the multiple teams at offshore and onshore sites involved in OOSD projects 
on both vendor and client sides demanded that we address inter-organizational and 
multi-national project cooperation, something that is not included in the TIP theory. 
Further, agency theory clarified the problematic of behavior uncertainties and adverse 
selection of team members. Our theory of multiple teams predicts project development 
failures in the OOSD project context. We developed theoretical propositions regarding 
project failures in OOSD projects that together argue that in order to avoid failures, the 
onshore and offshore teams from the vendor and client sides ought to work as an 
integrated project team. The six unique team aspects based on retrospective empirical 
research predict team-level project failures in OOSD projects to a great extent. These 
team aspects together could define the project context risk that project managers need to 
consider while engaging in OOSD projects. Our focus has been on a high-level team 
analysis examining the unique aspects of each team involved. Detailed team dynamics 
regarding each aspect need to be studied using case study research, provided both vendor 
and client sides agree to such sensitive research.  
 
We also examined cultural aspects and work practices, which we see as the creation and 
reproduction of meanings and practices between onshore and offshore teams (Brannen 
and Salk 2000). Although we found national cultural dimensions to be relevant, we also 
discovered that they were less reliable as predictors of issues that could lead to project 
conflicts. Finally, we found a mutually satisfactory working culture to be important: the 
integration of work practices from both offshore and onshore sites was found to result in 
better outcomes than the imposition of one-sided work practices in the project team.  
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5.  EWSs of  OOSD project failures  
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
Early warning signs (EWS) have been identified as a project management instrument to 
manage issues arising in the project (Nikander and Eloranta 2001; Kappelman, 
McKeeman and Zhang 2006). A review of the literature shows that only a few empirical 
studies analyze the EWSs of failure. The context of offshore-outsourced software 
development (OOSD) projects, in particular, is an unexplored area that calls for more 
research. The causes of issues will over time appear as project issues. In the case of 
project failures, the project issues that lead to project failure can be regarded as failure 
issues (Philip, Schwabe and Ewusi-Mensah 2009). The failure issues as well as their 
causes can be perceived as the EWSs of failure in the early project stages (figure 14).  
 
 
Figure 14: Situating EWSs of failure 
 
We have analyzed the team-level aspects that lead to project failures in chapter 4. These 
unique aspects of failure remained relevant throughout the lifecycle of the project. In this 
chapter, we will concentrate on the team-level dynamics in the early project phases. 
Naturally, the definition of early phases can vary across organizations – especially in an 
outsourcing project, where the vendor project members come to the project later in the 
project initiation stage. For our study, we considered the first 20 percent of a project’s 
collaboration between the vendor and client as relevant for studying EWSs. Recognizing 
issues in this early phase allows project managers to take corrective measures to finish the 
project as originally planned (Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 2006).   
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Our research concentrates on problems or issues that appeared between clients and 
vendors. As the client and vendor in an OOSD project might not work together in the 
first 20 percent of the project’s calendar in the client organization, we have adopted a 
pragmatic definition of EWSs (as discussed in chapter 1). We define EWS as a project 
state or indication that warns one about possible or impending problems or issues in the 
first 20 percent of the project’s cooperation or collaboration period between clients and 
vendors (based on Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang 2006).   
 
On the one hand, the computer-mediated communication (CMC) that has become 
established as the primary form of collaboration in the semi-virtual OOSD project 
context, leads to improved performance. Yet on the other hand, the organizational and 
national differences related to CMC can also lead to difficulties in evaluating the teams 
during the collaboration, and thus complicate the detection of EWSs. The lack of 
understanding of the EWSs of failures in OOSD projects calls for their identification 
from the perspective of project managers, who are close to the execution. In this chapter, 
we focus on the early stages of OOSD projects, and explore the team-level dynamics that 
lead to failure12. We reiterate the research question defined in chapter 1:  
What are the early warning signs specific to offshore-outsourced software development project failures that 
are related to the project team and how can the project managers perceive them?  
5.2.  EWSs of failure 
 
Our data analysis of failed project cases found two types of EWSs of failures in OOSD 
projects: offshore-specific and non-offshore specific EWSs (Philip, Schwabe and Wende 
2010).  Offshore-specific EWSs are unique to OOSD projects and require special attention. 
Non-offshore specific EWSs are not unique to OOSD projects, but in order to overcome the 
disadvantages caused by the offshore environment, they require more attention in that 
environment than in domestic software outsourcing projects. Further, the identified 
EWSs emerged as three higher-level categories of EWSs of failure at the team level, 
namely, team initiation, team interactions, and team moderators. These higher-level 
categories and their sub-categories formed the unique aspects of failures in OOSD 
                                              
12 Parts of this chapter have been published earlier in (Philip, Wende and Schwabe 2013a). 
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projects that emerged during the whole project life and that we discussed in the previous 
chapter. The sub-categories that will be discussed in the following sections include shared 
project execution structures, team member competencies (non-offshore specific EWS), 
project team-building efforts, awareness of shared work context, team collaboration, and 
onshore-offshore team coordination (offshore-specific EWS).  
 
As briefly outlined in chapter 4, team initiation efforts to build up the OOSD project 
team include setting up shared project structures and engaging in team-building efforts. 
These efforts influence team interaction, which is visible in the collaboration between 
teams and the shared context awareness among the project teams at onshore and 
offshore locations. Further, team moderators, such as onshore-offshore team 
coordination and team-member competencies, could lead to improved project 
performance by influencing the team development categories of team initiation and team 
interactions throughout the OOSD project. 
 
Our data analysis shows that project managers notice directly some EWSs of failure that 
lead to project issues; however, some EWSs could only be noticed indirectly in the 
project. In order to understand the presence and perception of EWSs, we differentiate 
the EWSs of failure into early indications and issues that can be perceived directly and 
indirectly. Project managers found issues in the early project stages that cautioned them 
about project issues, which we refer to as early warning issue (EWI). EWI is defined as an 
early project issue that requires attention in the first 20 percent of the project’s 
cooperation or collaboration period between clients and vendors. Nikander and Eloranta 
(2001) and Kappelman et al. (2006) have identified EWSs that come under the category 
of EWI, which were not easy for project managers to notice during the project.  
 
We refer to the category of EWSs that offered more concrete warning signals for project 
managers to identify during the project as early signals of failure. Early signal is defined as a 
project indication or situation that provides concrete information about an early warning 
issue of failure during the first 20 percent of the project’s cooperation or collaboration 
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period between clients and vendors. Early signals of failure13 in OOSD projects appear as 
weak signals during the project start. Nikander and Eloranta (2001), Havelka and 
Rajkumar (2006) and Kappelman et al. (2006) have identified EWSs that are termed early 
signals in this work.  
 
We found that an EWS of failure could be described as a pair of EWI and early signals of 
failure, where the early signals could comprise more than one indicator. The presence of 
one or more early signals of failure could predict the existence of EWIs of failure. The 
causes of project issues might be noticed first as early signals of failure and then as EWIs 
(figure 15). The causes of failure issues can thus be determined through the presence of 
both the EWIs and early signals of failure. The early signals of failure can point to the 
project state or condition that requires analysis, which the project managers can then 
examine to see whether any EWIs of failures have surfaced or could be identified. For 
instance, in project case A, the early signal of not promptly addressing escalation 
predicted the existence of the EWI that the vendor team does not honor deadlines. 
Escalation not addressed promptly together with the vendor failure to honor deadlines 
formed the EWS of failure. This eventually led to tensions between client and vendor 
teams that resulted in failure issues14 such as timeline slippage and costs exceeding the 
approved budget. This scenario then led to project failure or cancellation. The root 
causes of the issues were the lack of onshore-offshore project management know-how 
and cultural differences regarding time perception. Vendors considered fulfilling the tasks 
of primary importance, without giving due importance to agreed milestones. 
 
 
                                              
13 Drummond and Hodgson (2003, p. 151) defined metaphor as a “linguistic device whereby one 
phenomenon is understood in terms of another.” We use the terms “early warning signs” and 
“early signals” in this thesis as metaphors in the context of project failures to investigate the 
issues and problems during the early project phases. Oxford dictionary (1993) defines the word 
“sign” as “a thing indicating or suggesting a quality or state etc.; a thing perceived as indicating a 
future state or occurrence,” whereas “signal” is defined as “a usually prearranged sign conveying 
information, guidance etc. especially at a distance.”  
 
14 Failure issues are issues critical enough to call for project cancellation. 
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Figure 15: Recognizing early warning signs of failure 
 
Although the early signals are more concrete for the project managers to identify during 
the project, they may not point unambiguously to an EWI. For instance, the early signal 
of missing interaction between vendor offshore and onsite teams could indicate that 
there exists a warning issue of lack of collaboration between vendor teams. However, this 
signal could also mean that the vendor onshore team lacks the motivation to work with 
the vendor offshore team. Early warning issues may become distinct as the project 
progresses; the presence of other early signals will then help project managers assign the 
early signals to a particular EWI of failure and thus clearly identify the EWS of failure as 
a pair of EWI and its early signals. This check for the existence of EWI allows the 
elimination of false positive signals. The causes of issues that lead to project issues also 
eventually become noticeable as the EWSs of failure appear distinct from the project. 
Some of the EWIs and early signals of failure that were identified could also appear as 
causes of failures. A detailed discussion about the causes of failures as well as failure 
issues is out of scope of this work, as we focus on the EWSs of failure.  
 
In the sections below, we discuss the EWSs of failure that we identified from the failed 
project cases. Section 3.4.2 provides an overview of the project cases that are referred to 
in the data analysis. 
5.2.1. Team initiation 
5.2.1.1. Project team building efforts 
A semi-virtual project team that understands its function and consequently makes the 
required effort to fulfill the team objectives provides the basis for successful team 
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performance. As timely face-to-face meetings between onshore and offshore teams 
cannot always take place in the OOSD project context, an important role in avoiding 
project failures is played by the project managers’ initiatives to build a project team whose 
members collaborate with their counterparts at onshore and offshore sites. Below, we 
discuss the EWSs of failure that we identified and that are related to team building 
efforts. An overview of the EWIs of failure regarding project team-building efforts and 
their early signals is shown in table 8. The project cases are given in brackets.  
 
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Absence of trust between vendor and 
client teams [A, B, N, O] 
-Vendor offshore team’s efforts not 
appreciated by client team [O] 
-Lack of opportunities for informal 
interactions [N, O] 
-Expectation gaps in technical deliverables [A, 
B] 
Lack of team-building exercises by 
client and vendor [D, K, N, P] 
 
 
-Managers ignore team-building efforts [K, P] 
-Lack of project team kickoff meetings [D] 
-Lack of procedures to integrate new team 
members [N] 
Table 8: Team-building efforts 
 
Lack of trust between vendor and client teams is an EWI, which could manifest as the 
lack of any appreciation by client team members for the efforts made by vendor offshore 
members. In that case, members of neither team will feel part of the extended project 
team. Other indicators of a lack of trust are absence of opportunities for informal 
conversations or online meetings and negative first impressions in terms of expectation 
gaps in technical deliverables. Klakegg et al. (2010) consider lack of trust in project 
organization an EWS that is critical for project execution. Kern and Willcocks (2000, p. 
331) define trust in the IT outsourcing context as “the belief that a party’s word is reliable 
and that it will fulfill its obligation as stipulated in the agreement, by acting predictably 
and fairly.” The gaps in expectations regarding the efforts and outputs by both onshore 
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and offshore teams could provide early signals regarding the direction in which the team 
develops. Rottman and Lacity (2008) note that the social networks between the US client 
and the domestic vendor could not be replicated with the Indian vendor because of the 
cultural differences and the different offshore work environment. The institution of 
occasional face-to-face meetings and site visits between both client and vendor members 
was reported to improve the social ties between the offshore and onsite members (Oshri, 
Kotlarsky and Willcocks 2009) and eventually lead to better rapport and trust (Kotlarsky 
and Oshri 2005). However, face-to-face meetings remain restricted to a small part of the 
life of the OOSD project in order to not undo the benefit from cost arbitrage.  
 
Insufficient attention to and promotion of team-building exercises by both client and 
vendor managers is an EWI that leads to poor cooperation and bonding between teams. 
The project manager of case P recalled that ignoring team-building efforts was an early 
signal that resulted in an incoherent team and eventually led to the cancellation of the 
project: “At the expectation end, there was no need to build a team. By definition, there 
was no team charter. Then you have no contract or no rules being defined on how you 
will behave in presence of conflicts.” Further early signals include lack of project team 
kickoff meetings and of procedures to integrate new team members into the team. Koh, 
Ang and Straub (2004) find that building effective inter-organizational teams is an 
obligation of the vendor. However, both the vendor and the client have responsibility for 
team-member integration. Unless both client and vendor project managers have an 
interest in pursuing integrated team-building efforts, the project could head toward a 
team-level failure. 
 
5.2.1.2. Shared project execution structures  
 
Work practices within a project team provide warning signs regarding the team’s 
development. Organizational and professional cultures, rather than the national culture, 
will dominate team behavior related to work practices (Karahanna, Evaristo and Srite 
2005) in OOSD projects. A shared project framework is a prerequisite for the execution 
of offshore projects.  
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An overview of the EWIs of failure that emerged from the project cases regarding 
project execution structures and their early signals is given in table 9. The lack of a shared 
understanding regarding deliverables could lead to incorrect deliverables. Such problems 
can be observed in cases where the expected deliverables are not defined or explicitly 
agreed upon before the start of work (Herbsleb and Moitra 2001). For instance, the lack 
of a common understanding of deliverables led to poor initial deliverables in project case 
P, which in turn eventually led to the cancellation of the project.  
 
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Lack of a common understanding 
about deliverables [A, J, L, P] 
-Expectation gaps in deliverables [A, J, P] 
-Lack of explicitly agreed project outputs [L] 
Vendor offshore team fails to honor 
deadlines [A, I, J, L] 
-Deadlines not met by vendor offshore team 
[I, J, L] 
-Escalations not addressed promptly [A] 
Lack of shared concepts for project 
execution [D, G, K, O] 
-Vendor and client teams have different 
methodologies, documentation, and change 
management processes [D, O] 
-Lack of identical software and hardware 
versions at client and offshore sites [G, K] 
Business requirements not understood 
properly by vendor team members [A, 
K, L, N, P] 
-Expectation gaps in technical deliverables [A, 
N] 
-Ambiguous requirements with room for 
misinterpretations [K, L, N] 
-Requirement assumptions by vendors are not 
verified [P] 
Table 9: Shared project execution structures 
 
The vendor offshore team’s failure to meet deadlines commonly has a cultural 
dimensions (Huang and Trauth 2008), as the team may subordinate meeting deadlines to 
meeting objective. Indicators of this warning sign could include the vendor team missing 
deadlines or not addressing escalations as promptly as expected by the client. In global 
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teams, variation in the sense of urgency and in priorities assigned to the execution of 
tasks on a temporal scale might be attributable to differences in the perceptions of time.  
Saunders, Van Slyke and Vogel (2004) note that regions with predominant Hindu or 
Buddhist cultures, like India, tend to view time as timeless, i.e., having a cyclical, 
recurrent, long-term, and polychronic nature, whereas the Western vision of clock time 
characterizes time as having a linear, uni-dimensional, short-term and monochronic 
nature.   
 
In addition to divergent perceptions of time, team members may not agree about the 
process of project execution.  Differing concepts of project execution between client and 
vendor teams can lead to diverging outcomes. The project manager of case O remarked 
on the missing project structures that led to a deadlock:  “…the lack of process or the 
key responsibility charged or responsibilities lead to the situation where people find no 
directions, whether they are supposed to do that or not.” Project managers can notice the 
differing concepts when different methodologies are followed or change management 
and documentation processes are not established. Different software and hardware 
versions used at client and vendor sites can also indicate diverging outcomes.  
 
The vendor team’s lack of understanding of business requirements can also lead to 
ambiguous results. This can be detected using feedback loops (Fortune and Peters 2005) 
as soon as the requirement specifications developed by the vendor team are verified by 
the client. Specifications from the client side can leave room for misinterpretations, 
especially when the offshore team members are not well versed in domain knowledge. 
The verification of requirements by non-specialists might reveal the ambiguities. 
Incorrect assumptions made by the vendors may become evident in the deliverables, 
unless the assumptions are verified with client team members.  
5.2.2. Team interactions 
5.2.2.1. Collaboration between teams 
 
The lack of adequate collaboration between vendor teams as well as between vendor and 
client teams has emerged in our research as one of the EWSs of failure relevant in the 
OOSD project context. The establishment of collaborative processes on the inter-team 
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level during the early project phases improves the team bonds and thus positively affects 
team performance, which provides early warning indicators toward the later project 
phases (Hoegl, Weinkauf and Gemuenden 2004). Table 10 presents an overview of the 
EWIs of failure and their early signals that emerged from the project cases regarding the 
question of collaboration between teams. 
 
Inadequate collaboration between vendor’s onshore and offshore teams can lead to the 
project team missing the project objectives. This EWI may be noticed from the lack of 
regular meetings or interactions between the vendor’s offshore and onsite teams. Vlaar, 
van Fenema and Tiwari (2008) show that the knowledge and experience asymmetries of 
onshore and offshore vendor teams force them to engage in sense-making activities to 
reduce the asymmetries. The absence or scarcity of interactions in an OOSD project 
could result in team members having varying definitions of the situation, which then 
affect the collaboration process. Although the two teams are officially part of the project, 
they may not feel the need for collaboration. This might be the result of both vendor 
organizations operating independently and the offshore team being expected to deliver by 
default.  
 
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Lack of collaboration between vendor 
teams [B, N, O] 
-Lack of regular meetings [B, N, O] 
-Missing interaction between vendor offshore 
and onsite teams [B, O] 
-Vendor offshore and onsite teams are part of 
independent organizations and both are not 
integrated into the project [B] 
Lack of agreed communication 
structures between vendor and client 
teams [C, N, O] 
-Communication paths are not clear for team 
members [C, N] 
-Lack of interactions between client and 
vendor teams [N, O] 
Client team mistrusts vendor offshore 
team members [O] 
-Client team member changes use cases 
without informing vendor offshore team [O] 
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-Lack of interaction between client and 
vendor offshore teams [O] 
-Vendor offshore team not respected or 
appreciated by client team [O] 
Table 10: Collaboration between teams 
 
An agreed-upon communication structure forms the prerequisite to efficient 
collaboration. An indicator of this EWI would be an undefined path for communication, 
which leads to communication breakdown in the team. The offshore client project 
manager of case O states the following regarding communication and alignment in the 
project: “It [communication] was not to the level where it should have happened. Of 
course there was some communication, ad-hoc communication, but there was no formal 
team-based communication. So that was one of the reasons, which resulted in a situation 
where the offshore team was truly getting misaligned with the complete project 
objectives.” In project C, the vendor onsite coordinator did not follow up on the issues 
with the offshore team and the client expected the vendor team to resolve internal 
problems by itself. Another indicator of a lack of communication structure is the lack of 
interactions between the client and vendor teams. Damian and Zowghi (2003b, p. 158) 
maintain that in the early phases “communication between remote stakeholders will have 
the greatest effect in reducing the impact of global collaboration on managing 
requirements in multi-site organizations.” Frequent and intense communication will 
improve the chances of understanding the remote counterparts (Herbsleb and Moitra 
2001). Particularly complex projects with interdependent and uncertain tasks require 
informal communication and coordination measures (Cramton and Webber 2005). Kern 
and Willcocks (2000) also note frequent communication leading to improved trust, which 
in turn leads to improved informal and formal communication between team members. 
 
Mistrust of vendor offshore team members by the client team is another EWI that may 
lead to project issues. Missing interaction between client and vendor offshore teams can 
be an indicator of mistrust and warn of failure. The offshore project manager of project 
case O remarked the following about missing trust: “It’s difficult to say that, but there 
was a lot of resistance from the local team in offshoring this project. There might be 
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different reasons for that - jobs and security, different reasons for that. But I cannot tell 
you all of them, but there was not a collaboration. There was not an open team which 
would like this implementation to be done. They were not extending the collaboration 
that we expect in such a setup of the project. That was a limiting factor.” We found that 
mutual trust (Lee, Huynh and Hirschheim 2008) between vendor and client teams 
affected knowledge sharing and thus collaboration. Especially in virtual or semi-virtual 
environments, trust between counterparts was a crucial factor in the team development 
as trust-building measures, such as face-to-face meetings and workshops, are limited in 
OOSD projects (Lee-Kelley, Crossman and Cannings 2004).  In project O, the client 
team members made changes to use cases without informing the vendor offshore team, 
which led to a mismatch of expectations. A client team’s lack of appreciation of good 
work done by offshore team members, or treatment of them as “software factory 
workers,” thus denying them respect, might form an indicator that points toward mistrust 
on the part of the client team. The concerns of client team members regarding job 
security could play a role in causing mistrust. 
 
5.2.2.2. Awareness of shared work context  
 
Recognition of differences in the shared work context and the failure to adapt and 
communicate these differences has been identified as one of the EWSs of failure in the 
OOSD project context. Cramton (2001) found that the virtual team members’ lack of 
skills in detecting local contextual differences and constraints across location and in 
sharing them with counterparts caused coordination as well as relationship problems 
among team members. The organizational culture of virtual teams as well as their work 
practices further exacerbate the problems that may prevent the emergence of a shared 
context between onshore and offshore teams. On the other hand, informal team activities 
result in the development of social ties and rapport (Kotlarsky and Oshri 2005) between 
the onshore and offshore teams and thus allow a smooth knowledge transfer, which in 
turn leads to a successful collaboration.  
 
The EWIs of failure regarding shared context awareness, along with their early signals, 
are listed in table 11. A client’s escalation of an issue may not be handled seriously by 
vendors, as the vendors may have different time perceptions and priorities. The early 
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signals include assurances of normality by the vendor and promises that everything will 
be perfect with the next deliverable. Repeated expectation gaps in deliverables can be 
considered an indicator that the project could be heading for trouble. In project cases A 
and B the deliverables got worse after the assurances from the vendor’s onsite managers. 
As the client team cannot check the progress of development that happens at the 
offshore site, escalations are anticipated to be followed up with expected results. This 
failure in meeting expectations will result in problems that Sarker and Sahay (2003, p. 
251) define as occurring “when a team member is perceived as contradicting, discrediting, 
or doubting an agreed upon norm of interaction.” Such troubles between virtual teams 
could damage the trust between teams and the teams’ motivation to work with their 
counterparts. Lea and Spears (1991) report that the breakdown of social constraints and 
regulations in the virtual interactions can lead to antinormative behaviors, as there is less 
effective possibility for control and supervision in the virtual scenario as compared to co-
located development. 
 
 
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Escalations not taken seriously by 
vendor [A, B] 
-Assurance of normality by vendor when 
issues are raised [B] 
-Repeated expectation gaps in deliverables [A] 
Vendor onsite team lacks motivation to 
work with offshore team [O] 
-Missing interaction between vendor offshore 
and onsite teams [O] 
-Vendor onsite team does not provide the 
requested information [O] 
Lack of openness to discuss problems 
by vendor offshore team [A, I] 
-Delays of deliverables not communicated in 
advance [A] 
-Non-admission of technical problems or 
mistakes [I] 
Insufficient cultural intelligence among 
vendor and client teams  [I, L, R] 
-Vendor offshore team members do not 
challenge requirements [I, L] 
-Vendor offshore team members do not talk 
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openly in meetings in the presence of superior 
[C, R] 
Table 11: Awareness of shared work context 
 
The project case O failed primarily because the vendor onsite team lacked the motivation 
to work with the offshore team; this was also their first project in offshore mode. The 
lack of motivation can be indicated by the absence of interaction between the vendor’s 
offshore and onshore members. Vendor onsite team members may not promptly provide 
the information requested by the offshore team, waiting instead for follow-up requests 
before acting.  Maznevski and Chudoba’s (2000) study of virtual teams found that the 
effectiveness of a global team outcome develops as a function of interactions on a timely 
basis. This temporal interaction failure between vendor teams has emerged in our 
research as an EWS of failure in OOSD projects.   
 
The Indian vendor offshore team may not openly communicate information about 
problems or delays within the project to the client team, as this might put future team 
engagements in jeopardy. The indicators of this EWI include deliverable delays not being 
communicated in advance (Rottman and Lacity 2008) and not openly admitting technical 
problems or mistakes during the project. Hoegl and Gemuenden (2001, p. 437) argue that 
lack of openness within teams could hinder “the most fundamental function of 
teamwork, namely the integration of team members’ knowledge and experience on their 
common task.” Following strict team hierarchy in projects might also lead to a restricted 
communication style that hinders openness (Herbsleb and Moitra 2001). Klakegg et al. 
(2010) note that the absence of a culture of openness affects communication and thus 
becomes an EWS of failure.  
Lacking organizational and professional cultural intelligence regarding the other team will 
not lead to an awareness of shared work context. One possible indicator is the lack of 
initiative to ask questions or challenge requirements by vendor offshore team members. 
This reluctance could be rooted in an unwillingness to show disrespect to the client or in 
a wish to protect the dignity of one’s team or the client (Nicholson 1999). Beck et al. 
(2008) argue that the cultural intelligence of team members positively affects project 
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management and thus the outcome. In contrast to individualism, teams that value 
collectivism are obliged to maintain the face of the team and meet the obligations placed 
on them by the team (Bochner and Hesketh 1994). This social obligation could result in 
differences in team collaboration. The project manager of case C commented as follows 
on difficulty of collaboration, which acted as an early signal of project failure: “And the 
reason is that I think that the teams over there are very hierarchical, they have their 
internal structure of importance and of the supervision and it’s difficult to flatten that.” 
Sahay and Walsham (1997), following Gidden’s structuration theory, draw upon the rules 
and resources instantiated in social relationships to explain the challenges to 
implementing an information system in India in a joint Indo-US project. According to 
them, the variety of social structures (community, religion, family, professionalism, and 
academia) that shaped the relations between team members helped explain the 
managerial attitudes. The clear superiority of Indian managers over other members of the 
Indian team made their attitudes highly instrumental in moving the project forward.   
 
Vendor offshore team members also might not talk openly in the presence of their 
superiors during a meeting or workshop because of the hierarchies and social structures 
followed in the team. The silence of team members in project case B was interpreted by 
the client project manager as a normal project situation, and the client realized only after 
the first delivery that the offshore team did not understand the requirements.  
 
5.2.3. Team moderators 
5.2.3.1. Team member competencies 
 
EWSs of failure in the area of team member competencies has emerged in our research 
as one of the important non-offshore specific EWSs, that is, EWSs that can apply to 
domestic projects as well. The dynamics of the Indian offshore market have shown the 
relevance of close scrutiny of the project-related skills and competencies required of team 
members. Most vendor offshore teams in failed projects had a combination of fresh 
graduates and senior members, which indeed is part of the low-cost offshore business 
model. The high percentage of fresh graduates in the vendor offshore team can result in 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 128 of 196 
 
asymmetries related to knowledge and experience (Vlaar, van Fenema and Tiwari 2008) 
compared to the vendor onshore and client teams. Further, career progression towards 
management positions happens faster in India than in Western countries. As the client 
project manager in case H as well as the vendor onshore manager in case I noted, the 
aspirations of offshore team members regarding career development may affect the 
functioning of a project team. As soon as a team member becomes an expert, she or he 
expects monetary compensation, promotions, onsite visits, and the like. Unless the 
offshore team member remains motivated, a new person can take over her or his job. 
This vicious cycle in offshore projects might result in offshore team members lacking 
important competencies regarding domain-specific knowledge, communication 
competency, and technical skills.  
 
Table 12 provides an overview of EWIs of failures regarding team member competencies 
and their early signals. The lack of domain-specific knowledge (Rottman and Lacity 2006; 
Iacovou and Nakatsu 2008) can be perceived when the knowledge feedback mechanism 
reveals inadequacies in business knowledge. Such mechanisms include playback of 
knowledge gained through verification workshops, or the request of a written summary 
of discussed points. Attrition in the vendor offshore team (Vlaar, van Fenema and Tiwari 
2008) as well as the absence of subject matter experts (SME) from the vendor offshore 
team are indications that the project team lacks industry-specific know-how. Project case 
B, in the banking sector, suffered knowledge and competency issues as the four key 
members from the vendor offshore teams left the organization after one year of the five-
year project.  
 
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Vendor offshore team lacks domain-
specific knowledge [B, K, Q] 
-Knowledge feedback mechanism shows lack 
of adequate business knowledge [Q] 
-Lack of SME in the vendor offshore team 
[N, Q] 
-Key vendor offshore team members leave the 
project [B, K] 
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Project team cannot elicit business 
specifications thoroughly [E, I, Q] 
-Lack of SME in the vendor onsite or 
offshore team involved in requirement 
analysis [E, Q] 
-Lack of team members with organization-
specific knowledge involved in requirement 
analysis [I] 
Vendor offshore team members lack 
communication competency [A, B] 
 -Offshore team members are non-
communicative or silent [A, B] 
Vendor team members lack required 
technical skills [A, B, C, K, H, Q] 
 
-Low quality of technical deliverables [A, C, 
Q] 
-Expectation gaps in technical deliverables [A, 
K, H] 
-Key vendor offshore team members leave the 
project [B] 
Table 12: Competencies of team members 
 
The inability of the project team to elicit business specifications in a clear and 
unambiguous manner affects the later development stages. Lack of an SME on either the 
onsite or the offshore team of the vendor affects the requirement analysis. Project case Q 
failed because the vendor offshore team lacked members with insurance-domain 
knowledge. The presence of at least one team member from the client side in the project 
team with organization-specific knowledge could help elicit the requirements efficiently. 
This is because the transfer of encultured and embedded knowledge within an 
organization (Sahay, Nicholson and Krishna 2003) works better with the presence of a 
client employee.  
 
The project manager of case A noted that some offshore team members suffered from a 
lack of communication competencies to such a degree that they eventually had to be 
replaced: “There were two guys who were not very communicative. They were not used 
to like very open or very communicative, so they were keeping silent for most of the 
time, even on asynchronous communication.” But the project also suffered because of 
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the lack of domain-specific and technical skills required for developing the business 
intelligence project. The missing communication competency of the vendor team 
members may have affected the conveyance of information within the project. Members 
who do not exchange information or remain silent when they are asked for information 
are demonstrating poor interaction skills.  
 
The lack of technical skills on the part of the vendor team (Iacovou and Nakatsu 2008) to 
do requirement analysis or system design also affects project development. Senior 
developers were missing in project cases H and I, contrary to the promises made by the 
sales and marketing executives of the vendor team. Low quality or expectation 
differences (Lane and Agerfalk 2007) indicate a lack of the required technical skills. Key 
project members leaving the project is another indication of a vendor team that lacks 
technical skills. In terms of the methodologies applied, we found that iterative 
development with more intermediate deliverables provides more cues regarding the 
quality of deliverables than the pure waterfall model popular in OOSD projects. 
5.2.3.2. Onshore-offshore team coordination 
 
Onshore-offshore team management by both the client and vendor organizations has 
emerged as one of the capabilities crucial to executing the project successfully. In the 
multi-national organizational setup, where the vendor offshore team works as an 
extended arm of the vendor onshore team, it is imperative that both client teams acquire 
this capability. Project managers’ ability to coordinate project resources by allowing 
efficient interactions minimizes issues among team members in the onshore-offshore 
environment (Carmel and Tjia 2005).  
 
Table 13 provides an overview of the EWIs of failure and their accompanying early 
signals regarding onshore-offshore team coordination. Lack of team coordination know-
how leads to OOSD projects getting out of hand and thus derailing the timeline, budget, 
and quality expectations. Hoegl, Weinkauf and Gemuenden (2004) found that inter-team 
coordination in the virtual environment was positively related to the quality of teamwork. 
If both the client and the vendor side suffer from a lack of project managers with 
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experience in distributed or virtual environments, problems could be challenging to head 
off. Iacovou and Nakatsu (2008) have identified project management know-how by the 
client as relevant for offshore project success. Team coordination forms part of the 
capability to manage offshore projects (Erickson and Ranganathan 2006). However, in 
the multi-national organizational context, both client and vendor need to possess the 
team coordination capabilities. Other early signals of failure include the absence of shared 
project plans at client and vendor locations and a lack of an integrated organization chart 
with defined team members to contact for queries. Sidhu and Volberda (2011) note that 
the involvement of the offshore team in an early project stage will lead to positive results 
regarding the coordination of team tasks. The size of team members is another signal of 
challenged team management. Offshore managers can be overwhelmed if they are 
expected to handle more than 10 employees.  
 
 
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Lack of onshore-offshore team 
coordination know-how by client and 
vendor [B, E, F, M, N, O, P] 
-Neither vendor nor client project managers 
have experience in distributed or virtual 
projects [M, O, P] 
-Lack of a shared project plan [F] 
-Lack of an integrated organization chart with 
defined contact persons [F] 
-Vendor offshore managers manage large 
teams [B, N] 
Vendor onsite team fails to transfer 
knowledge to offshore team properly 
[H, N] 
-Knowledge feedback mechanism shows lack 
of understanding by vendor offshore team [H, 
N] 
Vendor onsite team simply expects the 
offshore team to provide deliverables 
based on specifications [N, O, P, Q] 
-Lack of regular meetings [N] 
-Lack of knowledge feedback mechanisms [P, 
Q] 
-Complex knowledge areas not identified [O] 
-Questions from vendor offshore team are 
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blocked by vendor onsite team [N, P] 
Table 13: Onshore-offshore team coordination  
 
Project case Q was cancelled as the vendor offshore and onshore teams lacked 
interactions and also knowledge feedback mechanisms. The project manager noted: 
“…you need to have a kind of feedback to get clear on what needs to be done, why it 
needs to be done and whether something written in a requirement is a typo or that has 
truly been meant that way.” The coordination of knowledge (Espinosa et al. 2007) across 
sites forms a challenge for project managers at different locations. The achievement of 
mutual knowledge between onshore and offshore teams has proved difficult, as dispersed 
teams cross cultural and organizational boundaries that amplify the feedback lags 
regarding information exchange and interpretation. This information lag can lead to 
misinterpretation of embedded and tacit knowledge by offshore members, which then 
results in incorrect deliverables (Nicholson and Sahay 2004). The offshore team’s lack of 
absorptive capacity and the arduous relationship involving distance between the teams 
involved can function as barriers to the transfer of sticky knowledge within the global 
organization (Szulanski 1996).  An early signal of this knowledge transfer issue comes 
from knowledge feedback mechanisms that can reveal the lack of proper understanding 
on the offshore side. Complex knowledge, in particular, requires intensive feedback 
loops. Oshri, van Fenema and Kotlarsky (2008) report the use of a transactive memory 
system in an Indian vendor organization that combines collective expertise and 
communication among team members to achieve a successful transfer of knowledge 
between onshore and offshore teams.  
 
Another EWI that emerged from the data was the expectation of the vendor onsite team 
that they would receive the deliverables based on specifications on an agreed deadline 
without much interaction in between. The indicators of this misguided assumption are 
the lack of regular meetings online and the lack of knowledge feedback mechanisms. The 
inability to invest effort in identifying dependencies in knowledge areas and the blocking 
of questions from the vendor offshore team by the vendor onsite team are further 
indicators of this assumption.  
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5.3. Discussion - Putting EWSs into the context of failure 
 
Our data analysis of OOSD project failures provides new insights into the failure process 
of OOSD projects. We found that the EWSs of failure can be perceived by project 
managers by looking for the presence of early signals of failure during the early project 
stages. The identification of the more concrete early signals together with the check for 
the emergence of EWI has allowed us to understand the initial stages of failures and the 
process through which problems become failures in the OOSD project context. We 
found the analyzed concept of the EWSs of failure evolving around these two constructs, 
namely, early warning issues and early signals of failure. 
 
Figure 16 depicts the OOSD project failure model that shows the process of project 
failure and incorporates the EWSs of failure. The causes of project issues leading to 
failure issues has been discussed extensively in the literature (e.g., Ewusi-Mensah 2003; 
Sahay, Nicholson and Krishna 2003; Philip, Schwabe and Ewusi-Mensah 2009; Wiener, 
Vogel and Amberg 2010). On the other hand, the causes of failure also manifest 
themselves as the EWSs of failure (Nikander and Eloranta 2001), which again divide into 
easily noticeable early signals of failure and less noticeable early warning issues of failure. 
This differentiation forms a main contribution of this qualitative work to understanding 
the early stages of project failure. Our exploratory model found that the early signals of 
failure could predict the existence of the EWIs of failure. The EWIs of failure could 
further predict failure issues, which are issues critical enough to call for project 
cancellation. The inability or unwillingness to manage such issues will result in project 
failure or cancellation.  
 
Our exploratory model can be viewed as an extension of the EWS concept developed by 
Nikander and Eloranta (2001). We have extended the causal and predictive links related 
to the EWSs and project failures as well as elaborated the concept of EWSs of failure in 
our model. The causes of failure issues can be offshore-specific or non-offshore specific, 
or a combination of both. They can be difficult for project managers to notice in the 
beginning. The early signals, by contrast, are easily noticeable and, thus, the presence of 
EWI can be checked in the early project stages to eliminate the possibilities of false 
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positive signals. The failure issues that appear initially as EWIs of failure could also be 
perceived with equal ease. Williams et al. (2012) maintain that project leaders are generally 
not good at picking up EWSs. However, project managers can notice the EWIs of failure 
in the early project phases before the failure issues appear in the later phases.  
 
 
Figure 16: EWSs of failure and OOSD project failure model 
 
As Ewusi-Mensah (2003) notes, a “multiplicity of cofactors” (p. 47) can cause the 
cancellation of the project,  and both offshore and non-offshore factors play a role in 
leading to the circumstances that cause cancellation. The failure issues, their causes, and 
the EWSs of failure may appear as either offshore or non-offshore specific in nature. We 
have already discussed an example of offshore-specific EWS in section 5.2. An example 
of a non-offshore specific EWS would be, say, the early signal of knowledge feedback 
mechanism revealing the lack of necessary business knowledge in case Q. This indicated 
the EWI of the vendor team lacking domain-specific knowledge, which eventually led to 
the failure issue of a non-functioning information system and further to the project 
cancellation. Unless the vendor can solve the team member competency problems within 
a reasonable and mutually agreed time limit, the project could head toward failure.    
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The concept of EWSs of failure with its dual composition – EWIs and easily noticeable 
early signals of failure – can be used as a tool in risk management. EWIs and early signals 
provide advance information about project risks; however, the information regarding 
their probability and the impact of potential problems or issues are traditionally handled 
by risk management measures (Nikander 2002). This early risk perception instrument 
could be applied in conjunction with project assessments (Williams et al. 2012). Project 
assessment types during the project include project reviews, project health checks, and 
benchmarking (Williams et al. 2012). Concrete measures for risk identification and 
management (Boehm 1991) in relation to the EWSs of failure could include check lists, 
balanced scorecards and “traffic lights” (Williams et al. 2012).  
 
We found that the project failures analyzed in this work happened mainly as a result of 
offshore-specific project issues. Only 5 out of 19 offshore projects were canceled in the 
later project stages as a result of non-offshore specific issues. The existence of non-
offshore specific issues in the project suggests the need for a combination of EWS and 
risk management frameworks that can monitor and manage offshore-specific and non-
offshore specific issues.    
 
Project managers can perform only as well as the body of knowledge and experience that 
they bring into a project allows them to, as each project is a unique undertaking. Williams 
et al. (2012) differentiate between two types of EWSs – “hard” issues that are identified 
through formal project assessments and “soft” issues that are identified through 
assessment based on gut feelings. Our analysis found that most issues were hard issues 
that are of a technical nature and can be measured to a substantial extent. On the other 
hand, soft issues are difficult to measure as they include people issues related to culture, 
such as attitudes and values. Among the EWIs that arose in our study, the category of 
soft issues included such matters as absence of trust between vendor and client teams, 
lack of motivation by the vendor onshore team to work with the offshore team, lack of 
openness to discuss problems by the vendor offshore team, and a dearth of trust between 
client and vendor offshore teams. Williams et al. (2012) maintain that as a result of the 
behavioral complexities of team members, the causal relations between the root cause of 
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failure and EWSs are less obvious. Williams et al. (2012, p. 47) note further that 
addressing soft issues requires “broad experience and a deep understanding of both 
objectives and culture” from project managers.  
 
Even though we elicited the experiences of project managers in terms of IT, project 
management, and offshore project management experiences, we were unable to establish 
a direct link between the project managers’ experiences and their ability to notice soft 
issues. Such insights could be of interest to practitioners, and the level of project 
managers’ onshore-offshore team management capability needs to be analyzed. Cultural 
intelligence (Beck, Gregory and Prifling 2008) regarding national, organizational, and 
professional cultures across teams might alert project managers to the EWSs that are of a 
soft nature. The presence of such EWSs in our analysis further points to the importance 
of OOSD projects attaining onshore-offshore team management capabilities. 
 
In a sense, the EWSs of failure can be considered the prerequisites that should be 
managed in order to execute projects successfully. Among the six categories of EWSs of 
failure we identified, the categories of onshore-offshore team coordination and 
collaboration between teams are the least discussed in the literature.  Yet we found 
onshore-offshore team coordination a particularly important feature, and further 
discovered that addressing both the client’s and the vendor’s – not just the client’s – 
capability to coordinate onshore-offshore teams was instrumental in avoiding failure. The 
IS offshoring literature (Lacity et al. 2010; Wiener, Vogel and Amberg 2010) has mainly 
discussed the interactions between the client and vendor offshore teams. The team 
interaction between the vendor’s onshore and offshore teams, we found, is an area that 
requires more research to provide insights into the work practices and organizational 
cultures that impede collaboration. The lack of adequate collaboration between the 
vendor’s onshore and offshore teams was another area that is lacking in research, mainly 
because of confidentiality agreements between clients and vendors as well as language 
problems (Vlaar, van Fenema and Tiwari 2008). 
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5.4. Summary  
 
In this chapter, we attempted to identify the early warning signs (EWS) of failure related 
to the team level in offshore-outsourced software development (OOSD) projects; we also 
explored how they are perceived by project managers. The empirical data shows that 
EWSs of failure fall into three categories: team initiation, team interactions, and team 
moderators. The EWSs of failure under the category of team initiation were further 
divided into team-building efforts and shared project execution structures. The team 
interaction category includes the sub-categories of collaboration between teams and 
awareness of shared work context. Finally, the team moderators that affect the other two 
categories include onshore-offshore team coordination and team member competencies. 
Our data analysis of OOSD project failures points to the necessity of dyadic client-
vendor team-level interactions and consequent measures to avoid project failures. In 
particular, we found that the dynamics between the two vendor teams (onsite and 
offshore) played a role equal to the dynamics between client onshore and vendor 
offshore teams that get the bulk of the attention in the literature. 
 
Our research has made three main contributions to the state of research on IS failure and 
offshoring. Firstly, we have developed an exploratory model of OOSD project failure 
incorporating EWSs of failure, which helps us understand the process of OOSD project 
failure. The concept of EWSs of failure can be used in conjunction with the risk 
management framework in organizations that are involved in OOSD projects to reduce 
project failures. Secondly, we have distinguished the concept of EWSs found in the IS 
literature into early warning issues (EWI) and their easily noticeable early signals of 
failure. Early signals of failure helped us understand how project managers might be able 
to perceive the EWSs of failure that surface in early project stages. This work is among 
the first to analyze the team-level EWSs of failure extensively during the first 20 percent 
of the collaboration period between vendors and clients. Thirdly, we have identified and 
characterized the EWSs of failure in OOSD projects at the team level. The project 
context with its unique characteristics was found to provide information regarding the 
EWSs of failure (Williams et al. 2012). 
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The OOSD project failure model, together with the concept of EWSs of failure, can be 
used as a guideline by practitioners trying to understand the failure process in OOSD 
projects; this helps practitioners reduce offshore-specific risks. Schmidt et al. (2001) find 
that risks are perceived differently by project managers on different continents. The 
EWSs of failure identified through our research stem from India-centric project cases, 
which may of course limit their applicability. Nevertheless, most practitioners in OOSD 
projects could probably benefit from further addressing the EWSs in the categories of 
shared project execution structures and team collaboration. Organizational and 
professional values as well as the work practices of various organizations involved in the 
OOSD project could be taken into consideration in developing risk identification and 
management measures.  
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6. Management of  EWSs of  failure 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The offshore-specific risks of OOSD projects make them prone to failure, while at the 
same time making it difficult for project managers to perceive the existence of EWSs of 
failure. As the previous chapter pointed out, provided that the early warning signs 
resulting from the causes of failure issues can be detected in the first 20 percent of the 
project’s cooperation between vendors and clients, they can be managed effectively to 
achieve the original project objectives. The detection of EWSs allows project managers to 
take the necessary measures to put the project back on track. On the other hand, failure 
to detect the EWSs leads to project issues that require attention. In the case of failed 
projects, the serious issues that call for the cancellation of projects are called failure 
issues. The EWSs of failure allow project managers to act based on predictions, and thus 
to manage the issues in a timely manner. Further, the existence of EWSs predicts failure 
issues that could result in project failure or cancellation. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: EWSs of failure leading to failure issues 
 
The existence of EWSs of failure in OOSD projects has been confirmed by our research. 
Nevertheless, the ability to notice EWSs early in the project stages and the measures 
undertaken in OOSD projects to correct them have not been studied extensively. In 
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particular, there exists little empirical research regarding the management of perceived 
issues and the reasons behind the inability of project managers to act upon the EWSs 
(Williams et al. 2012). The reasons behind the failure to manage the perceived EWSs of 
failure are not well understood.   
 
Managing the issues early in the project allows project managers to complete the project 
according to the original estimates. In this chapter, we study how project managers 
involved in OOSD projects manage the project issues in the early project phases15. We 
reiterate the research question formulated earlier:  
How are the team-level early warning signs of failure managed by project managers in offshore-outsourced 
software development projects? Why are they not managed effectively? 
6.2. Management stages of EWSs of failure 
Our analysis of failed project cases (cf. section 3.4.2) showed that most project managers 
failed to act upon the EWSs of failure and thus were not able to save the project. Among 
the projects that were cancelled in the requirements analysis phase, in cases F and M the 
project managers noticed the inability of their organizations to engage in OOSD projects 
early enough and stopped the project. The cancellation of project case S happened due to 
the realization of the lack of business benefits to the organization in the requirements 
analysis phase. Most of the EWSs of failures were detected by project managers in our 
retrospective research; however, several factors seem to have hindered concrete actions 
based on the warnings. The EWSs were mostly noticed, and some of them were 
addressed, based on the experiences of the project managers. 
 
The qualitative data analysis has resulted in patterns (Miles and Huberman 1984), which 
showed issues passing through four distinct stages among vendors and clients once the 
EWSs were detected during the project execution. These stages include monitoring for 
EWSs, detection of EWSs, acknowledgment of issues, and addressing issues (figure 18). 
The EWSs of failure that were managed in each stage and category are listed in appendix 
B. As the previous chapter notes, the EWSs of failure were found to be a pair of early 
                                              
15 Parts of this chapter have been published earlier in (Philip, Wende and Schwabe 2013c). 
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signals and an EWI. Each early signal that went on to become or contribute to an EWI 
was found to be at one of the management stages at any given time. Each EWS, if it was 
not managed in a timely manner, developed into a failure issue (cf. section 5.3) that 
caused project cancellation. Several failure factors affected the management of EWSs in 
each stage and eventually added to the causes of failure issues.   
 
 
Figure 18: Management stages of the EWSs of failure 
 
The early signals are detected during the monitoring stage. In order to consider them 
EWSs, the early signals and issues should be detected during the early 20 percent of the 
project’s collaboration between vendors and clients. The later stages, acknowledgment 
and addressing issues, do not necessarily fall within the early 20 percent. Nevertheless, in 
order to manage the issues in a timely manner and to execute the project according to the 
original estimates, the issues need to be solved close to the early 20 percent (Kappelman, 
McKeeman and Zhang 2006). Further, early detection and resolution of issues will leave 
more room for the execution of planned as well as unplanned tasks. The timeline 
boundaries of the acknowledgment and addressing stages were found to be mostly after 
the early 20 percent of the project collaboration. Once the issue has been managed in the 
addressing stage, the project returns to the EWS monitoring stage with respect to issue 
management.  
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Each ascending issue management stage was found to be increasingly difficult to reach. 
The higher stages could be viewed as reaching a higher maturity level regarding the 
management of individual issues. Unless efforts are initiated to proceed to the higher 
stages, the issues could be considered as managed only until that stage. Several failure 
factors were found to affect the management of each EWS stage. In the following 
sections, we discuss each management stage and the failure to manage EWSs in each 
stage.  
6.2.1. Monitoring for EWSs 
 
The monitoring stage prepares project managers to search for early signals of failure 
during the project execution. Ansoff (1984, p. 355) recommends that managers be alert 
and “listen with their ears ‘close to the ground’” in order to detect early weak signals. As 
humans can only selectively perceive and process information coming through 
(Loosemore 2000) during the project execution, our cognitive bias and preparedness 
provide the direction for detecting and managing issues (Watkins and Bazerman 2003). 
Humans also possess limited capability for paying attention to the consequences of issues 
and actions, which results in our “bounded capacity to be rational” (Ocasio 1998, p. 187). 
Issues develop as the discrepancies between the existing and desired states becomes 
wider (Billings, Milburn and Schaalman 1980). Therefore, project managers need to have 
a clear conception of the project context and the expected project state during the 
execution.  
 
Keil and Montealegre (2000) suggested that negative feedback and external pressure 
could be considered warning signs. However, these signs need to be followed up in order 
to manage them. Other concrete measures to detect EWSs, suggested by Williams et al. 
(2012), include check lists, balanced scorecards, and “traffic lights.” Our data analysis of 
the failed cases shows that 27 percent16 of the early signals identified by project managers 
in retrospect were not detected during the project. Table 14 lists the failure factors that 
                                              
16 All percentage figures given in this chapter were calculated using values that are provided in 
the tables presented in appendix B. 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 143 of 196 
 
led to the inability to detect EWSs during the monitoring stage, along with their 
respective project cases. In what follows, we discuss the circumstances that led to the 
difficulties in detection.   
 
Failure factors  Project cases 
Missing risk monitoring mechanisms   E, G 
Hands-off approach  C, F, H, P, R 
Lack of intensive collaboration between clients and vendors  K 
Underestimation of offshore project context  D, N 
Optimism regarding delivery  L 
Table 14: Monitoring stage and failure factors 
 
Deficient risk monitoring mechanisms will reduce the preparedness of project managers 
to deal with the early warnings that appear in projects. The onshore vendor project 
manager of case E noted the failure reason in detecting issues during the early phases: “It 
was a bit late. If we had noticed the problem before then we had more chances to maybe 
save the project. Because in that case we might be in a position to tell to the client openly 
that yes, this is a problem. Which we did afterwards as well, but then we might have been 
in a good position to give more solutions to that client during the first 20% of the project 
collaboration.” Lack of risk monitoring reduces the chances of recognizing issues and 
thus leads to the inability to provide appropriate responses (Leidner, Pan and Pan 2009). 
Loosemore (2000) emphasizes the necessity of gathering intelligence early in the project 
in order to be able to offer swift responses in crisis management.  
 
Another failure factor was the “hands-off” approach adopted by several clients – that is, 
blindly trusting vendors to deliver the systems. Unless the client takes an active interest in 
managing the project execution from the early stages on, vendors may take advantage of 
the information asymmetry that exists between the actors. The client project manager of 
case H admitted his failure in managing the project using the following words: “Of 
course,  the vendor did fail, terribly and miserably, but I would put the blame squarely on 
our side because we failed in managing. We took a hands off approach because our 
priority was obviously at different point in time differently. So we failed to manage it and 
monitor the progress of the project and in the end we suffered it.” Project case R was 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 144 of 196 
 
also canceled as the EWSs remained unnoticed and unaddressed by the client who was in 
a “hands-off” mode. The client, who is from the airline industry, trusted the Indian 
vendor to deliver and never bothered to check the technical aspects of the project. The 
client believed the promises of the marketing and sales personnel of the vendor team and 
simply expected the final system to be delivered; in the end, the system never went live, 
as the software quality was too poor.  
 
Inadequate collaboration between the business and IT teams of clients and vendors in 
case K led to many issues that went undetected. The organizational structures in these 
teams resulted in structures in which neither side took responsibility for project 
development. This resulted in a situation in which warnings regarding team collaboration 
could not be anticipated (Watkins and Bazerman 2003) by the project managers. 
Underestimating the complexities involved in the offshore project context may put the 
project execution at risk. Project cases D and N suffered from the difficulties of 
synchronizing project knowledge with the offshore team, which became apparent only 
later in the project. Snowden and Boone (2007) differentiate context into simple (known 
knowns), complicated (known unknowns), complex (unknown unknowns) and chaotic 
(unknowables). Based on the context information from failed project cases, we found 
either complicated or complex contexts, in which “unknowns” dominated. Further, 
especially with lacking project experience, the context remains complex for project 
managers. With increasing experience in onshore-offshore projects, the context can reach 
the complicated category.  
 
Optimism regarding keeping agreed milestones by the vendor resulted in poor 
deliverables with slipping milestones in project case L. Instead of reviewing the project 
together with the client, the vendor manager further agreed to deliver according to the 
original estimates in order not to cause displeasure to the American client. After three 
slipped milestones, the American client manager decided to cancel the project. Optimism 
bias is known as a psychological barrier that affects many projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm and 
Buhl 2002). Klakegg et al. (2010) note that optimism is one of the key barriers in 
detecting EWSs during the project execution. This results from the propensity of 
optimism to inhibit the project managers’ ability to look for warning signs. Williams et al. 
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(2012, p. 49) describe the optimism tendency as the “the trust in the project’s ability to 
run faster and fix the problems, and it will be fine in the end.” Only project assessments 
can reveal how far behind the targets the current state stands. Project managers cannot 
always discern the direction in which a project is heading, especially when many factors 
are beyond their control (Keil et al. 1998).  
 
6.2.2. Detection of EWSs 
 
The EWSs of failure were noticed by project managers in the failed projects in one way 
or another, but without the accompanying realization that they could eventually lead to 
failure. In retrospect, project managers detected 73 percent of the early signals of failure 
during the project execution, while the rest remained undetected in this phase. Once the 
early signals are detected, the EWSs need to be identified by checking the early signals 
and their early warning issues in this stage. However, detection of early signals and the 
warning issue they refer to does not necessarily prompt project managers to overcome 
these issues, due to difficulties in collaboration between vendors and clients. Among the 
six EWS categories, only the team-building efforts category (see chapter 5) has more 
undetected than detected early signals during the project execution (see appendix B). The 
early warning issue of missing team-building exercises by client and vendor, especially, 
went completely unnoticed in all projects. This could point to insufficient focus on team 
building efforts during the early project phases. Failure factors that hindered further 
actions in the detection stage, along with their respective project cases, are given in table 
15. 
 
Failure factors  Project cases 
Lack of intensive collaboration between vendor onsite and offshore 
teams  
B 
Assuring normality or continuity  B, I 
Trusting the reputable vendor  C, P 
Keep future business prospects intact  Q 
Missing onshore-offshore project experience  M 
Tight schedule  J 
Table 15: Detection stage and failure factors 
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The client project manager of case B found that even though the issues were detected 
and discussed with the vendor manager, the underlying problem could not be solved by 
the client. The vendor organizations at onshore and offshore sites worked as independent 
organizations and did not collaborate effectively to solve the issues raised regarding the 
banking application. In the light of information asymmetries (Baiman 1990) in such 
organizational set-ups, a certain level of trust on the part of the client in the assurances of 
normality given by the vendor is necessary. Private information that only the vendor 
(agent) has access to leaves the client (principal) in an imperfect monitoring situation 
(Keil, Mann and Rai 2000) that cannot be solved quickly in offshore projects. Further, 
the reputation of vendors also invited client trust in cases C and P, leading clients to carry 
on with the project even after the issues were noted. Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002) 
point to optimism bias as the psychological barrier that needs to be checked in order to 
effectively manage the issues. 
 
Another failure factor in managing the detected issues further was the interest in keeping 
future business prospects intact. This situation will lead to a “mum-effect” (Keil and 
Robey 2001) among project managers, which is the reluctance to admit project problems 
openly. In case Q, both the vendor and the client lacked interest in taking up the issues 
regarding incompatible technical design. The project manager described the situation that 
resulted as follows: “From a vendor perspective when the first concerns were raised there 
was a massive - I’ll use a technical term - freak out on the customer side. And on the 
vendor side. I was on the vendor side raising concerns. Both parties immediately became 
polarized. It was in the context of a much larger additional transaction covering overall 
outsourcing engagement. So both parties wanted the noise to go away quickly for the 
sake of a much larger transaction.” Paradoxically, long-term relationships could force 
project managers to avoid any strains on the relationship. 
 
Lacking onshore-offshore project coordination experience on the part of the project 
manager forced the cancellation of project M, which happened to be one of the first 
offshore projects in the client organization. Although the manager could pick up the early 
warning issue of lack of team coordination, it could not be acted upon further as there 
was a lack of support in the organization. In project J, tight schedules given by the 
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management resulted in project cancellation even when the early warning issues were 
picked up. The vendor’s failure to see the project context and prioritize the tasks forced 
the client to look for an alternative work force that was not readily available from the 
vendor organization, contradicting initial promises. Williams (2012) finds that time 
pressure can lead to a situation where EWSs cannot be detected so they can be acted 
upon effectively. 
6.2.3. Acknowledgment of issues 
Once the early signals and early warning issues are detected, both the vendors and clients 
need to acknowledge the existence of issues and the subsequent necessity to address 
them. Mutual admission of issues expresses the willingness to resolve them (Havelka and 
Rajkumar 2006). This results in a shared understanding of warning between the partners 
(Leidner, Pan and Pan 2009). Our data analysis shows that only 33 percent of the 
detected early signals were acknowledged between the vendor and client teams, which 
shows the difficulty of reaching this stage. Table 16 lists the factors, along with their 
respective project cases, that led to the failure to further address the issues acknowledged 
between clients and vendors. 
 
Failure factors  Project cases 
Client concerns ignored A 
Inadequate onshore-offshore project experience  B 
Table 16: Acknowledgment stage and failure factors 
 
Although the client manager in case A expressed his concerns to the vendor manager, the 
latter never acknowledged them as a problem that needed to be addressed: “And the 
delivery management was always giving them rosy pictures saying that, ‘There are some 
problems, but it’s okay we’ll take control of it.’ So I think the major problem here was 
that if they took our solutions more seriously, basically the voice of the customer is quite 
important, then they would have seen the problems much earlier themselves.” Keil and 
Robey (2001) have noted the “deaf-effect” of managers regarding concerns raised about 
risks in runaway projects. The cognitive bias of the human mind leads managers to 
underestimate and ignore many issues; humans tend to see the things as they would like 
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them to be rather than acknowledging their actual state (Watkins and Bazerman 2003). 
The optimism of vendors also serves as a  psychological barrier and leads to 
underestimating the situation (Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl 2002). 
 
The client project manager of case B noted the complications regarding acknowledging 
issues among vendors as follows: “It was only possible to escalate and to bring the facts, 
and if they say, ‘Everything is under control, there is no issue’ and what you can see is 
only some, maybe clouds outside, but there is no rain. Okay, hopefully it’s true, but again, 
it was not true.” Information asymmetry around the issues (Keil, Mann and Rai 2000) 
raised puts the client manager in a difficult position, as he cannot control the situation in 
the offshore site. The experiences of the project manager working with the vendor 
organization also played a role since he was not aware of the organizational and 
professional culture in the offshore context. The mum-effect of vendors also explains the 
lack of open admission of problems both at offshore and onshore sites.  
 
There seem to exist barriers to acknowledging EWIs that are particularly difficult to 
surmount in the onshore-offshore context, as Indian managers seem to be culturally 
reluctant to admit project problems openly. Indian project managers were alleged by 
clients to be non-transparent in their communication as a result of their organizational 
culture. Mutual acknowledgment of issues and the determination to resolve them (Keil 
and Montealegre 2000; Havelka and Rajkumar 2006) sets the stage to address them in the 
next step.   
6.2.4. Addressing issues 
Agreement by the vendor or the client to solve the issue, along with taking measures to 
find solutions, forms the next stage in managing EWSs of failure. This could involve 
finding the root cause of the problems, which could take a substantial amount of time. 
Among the early signals detected in the first stage, only 18 percent were addressed in this 
stage. This shows how difficult it becomes to solve issues between vendors and clients 
during project execution. Case studies by Klakegg et al. (2010) also suggest that EWSs 
that were detected during the project could not be acted upon to make use of the project 
efforts. Once the issue is resolved by taking appropriate measures, it can be regarded as 
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successfully managed. A resolved issue can be further monitored for early signals in the 
monitoring stage, and thus the management of EWSs forms a cyclical model. Failure 
factors that hindered the addressing of issues, along with their respective project cases, 
are listed in table 17. 
 
Failure factors  Project cases 
Late intervention  A 
Inadequate onshore-offshore project experience  O 
Waterfall methodology  R 
Table 17: Addressing stage and failure factors 
 
The issues need to be prioritized based on the state of knowledge, impact, and urgency in 
order to leave adequate response time for resolution (Ansoff 1984). Late addressing of 
issues could make the efforts that go into detecting the EWSs unrewarding. This situation 
was experienced by the client project manager of case A who noted: “The delivery 
management would then say that, ‘Look these are just starting problems and we are 
just…we’ll go into a more, let’s say, stable phase. It’s just this kind of inception problems 
that we have.’ ” Although the problems regarding team member competencies were 
acknowledged by both sides, the resolution – introducing new members – came too late 
for the client to finish according to the original plans. The sales and marketing team of 
the vendor presented an optimistic picture of offshore execution without providing a 
smooth transition to the delivery team, which resulted in contract breaches. This late 
intervention by the Indian vendor might be attributable to the timeless vision of time 
held by Indians as opposed to the Western view of time as clock time. Saunders, Van 
Slyke and Vogel  (2004) note differences regarding time perception among different 
cultures, which could affect the team performance.    
 
Inadequate onshore-offshore project experience seems to have played a major role in the 
inability to solve most issues. An experienced offshore project manager in case O, who 
found himself in a situation that made it difficult for him to address the issues, noted the 
following: “Most of the people don’t notice these [issues], that’s where the failure 
happens. And fortunately in a lot of failed projects that I’ve seen, because of the past 
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experience I was able to notice these problems quite early, the lack of collaboration and 
lack of processes. Even if the project during the setup time could have looked at the best 
practices of the last project, they could learn from the material. They don’t need to 
reinvent the whole wheel. They can just take a lot of things and tailor themselves to the 
project needs. But this was missing in the project. And this was noticed quite early in the 
project, and that’s why we took some of the actions. But I would say that they could have 
done better in terms of managing or establishing those types of detailed processes 
between the team in terms of how … we should bring it.” Case studies by Klakegg et al. 
(2010) show that the experience and competencies of project managers play a role in 
detecting and addressing EWSs during the project execution. 
 
Havelka and Rajkumar (2006) propose an immediate recovery stage, which could take 
place at any point of the troubled project. By contrast, we found that addressing issues in 
a timely manner closer to the first 20 percent of the project’s cooperation period between 
the vendor and client was important if the project was to benefit from warning signs 
management. Watkins and Bazerman (2003) suggest that failure to recognize and 
prioritize risks and mobilize resources accordingly results in predictable surprises that 
could have been anticipated. The management stages of EWSs show that a clear 
understanding of the onshore-offshore project environment plays a major role in 
avoiding such predictable surprises.   
 
Another factor that hindered the early addressing of issues was the use of waterfall 
methodology, in which the deliverables can only be verified late (by the end of each 
phase). This problem was mentioned only by the project manager of case R, although all 
cases but case Q used this methodology. Many projects could not be managed using 
EWSs, as they applied waterfall methodology instead of incremental methodologies, 
which, although more costly, can result in faster verification of deliverables. The waterfall 
methodology continues to be the most popular methodology of systems development 
because of its clear delineation of the activities to be executed onshore and offshore 
(Sakthivel 2012). Information asymmetries between clients and vendors are high in the 
waterfall model compared to agile methodologies such as the iterative model and extreme 
programming, as vendors’ behavior can be ascertained by clients only after the delivery of 
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artifacts in each phase (Kataja and Tuunanen 2006). Without referring to offshore 
development, the Standish Group’s (2010) CHAOS report noted that among the projects 
it studied from 1994 to 2008, 43% using agile development methodologies had been 
successful (12% failures and 45% challenged) as opposed to 26% those using successful 
waterfall development (15% failures and 59% challenged). 
6.3. Summary  
  
In this chapter, we investigated how project managers perceive and manage the presence 
of EWSs of failure in offshore-outsourced software development (OOSD) projects. We 
developed a four-stage model for the management of EWSs of failure that can be applied 
in domestic as well as offshore outsourcing projects. The four stages are: monitoring for 
EWSs, detection of EWSs, acknowledgment of issues, and addressing the issues. We 
characterized the difficulties of managing EWSs in each management stage. The 
monitoring stage itself faces several difficulties in detecting the EWSs. Each stage of issue 
management was found to be increasingly difficult to reach during the early project stage, 
resulting in many issues not being managed in the failed project cases that we analyzed. 
In retrospect, of the identified early signals of issues in all failed projects, only 13 percent 
reached the final stage of EWS management, namely, addressing issues.  
 
The distinct project characteristics of the OOSD projects cause specific risks in the 
onshore-offshore project environment; in failed project, these risks seem to be 
underestimated. Our research points to inadequate onshore-offshore project experience 
as a major factor contributing to the failure to manage the early warning issues that were 
detected. We also found that although most issues were detected during the project 
execution, preparedness to manage them in terms of established risk management 
measures was a common factor in preventing the management of issues in a timely 
manner. As IS projects are unique and dynamic in terms of their context and execution 
(Cule et al. 2000), they also require unique measures to resolve the issues. Recent studies 
on EWSs in complex projects (Klakegg et al. 2010; Williams et al. 2012) show that EWSs 
were less useful in complex projects as the complex issues remain uncovered during the 
project execution. However, the failed project cases that we studied were also mostly 
complex, and yet some issues in them were managed with appropriate risk management 
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measure. In contrast to the failed projects analyzed for this thesis, project managers also 
talked about a successful OOSD project, in which the relevant issues that led to 
cancellation in failed projects were successfully managed.       
 
Among the six EWS categories that we analyzed, the category of project team building 
efforts stands out as the only one where less than half of the identified EWSs of failures 
were detected during the project. The early warning issue of missing team-building 
exercises by client and vendor was not detected in any of the projects. This could point 
to the difficulty of constructing a project team out of client, vendor onshore, and vendor 
offshore teams and maintaining them across organizations and countries.  
 
Our explorative data further suggests that the waterfall methodology with its late 
deliverables may not be the most suitable methodology to deploy EWS detection 
mechanism. Waterfall methodology was the predominant methodology used in all failed 
projects, except in case Q. On the other hand, whether agile methodology, with its 
quicker deliverables in several iterations, might be more applicable to detecting EWSs in 
the offshore-outsourced scenario remains to be verified. 
 
We have made two main contributions to IS failure and project management research in 
this chapter. Firstly, we have developed a cyclic four-stage management model to detect 
issues between clients and vendors and to successfully manage them. This process model 
can be applied by practitioners to detect and assess early warning issues in outsourcing 
projects. Secondly, we have characterized the failure factors in each management stage.  
We found that the project managers required more experience and understanding of the 
offshore-outsourced environment in order to detect the warning issues and address them 
together with their offshore or onshore counterparts. This research also stands among 
the few works to have analyzed OOSD project failures, and the even fewer that 
specifically address the early project stages of OOSD projects.   
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7. Conclusion 
 
7.1. Research limitations  
Our exploratory research has several limitations; however, we believe that this 
exploratory work has shed light on offshore-outsourced project failures, a relatively 
uncharted field of investigation. The India-centricity of our research is the primary 
weakness of this work, as it causes our data to be limited by the homogenous 
organizational culture on the vendor side.  Thus, the research results may not be entirely 
generalizable (Glick et al. 1990). However, we decided to anchor the data to Indian 
development projects as an exploratory endeavor. India was chosen because it is the most 
dominant IT offshoring nation (Oshri, Kotlarsky and Willcocks 2011). Further research 
could include other software development countries to improve the generalizability of the 
results. 
 
We chose project managers as the key informants, as they are the most knowledgeable 
persons involved in failed projects. That choice, of course, also limits our research: 
triangulation of failure data in projects with other project team members or the vendor or 
client counterparts could have improved the validity of our results.  However, given the 
sensitivity of failure research, getting project managers to agree to tape-recorded 
interviews was difficult enough; for a researcher who is an outsider to the project 
organizations, being able to follow up failed projects into other parts of the organization 
proved an impossible task. Another potential limitation introduced by the interviews is 
that retrospective narration of project details is prone to recollection errors. In order to 
minimize the recollection errors (Glick et al. 1990), we asked the project managers to 
focus on major events and issues involved in two major projects in their career, one failed 
and one successful, and to choose projects that could be narrated with greater ease than 
other projects. 
7.2. Research implications 
 
This research aimed to study the partially-known phenomenon of OOSD project failure 
from project managers’ perspective with the goal of providing project managers with 
predictive tools to recognize circumstances that warn of failure as well as offering a 
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theoretical account of failures. By formulating theories about how to predict failure 
situations and EWSs of failures, we offer project managers guidance regarding realizing 
the benefits that the implementation of offshore-outsourced projects originally intended 
to provide. The insights from this exploratory research offer academics as well as 
practitioners a better theoretical and managerial understanding of offshore-outsourced 
project failures. Research on failures remains rare in the IS research literature because of 
the sensitivity of the topic: few organizations are willing to openly talk about failures, 
since doing so could affect their image and thus their public relations (Sparrow 2003). 
Publicizing offshore-outsourcing failures, in particular, could lead to a backlash from the 
public in the outsourcing countries. 
 
The first research question took up the unique team-level aspects of OOSD projects that 
predict project failures and how they predict failures. While the literature has identified 
several aspects, such as communication, coordination, organizational culture, and 
collaboration mechanisms, that are necessary for the successful completion of OOSD 
projects (e.g., Cramton 2001; Hinds, Liu and Lyon 2011; Sidhu and Volberda 2011), we 
found that the extent to which team-level (non)interaction predicts failures was far from 
clear. Researchers have identified cohesiveness and the capability of members to affect 
team performance within a single organization as important (e.g., Lakhanpal 1993; Hoegl 
and Gemuenden 2001), but research on the role that lack of cohesion in OOSD teams 
played in leading to failures was missing.  At the same time, informal communication 
(Fabriek et al. 2008) as well as the cultural orientation of team members was known to 
affect team effectiveness (Karahanna, Evaristo and Srite 2005). We therefore proceeded 
to examine the relationship of cohesiveness, and team dynamics in OOSD projects. 
The inherent complexity and uncertainty of software projects from the outset makes the 
early project stages the most critical in terms of avoiding failures (Brooks 1995; Hoch et 
al. 2000). This is because early mistakes could become costly in the later stages (Flowers 
1996; Ewusi-Mensah 2003). Analyzing the unique team-level aspects that lead to project 
failures aids in the identification of the EWSs of failure and thus addresses this problem. 
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The literature provided a number of valuable insights regarding OOSD projects. Iacovou 
and Nakatsu (2008) noted that the successful management of offshore projects requires 
better than ordinary project management skills from project managers, because the risks 
involved in offshore-outsourced projects are greater and more numerous than in 
domestic outsourced projects. IS failure research attributed major failures to 
organizational context, management processes, and project team composition (e.g., Lucas 
1975; Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 1991; Flowers 1996; Yeo 2002). Further, the TIP 
theory offered an elegant theoretical framework for explaining issues in a project within a 
single organization (McGrath 1991). However, failures in OOSD projects that involve 
multiple organizations could not be explained or predicted using extant theories. The 
scanty research on IS failures in offshore projects demanded an investigation of whether 
the aspects known to affect offshore projects, which were known from a perspective 
different from that of failure research, also predict failures.  
We identified six team-level aspects that predict failures, which include offshore-specific 
and non-offshore specific aspects. Offshore-specific aspects are unique to OOSD 
projects and require special attention. They include project team-building efforts, team 
collaboration, awareness of the shared work context, and onshore-offshore team 
coordination. Non-offshore specific aspects are not unique to OOSD projects, but they 
do require more attention in offshore environment than in domestic software 
outsourcing projects. They include shared project execution structures and team member 
competencies. Several authors have discussed these aspects in the literature as affecting 
project performance in project contexts other than the offshore-outsourced context, that 
is, in domestic outsourcing or captive offshoring. However, our analysis of those aspects 
established their relevance in avoiding project failures, grounded in the empirical data we 
gathered about failures. They were also relevant to identifying the EWSs of failure in 
early project stages.  
 
Our theoretical propositions regarding team performance and project failures argue that 
the onshore and offshore teams from the vendor and client sides need to work as an 
integrated project team in order to avoid failures. Team-level analysis of project failures 
that integrates different teams is the major contribution of our theoretical analysis. 
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However, the extent to which team-level aspects affect the overall project outcome could 
not be established in this study; for that, further research is required.  Our theory of 
multiple teams at offshore and onshore sites involved in OOSD projects on both vendor 
and client sides demanded that we address inter-organizational and multi-national project 
cooperation, something that was not addressed satisfactorily in the literature. Our theory 
of multiple teams is fairly well able to predict project development failures in the OOSD 
project context. Our theory also helps project managers consider the offshore-
outsourced team-level aspects that define the project context risk while engaging in 
OOSD projects.  
 
The second research question focused on identifying the team-level EWSs of failures 
specific to OOSD projects and to explore how project managers can perceive them. 
Klakegg et al. (2010) called for industry/project specific studies to find out the nature of 
EWSs in each industry/project. This call warranted paying particular attention to the 
software industry because the visibility of EWSs is determined by their intensity, 
duration, and subtlety (Loosemore 2000); these vary in the software development 
industry compared to other industries like construction. The imperfect control in 
offshore-outsourced projects and the intangible nature of software development lead to 
relatively low visibility of EWSs, and the software industry is characterized by high 
project failures. Therefore, the identification of EWSs provides a managerial tool for 
understanding the issues that lead to failures – a tool that is particularly important in 
offshore-outsourced software projects. 
Few studies regarding EWSs in IS research (Havelka and Rajkumar 2006; Kappelman, 
McKeeman and Zhang 2006; Philip, Schwabe and Wende 2010) called for a deeper 
analysis of the EWSs to understand how project managers, who are closer to the project 
than other stakeholders, notice the EWSs in failed projects. We identified EWSs of 
failures in six team-level aspects that were responsible for project failures. Our study laid 
an exploratory foundation for an improved understanding the nature of EWSs by 
discovering a dual composition – early signals and early warning issues of failure – that 
can be used to institutionalize an early warning mechanism to act upon in software 
projects (Keil and Montealegre 2000). The deployment of an issue management 
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instrument that involves EWSs would be particularly helpful in outsourced projects, as 
these involve greater risks than in-house ones. The offshore-outsourced scenario with its 
offshore-specific risks, in particular, could benefit from the management of EWSs. 
We concentrated on issues in the first 20 percent of project’s calendar, because early 
detection is important if one is to allow enough time to take corrective measures and 
complete the project as originally planned. Information regarding the probability and 
impact of potential issues are traditionally handled by risk management measures 
(Nikander 2002). As EWSs provide advance information regarding risks, an early risk 
perception instrument could be applied in conjunction with project assessment measures, 
such as project reviews, project health checks, and benchmarking (Williams et al. 2012). 
As a concrete measure, the identified EWSs of failure from this work could be used as 
check list (Boehm 1991; Williams et al. 2012) for early risk perception.  
The EWSs of failure are primarily meant as a predictive instrument, rather than providing 
a causal explanation of failures, since the utility of a predictive instrument is better in an 
exploratory field where research is scarce. Moreover, as Williams et al. (2012) note, the 
behavioral complexities of team members mean that the causal relationships between the 
causes of failures and EWSs are less obvious. Our exploratory model of OOSD project 
failures, which incorporates EWSs of failure, provides an overview of the failure process. 
This model also focuses on the predictive power of theory rather than on providing well-
developed causal explanations of each construct (Gregor 2006). 
The third research question investigated in a exploratory manner how the team-level 
EWSs of failure are managed by project managers in OOSD projects and the reasons 
behind the failure to manage them. Williams et al. (2012) found that even when the issues 
that lead to failure are detected in the early stages, they may not always be acted upon. 
The reasons for the failure to act upon EWS, we thought, merited deeper analysis in 
order to understand the nature of EWSs in offshore projects. Some of the reasons for 
this failure posited in existing research included the uncertainty of projects from the 
outset (Hoch et al. 2000; Klakegg et al. 2010), understanding complexities, and mastering 
interpersonal effects (Klakegg et al. 2010). In this context, agency theory was also 
interesting, as it explained the difficulties involved in monitoring the actions and 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 158 of 196 
 
behaviors of actors in distant places and thus the inherent difficulty of detecting EWSs 
early enough, and suggested that clients need to put more effort into reducing 
information asymmetries. Our analysis has shown that as the warning signals of issues 
become stronger (Ansoff 1975), they will be noticeable first as early signals and then as 
EWIs, and they passed through different stages of management. 
 
We laid an exploratory foundation by developing a four-stage model for the management 
of EWSs of failure. The four stages include monitoring for EWSs, detection of EWSs, 
acknowledgement of issues, and addressing the issues; this cyclical model to manage 
issues could also be applied for domestic outsourcing projects as the client and vendor 
are the main actors in the management of the EWSs. We characterized the difficulties of 
managing EWSs in each management stage and found that only 13 percent of the 
identified early signals of failures reached the final stage of management. The EWSs in 
the category of project team building efforts, in particular, were rarely detected in failed 
projects, which points to the difficulty of establishing and maintaining teams across client 
and vendor organizations.  
 
We concentrated on EWSs that were identified during the early 20 percent of project’s 
collaboration between clients and vendors. Even though the monitoring and detection of 
EWSs were analyzed from the early 20 percent, the later management stages mostly did 
not fall within project’s early 20 percent. This could also point to the late resolution of 
issues in failed projects that led to cancellation. In order to manage issues in a timely 
manner and achieve the intended benefits, the issues need to be addressed closer to the 
early 20 percent of project’s calendar. We also found that most projects were undertaken 
using the waterfall methodology that mostly provides deliverables too late to be 
efficiently managed within project’s early 20 percent. However, the feasibility of agile 
methodology for large projects in terms of economics in offshore projects, as well as the 
success of EWSs in projects involving agile methodology, still need to be established.  
7.3. Practical implications 
Our study of project failures from the OOSD project team perspective – consisting of 
client onshore, vendor offshore, and vendor onshore teams – has several managerial 
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implications. We provide managerial tools to predict project failures in OOSD projects as 
well as predictive models regarding the perception and management of EWSs of failure. 
These tools could guide managerial actions to improve the project success in OOSD 
projects. We propose that team members from the client and vendor sides have to realize 
the need to establish an integrated project team and to work towards it in order to avoid 
failures. This would mean that each team would need to understand the national, 
organizational, and professional cultures of the other teams in different countries in order 
for the project team to develop a shared understanding and shared work practices. The 
team development between vendor onshore and vendor offshore members is especially 
overlooked in offshore projects (Vlaar, van Fenema and Tiwari 2008).  
 
Our differentiation of the EWSs of failures into early signals and early warning issues 
could better allow project managers to detect the EWSs of failure and take corrective 
measures to rectify the mistakes. This is particularly relevant for offshore-outsourced 
projects that are exposed to more risks than domestic outsourcing projects. Further, the 
exploratory model of OOSD project failure, incorporating the EWSs of failure, can be 
applied by managers to understanding the relations between the EWSs and issues that 
lead to failure. Among the six categories of EWSs developed in our research, the 
categories of shared project execution structures and team collaboration related to 
organizational practices and national values could be further adapted to the 
organizational settings and national differences to monitor for the EWSs in projects. This 
is because project risks are perceived differently by project managers on different 
continents (Schmidt et al. 2001). 
 
We found that each management stage of an EWS was increasingly difficult to reach, as 
the stages involved require interactions between vendors and clients to manage the 
EWSs.  We also concluded that the lack of adequate onshore-offshore project experience 
was a major factor in the failure to manage EWSs. Further, the waterfall methodology has 
established itself as the predominant development methodology in offshore projects 
because of its clear delineation of activities at offshore and onshore locations – yet our 
exploratory research showed that this very methodology, in which outputs are delivered 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 160 of 196 
 
by the end of each phase, is at the core of project managers’ inability to act upon EWSs 
in a timely manner.  
7.4. Future research directions  
 
The EWSs of failure were identified from a relatively small group consisting of 19 project 
managers. Our research has served the exploratory purpose of establishing the existence 
of EWSs in the offshore-outsourced context. This existence could be researched further 
by testing the identified EWSs using a broad survey among project managers involved in 
OOSD projects. Our theoretical propositions regarding OOSD projects, in turn, could 
be tested using a larger data set of failed projects. Further, the management stages of 
EWSs in the early project stages could also be tested using such a survey. An important 
aspect in that survey would be the verification of the usefulness and effectiveness of 
EWSs in the onshore-offshore project context using successful and failed projects. Our 
research has indicated that several issues could be managed using the management model 
of EWSs. The extent to which offshore-specific risks influence the effectiveness of the 
early warning mechanisms could be explored as well. 
 
We have relied on project managers from the vendor and client sides, using interviews as 
a data collection method to explore the early stages of OOSD projects. Unfortunately, we 
have had to limit ourselves to one side of the failure cases in our research, because failure 
research remains a sensitive topic and, therefore, research involving both vendors and 
clients is an extremely difficult endeavor. Should practitioners and researchers succeed in 
establishing trust and convincing clients as well as vendors of the benefits of conducting 
research covering both sides, such case study research would shed valuable light on the 
dynamics behind client, vendor offshore and vendor onshore teams. The processes 
behind project failures could be better understood through case study research, which 
would also provide triangulation opportunities that would improve the validity of 
qualitative research. In the absence of case studies, we contend that using interviews 
about failed project cases as a data collection approach is the second best option available 
for conducting failure research, which provided more breadth than depth.  
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As our focus in the present research was on offering a predictive tool regarding project 
failures, we did not analyze further casual relationships that explain team development. 
This include the relationships among the higher categories of team initiation, team 
interactions and team moderators, and their sub-categories. A theory of explanation 
(Gregor 2006) could be developed further by expanding the above categories, provided 
both the vendor and client agreed to be part of a research. The OOSD project failure 
model could be further extended by providing well-developed causal explanations 
between the constructs. Additional interviews or case studies could help establish the 
causal relationships among  categories. Analysis of inter-organizational and professional 
work practices as well as the cultural negotiations that take place between the teams 
involved could be fruitful future directions to take to advance causal theoretical models. 
To better understand team development, an interesting approach would be to examine it 
further in terms of the in- and out-group phenomenon (Sidhu and Volberda 2011), which 
investigates how group members do or do not become part of the group. 
 
Even though we focused our research on failed projects, we also asked project managers 
to narrate about one successful project to contrast the distinctions between the failed and 
successful projects. However, we focused more on failed projects in interviews as a result 
of our objective to develop predictive theories regarding OOSD project failures. An 
equal depth of focus on successful projects would ensure that underlying causal 
relationships among various constructs can be established. 
Our research has mostly concentrated on hard issues in order to elicit EWSs of failure 
that can be measured during the project. EWSs could also appear as soft issues that are 
identified using gut feelings. Assessment of soft issues requires in-depth experience and a 
thorough understanding of the project environment (Williams et al. 2012).  Although we 
evaluated the experiences of project managers in terms of IT, project management, and 
offshore project management experiences, we could not establish a direct link between 
their experiences and their ability to notice soft issues in OOSD projects. Research into 
soft issues requires a deeper analysis of interpersonal effects across organizational and 
national boundaries. The extent to which such capabilities affect project managers’ ability 
and maturity to execute OOSD project will be of interest to practitioners. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – TIP theory propositions  
 
Proposition 1: Groups are assumed to be complex, intact social systems that engage in 
multiple, interdependent functions, on multiple, concurrent projects, while partially 
nested within, and loosely coupled to, surrounding systems. 
 
Proposition 2: All group action involves one or another of four modes of group activity: 
Mode I: inception and acceptance of a project (goal choice) 
Mode II: solution of technical issues (means choice) 
Mode III: resolution of conflict, that is, of political issues (policy choice), and  
Mode IV: execution of the performance requirements of the project (goal attainment). 
 
Proposition 3:  The four modes of activity are not a fixed sequence of phases but, 
rather, are a set of alternative kinds of activity in which the group and its members may 
engage.  
 
Proposition 4: Behavior in work group shows many forms of complex temporal 
patterning, including 
1. temporal aspects of the flow of work in groups, which  raise issues of scheduling, 
synchronization, and time allocation (see proposition 5) 
2. problems of efficiently matching periods of time with bundles of activities (see 
proposition 6), and  
3. entrainment processes leading to patterns of synchronization, both of group 
members’ behavior with one another, and of group behavior with “external” 
events (see proposition 7). 
 
Proposition 5: All collective action entails (at least) three generic temporal problems that 
both organizations and individuals must reckon with. The three generic temporal 
problems are 
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1. temporal ambiguity (when particular events will occur and recur and how long 
they will last) 
2. conflicting temporal interests and requirements, and  
3. scarcity of temporal resources. 
 
Proposition 6: A temporally efficient flow of work in groups requires complex matching 
of bundles of activities to particular periods of time. 
 
Proposition 7: One major form of temporal patterning is social entrainment. 
 
Proposition 8: In TIP theory, group interaction process refers to the flow of work in groups 
at a micro level.  
 
Proposition 9: In TIP theory, it is assumed that at any point in interaction, a group has a 
current purpose or objective that can be regarded as its focal task. 
 
Proposition 10: Each act can be regarded as either germane to the group’s current “focal 
task” or not germane to it. 
 
Proposition 11: Acts have situated, rather than generic, meanings in relation to the 
modes, functions, and paths of group activity.  
 
Proposition 12: Various aspects of the flow of work in groups are reflected in different 
forms of aggregations of acts.  
 
  
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 185 of 196 
 
Appendix B – EWSs of failures and their management stages in failed cases 
 
Project team building efforts 
 
Early warning 
issues  
Early signals Detected Acknowledged Addressed 
Absence of trust 
between vendor 
and client teams 
[A, B, N, O] 
Vendor offshore 
team’s efforts not 
appreciated by 
client team [O] 
 Yes No No 
Lack of 
opportunities for 
informal 
interactions [N] 
No No No 
Lack of 
opportunities for 
informal 
interactions [O] 
Yes No No 
Expectation gaps 
in technical 
deliverables [A] 
Yes Yes Yes 
Expectation gaps 
in technical 
deliverables [B] 
Yes Yes No 
Lack of team-
building 
exercises by 
client and 
vendor [D, K, 
N, P] 
Managers ignore 
team-building 
efforts [K] 
No No No 
Managers ignore 
team-building 
efforts [P] 
No No No 
Lack of project No No No 
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team kickoff 
meetings [D] 
Lack of procedures 
to integrate new 
team members [N] 
No No No 
 
Shared project execution structures  
 
Early warning 
issues  
Early signals Detected Acknowledged Addressed 
Lack of a 
common 
understanding 
about 
deliverables [A, 
J, L, P] 
 
Expectation gaps in 
deliverables [A] 
Yes Yes No 
Expectation gaps in 
deliverables [J] 
Yes No No 
Expectation gaps in 
deliverables [P] 
Yes No No 
Lack of explicitly 
agreed project 
outputs [L] 
No No No 
Vendor offshore 
team fails to 
honor deadlines 
[A, I, J, L] 
Deadlines not met 
by vendor offshore 
team [I] 
Yes No No 
Deadlines not met 
by vendor offshore 
team [J] 
Yes No No 
Deadlines not met 
by vendor offshore 
team [L] 
Yes No No 
Escalations not 
addressed promptly 
[A] 
Yes Yes No 
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Lack of shared 
concepts for 
project 
execution [D, G, 
K, O] 
Vendor and client 
teams have 
different 
methodologies, 
documentation, and 
change 
management 
processes [D] 
No No No 
Vendor and client 
teams have 
different 
methodologies, 
documentation, and 
change 
management 
processes [O] 
Yes Yes Yes 
Lack of identical 
software and 
hardware versions 
at client and 
offshore sites [G] 
Yes No No 
Lack of identical 
software and 
hardware versions 
at client and 
offshore sites [K] 
Yes No No 
Business 
requirements 
not understood 
properly by 
vendor team 
Expectation gaps in 
technical 
deliverables [A] 
Yes Yes No 
Expectation gaps in 
technical 
Yes No No 
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members [A, K, 
L, N, P] 
deliverables [N] 
Ambiguous 
requirements with 
room for 
misinterpretations 
[K] 
No No No 
Ambiguous 
requirements with 
room for 
misinterpretations 
[L] 
No No No 
Ambiguous 
requirements with 
room for 
misinterpretations 
[N] 
Yes No No 
Requirement 
assumptions by 
vendors are not 
verified [P] 
Yes No No 
 
Collaboration between teams 
 
Early warning 
issues  
Early signals Detected Acknowledged Addressed 
Lack of 
collaboration 
between vendor 
teams [B, N, O] 
Lack of regular 
meetings [B] 
Yes No No 
Lack of regular 
meetings [N] 
No No No 
Lack of regular 
meetings [O] 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Missing interaction 
between vendor 
offshore and onsite 
teams [B] 
Yes No No 
Missing interaction 
between vendor 
offshore and onsite 
teams [O] 
Yes Yes Yes 
Vendor offshore 
and onsite teams 
are part of 
independent 
organizations and 
both are not 
integrated into the 
project [B] 
Yes No No 
Lack of agreed 
communication 
structures 
between vendor 
and client teams 
[C, N, O] 
Communication 
paths are not clear 
for team members 
[C] 
No No No 
Communication 
paths are not clear 
for team members 
[N] 
No No No 
Lack of 
interactions 
between client and 
vendor teams [N] 
No No No 
Lack of 
interactions 
between client and 
Yes Yes No 
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vendor teams [O] 
Client team 
mistrusts vendor 
offshore team 
members [O] 
Client team 
member changes 
use cases without 
informing vendor 
offshore team [O] 
Yes No No 
Lack of interaction 
between client and 
vendor offshore 
teams [O] 
Yes Yes Yes 
Vendor offshore 
team not respected 
or appreciated by 
client team [O] 
Yes No No 
 
Awareness of shared work context 
 
Early warning 
issues  
Early signals Detected Acknowledged Addressed 
Escalations not 
taken seriously 
by vendor [A, B] 
Assurance of 
normality by 
vendor when issues 
are raised [B] 
Yes No No 
Repeated 
expectation gaps in 
deliverables [A] 
Yes Yes No 
Vendor onsite 
team lacks 
motivation to 
work with 
offshore team 
Missing interaction 
between vendor 
offshore and onsite 
teams [O] 
Yes Yes Yes 
Vendor onsite Yes Yes Yes 
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[O] team does not 
provide the 
requested 
information [O] 
Lack of 
openness to 
discuss 
problems by 
vendor offshore 
team [A, I] 
Delays of 
deliverables not 
communicated in 
advance [A] 
Yes Yes Yes  
Non-admission of 
technical problems 
or mistakes [I] 
Yes No No 
Insufficient 
cultural 
intelligence 
among vendor 
and client teams  
[I, L, R] 
Vendor offshore 
team members do 
not challenge 
requirements [I] 
Yes No No 
Vendor offshore 
team members do 
not challenge 
requirements [L] 
No No No 
Vendor offshore 
team members do 
not talk openly in 
meetings in the 
presence of 
superior [C] 
Yes No No 
Vendor offshore 
team members do 
not talk openly in 
meetings in the 
presence of 
superior [R] 
No No No 
Early Warning Signs of Failures in Offshore-Outsourced Software Projects 
Page 192 of 196 
 
Team member competencies 
 
Early warning 
issues  
Early signals Detected Acknowledged Addressed 
Vendor offshore 
team lacks 
domain-specific 
knowledge [B, K, 
Q] 
Knowledge 
feedback 
mechanism shows 
lack of adequate 
business 
knowledge [Q] 
Yes No No 
Lack of SME in 
the vendor 
offshore team [N] 
No No No 
Lack of SME in 
the vendor 
offshore team [Q] 
Yes No No 
Key vendor 
offshore team 
members leave the 
project [B] 
Yes No No 
Key vendor 
offshore team 
members leave the 
project [K] 
Yes No No 
Project team 
cannot elicit 
business 
specifications 
thoroughly [E, I, 
Q] 
Lack of SME in 
the vendor onsite 
or offshore team 
involved in 
requirement 
analysis [E] 
No No No 
Lack of SME in Yes No No 
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the vendor onsite 
or offshore team 
involved in 
requirement 
analysis [Q] 
Lack of team 
members with 
organization-
specific knowledge 
involved in 
requirement 
analysis [I] 
No No No 
Vendor offshore 
team members 
lack 
communication 
competency [A, 
B] 
  
Offshore team 
members are non-
communicative or 
silent [A] 
Yes Yes Yes  
Offshore team 
members are non-
communicative or 
silent [B] 
Yes Yes No 
Vendor team 
members lack 
required 
technical skills 
[A, B, C, K, H, 
Q] 
 
Low quality of 
technical 
deliverables [A] 
Yes Yes No 
Low quality of 
technical 
deliverables [C] 
Yes No No 
Low quality of 
technical 
deliverables [Q] 
Yes No No 
Expectation gaps 
in technical 
Yes Yes No 
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deliverables [A] 
Expectation gaps 
in technical 
deliverables [K] 
Yes No No 
Expectation gaps 
in technical 
deliverables [H] 
Yes No No 
Key vendor 
offshore team 
members leave the 
project [B] 
Yes No No 
 
Onshore-offshore team coordination  
 
Early warning 
issues  
Early signals Detected Acknowledged Addressed 
Lack of 
onshore-
offshore team 
coordination 
know-how by 
client and 
vendor [B, E, F, 
M, N, O, P] 
Neither vendor 
nor client project 
managers have 
experience in 
distributed or 
virtual projects [M] 
Yes No No 
Nether vendor nor 
client project 
managers have 
experience in 
distributed or 
virtual projects [O] 
Yes Yes Yes 
Neither vendor 
nor client project 
Yes No No 
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managers have 
experience in 
distributed or 
virtual projects [P] 
Lack of a shared 
project plan [F] 
No No No 
Lack of an 
integrated 
organization chart 
with defined 
contact persons [F] 
No No No 
Vendor offshore 
managers manage 
large teams [B] 
Yes No No 
Vendor offshore 
managers manage 
large teams [N] 
Yes No No 
Vendor onsite 
team fails to 
transfer 
knowledge to 
offshore team 
properly [H, N] 
Knowledge 
feedback 
mechanism shows 
lack of 
understanding by 
vendor offshore 
team [H] 
Yes No No 
Knowledge 
feedback 
mechanism shows 
lack of 
understanding by 
vendor offshore 
team [N] 
No No No 
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Vendor onsite 
team simply 
expects the 
offshore team to 
provide 
deliverables 
based on 
specifications 
[N, O, P, Q] 
Lack of regular 
meetings [N] 
Yes No No 
Lack of knowledge 
feedback 
mechanisms [P] 
Yes No No 
Lack of knowledge 
feedback 
mechanisms [Q] 
Yes No No 
Complex 
knowledge areas 
not identified [O] 
Yes Yes Yes 
Questions from 
vendor offshore 
team are blocked 
by vendor onsite 
team [N] 
No No No 
Questions from 
vendor offshore 
team are blocked 
by vendor onsite 
team [P] 
Yes No No 
 
 
